Why Jammu & Kashmir is more vulnerable than ever – Firstpost

Let me recall moments from mid-1999, when I served as Colonel of the Rashtriya Rifles, an experience that profoundly shaped my understanding of Kashmir’s counter-insurgency dynamics. While Operation Vijay was being fought on the heights of Kargil, the valley floor was also under siege — albeit of a different kind. The ISI, innovating once again, had infiltrated special suicide squads of highly trained and motivated terrorists, many led by Pakistani regulars.

Beginning July 1999, they launched sneak attacks on army and police camps that were then poorly secured by non-existent or minimal perimeters. It forced us into reactive postures. A large number of troops had to be diverted to static guard duties — defending installations, logistics hubs, and communication centres — all of which were vital not just for counter-insurgency (CI) operations but also for any future war. This diluted the effectiveness of our offensive posture; fewer troops were available for area domination, raids, and ambushes.

Cut to 2025. While India analyses the success of Operation Sindoor through the lens of conventional escalation — targeting key assets in Pakistani Punjab and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir — one cannot ignore that the ISI and its ecosystem will also be conducting their own war games. Their objective would be to re-establish relevance in the Kashmir theatre and reclaim psychological initiative.

Remember the Pahalgam attack of April 22, 2025, a brutal assault on tourists; it was not an isolated act. It was, in many ways, a copycat replication of Hamas’ strike of October 7, 2023, on Israel — a sudden and high-visibility operation meant to create shockwaves and provoke.

If we view Pahalgam in that light, it becomes clear that a new asymmetric campaign would be under contemplation — one that could integrate novel tactics and technologies for infiltration, recruitment of youth and management of hideouts. Also remember that the communication systems being used by terrorists are of the advanced Chinese versions, which are difficult to intercept. Enter drones, the bane of today’s warfare.

Operation Spider Web: The New Template

One of the most significant evolutions in modern warfare has been unfolding before our eyes in Ukraine. On June 1, 2025, Ukraine launched what is being referred to as Operation Spider Web — a sophisticated, long-range drone and sabotage operation deep inside Russian territory. The operation had reportedly been in planning for nearly 18 months. Small, innocuous-looking trucks — some pre-positioned and others inserted covertly — carried armed drones hundreds of kilometres into Russian territory.

These were launched against airfields, command and control nodes, early warning systems, and other critical infrastructure. The results were spectacular; not just in terms of physical damage but also psychological disorientation. For a country like Ukraine with limited air power, this operation represented a stunning workaround, achieving strategic effects without traditional air superiority.

The second Israel–Iran conflict of 2025 has added yet another layer of validation to this emerging pattern. For the second time in a single month, drones have not just crossed borders but have been launched from within adversary territory — in one case, reportedly from civilian rooftops in central Iranian towns.

Israel’s imaginative use of small, autonomous drone swarms, leveraging both prepositioned assets and internal collaborators, illustrates the new grammar of warfare. It is a compelling real-world demonstration of how state-level actors are operationalising asymmetric drone strategies to create strategic surprise and psychological shock.

If this is what state-on-state drone warfare looks like today, one can easily see how proxies or hybrid non-state actors in South Asia, particularly those from Pakistan, could mimic such tactics at a smaller scale with equally disproportionate impact. Just transpose this template to a sub-conventional, asymmetric theatre like J&K combined with Punjab. The implications are chilling — and very real.

Drone Wars in the Kashmir–Punjab Belt

Even though the number of terrorists operating inside the Kashmir Valley has dwindled, the threat is far from over. The conflict has been seeping southwards — into Rajouri, Reasi, Kathua, and even parts of Punjab. This southward spread coincides with the steady increase in drone sightings and recoveries along the Punjab border — originally attributed to narcotics smuggling, arms drops, and infiltration aids. If these drone operations are recalibrated for pure terror purposes, can one imagine the impact? It could also ensure the activation of all three target zones with lessened risk and yet a high scope for denial for the terror perpetrators.

Unlike 1999, today’s terrorists can do far more damage with fewer men. The cost-benefit ratio of drone warfare is heavily tilted in favour of the attacker. Even low-cost recreational drones, assembled from commercial kits, can strike convoys, helipads, or civilian targets and create an impact in the information domain.

GPS-guided kamikaze drones of the loitering variety can be launched from rooftops, fields, or moving vehicles. Encrypted communication apps, AI-assisted navigation, and satellite imagery make planning both detailed and deniable. The same open-source tools used by civilian OSINT communities — such as Google Earth and others — can be used for target acquisition, route mapping, and surveillance.

A series of micro-drone attacks in a short span of time — on convoys on the Jammu–Srinagar highway, fuel dumps in rear logistics areas, or crowded civilian spaces — could paralyse response grids, spark panic, and create disproportionate psychological effects.

That is exactly what terrorists sought in 1999 and managed to achieve for some time. This time the numbers could be higher as also the impact before the security forces find answers to neutralise them.

A ‘New’ Old War

What makes this emerging threat even more serious is that it blurs the line between war and peace. A drone strike from within Indian territory — launched from a hut, an orchard, or a cattle shed — does not carry the signature of cross-border infiltration.

Attribution becomes tricky. This strategy suits the adversary perfectly; it revives terrorism without increasing physical infiltration. It creates “ghost threats” — attacks without visible footprints. And it pulls in security forces into high-alert static duties, just like 1999 — thereby reducing proactive engagement options.

In a sense, this becomes a hybrid warfare layer built on top of a disaggregated insurgency — a low-cost, high-impact model aimed at strategic paralysis and political destabilisation. Since the line between targeting civilians and security personnel has blurred with the Pahalgam attack, tourist spots would be constantly under threat, robbing both sides of the Pir Panjal of the tourist footprint. Even the Amarnath Yatra could come under threat.

Lessons from 1999, Warnings from 2025

If the post-Kargil 1999 asymmetric surge forced India to rethink perimeter security, troop deployment patterns, and intelligence integration, the post-Pahalgam, post-Spider Web world of 2025 demands even more. This is a battlefield of algorithms and altitudes, where satellites meet sabotage and where drones replace the fidayeen.

The war in Ukraine has shown what’s possible — and the threat landscape in Kashmir and Punjab is evolving to reflect that. It is time we anticipate what comes next — because the adversary could already be contemplating the next moves. It’s not as if there aren’t counters to this threat, but that will need a full essay to cover, perhaps in the near future.

The writer is a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.