How India can play a big role – Firstpost

A shaky ceasefire may now exist after 12 days of Israeli airstrikes on Iran, Iranian missile barrages against Israel, and the U.S. use of bunker buster bombs against Iran’s top nuclear sites, but President Donald Trump’s core demand remains: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei surrender unconditionally and forfeit Iran’s nuclear programme.

Trump may be bombastic, but there is precedent, even despite Khamenei’s rejection of Trump’s demand. In 1980, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran. Within about two years, the Islamic Republic had rallied and rebounded and driven Iraqi forces out of most Iranian territory, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps lobbied then-Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini for more expansive war aims: Ousting Saddam and perhaps even “liberating” Jerusalem from the Jews.

The war continued for another six years killing an additional half million people. Finally, in July 1988, Khomeini realised he could take no more. He got on the radio and addressed the Iranian people. “It is like drinking from a chalice of poison,” he said, “but I have no choice but to sip from this cup if I want the Islamic Republic to survive.” Given a choice between a core policy and regime existence, the Islamic Republic’s leadership chooses survival.

There is also precedent for unpalatable regimes giving up nuclear weapons’ programmes. In 1991, Apartheid South Africa acknowledged it had a nuclear weapons programme and agreed to dismantle it. Even with a cooperative government in Pretoria, especially under Nelson Mandela, it still took 19 years for the International Atomic Energy Agency to certify South Africa’s programme disbanded.

If Khamenei surrenders Iran’s nuclear programme, it will become essential to extricate it from the country. This includes not only the Islamic Republic’s enriched uranium, the location of much of which remains unclear even after the U.S. attack on Fordow, but also every facility beyond the civilian reactor at Bushehr. Again, there is precedent: When Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi agreed to abandon his own weapons of mass destruction programme, the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 rushed in to dismantle and transport out of the country the industrial structures piece by piece lest Qadhafi change his mind.

The question then becomes in a similar situation, who might take custody of Iran’s nuclear programme. There is little trust for the International Atomic Energy Agency. Not only has its past Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei become outspoken in his criticism of Israel, but Jerusalem and Washington both would worry that other powers like Russia and China might leverage their influence with the Agency to impede its work and/or the organisation would cover up its own failures.

Trump might envision a role for Pakistan; after all, he increasingly and uncritically embraces Army Chief of Staff Asim Munir and believes he can deal with the de facto Pakistani leader, never mind his direct involvement in terror. India should not abide by this. Pakistan’s own nuclear programme is bad enough; to infuse it with additional highly enriched uranium would be irresponsible. Even if Pakistan agreed to quarantine Iran’s nuclear material, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency cannot be trusted. There would always be a high likelihood that Munir or the ISI would allow nuclear material to fall into Pakistan-terror hands.

India is perhaps the only country trusted by the United States, Israel, and Iran. While Munir can whisper sweet nothings into Trump’s ear and Pakistan can nominate the famously venal and insecure Trump with a Nobel Peace Prize nomination, India can offer real substance. If Indian nuclear scientists take possession of Iranian material and carry it overland to Chabahar, India can then transport the dismantled Iranian programme and enriched uranium to India where India can make it available to U.S., Israeli, and International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors.

Critics are correct that Iran’s future is uncertain, especially if the regime collapses. Many Iranians seek democracy, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has the weaponry and resources to frustrate their desire. The question then becomes whether power-hungry but non-ideological officers would take charge or those indoctrinated and embracing the core beliefs of the clerical regime. If the latter, the risk of Iran retaining nuclear material is too great to bear.

India must step forward as only it can.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.