A gamble India would rather avoid – Firstpost

Over the last three decades, particularly during the Modi government, Israel has become one of India’s most important strategic partners. This partnership encompasses a wide spectrum of diplomatic, counterterrorism, intelligence, defence, technological, agricultural, business, and cultural ties, as well as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strong personal friendship with Benjamin Netanyahu. India’s traditional stance of supporting Palestine in multilateral organisations has diluted significantly—New Delhi mostly abstains from voting against Tel Aviv in multilateral forums. Also, Hamas’s
growing ties with Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups and
Indian Islamist groups alarm Indian intelligence.

However, at the same time, India values its long civilisational ties with Iran. In the present context, energy security, strategic connectivity, and security constitute the bedrock of India’s Iran policy. Iran is India’s
second-largest oil supplier. India, with its aspirations to be a global economic powerhouse, places a high premium on energy security. Besides, its burgeoning population, if starved of oil supplies due to pressure on the Straits of Hormuz, can create massive political instability, chaos, and unrest.

Secondly, Iran provides India with the quintessential strategic connectivity to Afghanistan, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe. The Chabahar project on the Gulf of Oman, an India-Iran joint venture, provides India a gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. Wars and volatility in West Asia, dampening the prospects of the India-Middle-East Corridor (IMEC), and Western sanctions against Russia, blocking the entry of Indian goods into Europe through Russia, have also made the dormant International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) relevant and critical to India’s geostrategic and geoeconomic interests. Iran forms a crucial link in the INSTC. Reportedly, India wants to link it to the Chabahar port project.

Finally, the Khamenei regime’s religious hold over the Shia Muslim population,
constituting nearly 15 per cent of India’s total Muslims, also makes the Indian government jittery about taking clear sides in this war. Reportedly, the Shia Muslims have a better disposition towards Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

President Donald Trump’s
lunch meeting with Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir has raised eyebrows in Delhi. Though Pakistan has officially condemned Israel, India’s intelligence czars feel that Pakistan is likely to provide intelligence, air bases, refuelling facilities, and logistics support to the US whenever needed. The scenario looks more like a redux of America’s Afghan war of 2001. Such a scenario, strengthening Pakistan’s influence in South, West, and Central Asia, will not go down well with India. Pakistan, emboldened by American support and its enhanced geopolitical status, will be more audacious in orchestrating terrorist attacks in India.

Lately, India’s ties with Iran have also deteriorated due to the growing hardline approach of the Iranian regime. If the ongoing war leads to the ouster of the Khamenei regime, a major roadblock in India-Israel ties will cease to exist. However, Delhi will likely be uncomfortable with chaos and instability following the regime change, and if Pakistan emerges as an influential player in that scenario, it will be nightmarish. However, Pakistan’s deeper entanglement in the Iran imbroglio can further India’s objectives of weakening Pakistan. Massive internal schisms can result due to a fraught Shia-Sunni relationship within Pakistan, and it can accentuate internal protests and existing fissiparous forces, as Pakistan’s overly radicalised and religious society will perceive backing American causes as Islam’s betrayal.

Nevertheless, Israel supported India’s Operation Sindoor against Pakistan. Given that, India’s strategic ambiguity in the ongoing Israel-Iran war puzzles. India has
urged Israel and Iran to ‘de-escalate’ and ‘resolve underlying issues’; however, on a positive note, India has not
endorsed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s condemnation of Israel. Once again, New Delhi faces a dilemma akin to that it faced in the Russia-Ukraine situation; however, its strategic ambiguity, or so-called strategic autonomy, emanates from myriad compulsions and limitations.

For now, a flimsy ceasefire has taken place; however, if the conflict erupts again in the future, India will be hard-pressed to take sides. Also, in the long run, if this conflict escalates, engulfing other major West Asian stakeholders, resulting in instability and the ultimate defeat of states and forces promoting Islamist causes, it will deal a shattering blow to India’s Islamist organisations and radicalists’ morale. It will indeed be a great windfall for India, as its biggest internal security challenge comes from radical Islamism.

The author is a Cornell University graduate in public affairs, bachelors from St Stephen’s College, Delhi and has done his PhD on Jaish-e-Mohammad. He is a policy analyst specialising in counterterrorism, Indian foreign policy and Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.