A fractured G7 and India’s strategic turn – Firstpost

“In an uncertain world, partnership is our strength and cooperation our compass.” Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s words at the 2025 G7 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, did not merely reflect India’s aspirations; they underlined the strategic paradox at the heart of the gathering—a summit that showcased a world short on coordination, conviction, and coherence. It seemed to reflect that those powers that matter are transfixed by the geopolitical gyrations—especially of the last six months—into relative inaction.

What should have been a moment of democratic resolve against converging crises—war, climate, poverty, debt, terror, and technological disruption—instead revealed a G7 priding itself on being the directorate of the world and flag-bearer of the Western liberal order, grappling with internal dissonance and shrinking geopolitical heft and strategic will for development cooperation with the Global South.

The absence of a joint communiqué—the first since 2018—was no procedural glitch but a symptom of deeper dysfunction. The contrast with 2024 was stark. That year’s summit in Italy had produced real global public good outcomes: a $70 billion World Bank financing commitment, forward momentum on IMF quota reform, and concrete pledges on climate finance and debt relief. In Kananaskis, however, the grand table remained undecorated by such policy fruit. Despite the physical presence of the heads of the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN, there was no progress on Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)-related support, debt relief for developing countries’ unsustainable $29 trillion public debt, climate finance, and technology.

The only watered-down reference to global solidarity on these issues was a discussion the G7 had on the importance of building coalitions of partners—including the private sector, development finance institutions, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)—to drive inclusive economic growth and sustainable development. There was no reference to the SDGs themselves or to developing countries, no fresh financial pledges for energy transition, no reaffirmation of the $100 billion climate finance goal, no follow-up on the Bridgetown Initiative on debt relief, and no joint plan on green tech partnerships with the Global South.

The silence reflected the uncomfortable reality of the US—having withdrawn from the Paris Climate Treaty, cut aid, and even resisted sustainable development language in UN forums. With Europe distracted by inflation and war-related instability, the tariff battles and ‘bilateral deals’ eroding the WTO-led multilateral trading system, and Japan caught in alliance dilemmas, the G7’s normative project on the Western liberal order—on climate, equity, and solidarity with the Global South—is visibly fraying.

Meanwhile, the ongoing UN Financing for Development Summit in Seville—also referenced in the G7 Summit—spotlighted a US-led funding and aid retreat by the West, including the stunning cutoff of US contributions to the UN budget—a consequential 25 per cent share. The widening SDGs financing gap of $4 trillion per year threatens the entire sustainable development project for humanity.

In sidelining these issues, the G7 not only ignored a majority of the world’s population—it neglected the very engines of future growth and resilience. When those most vulnerable to climate shocks, food crises, and debt spirals are excluded, talk of global leadership rings hollow. Multilateralism, once the G7’s shared project, is losing its breath.

It wasn’t just the chequebook that was missing—it was vision. The G7, once seen as the self-styled conductor and animator of the multilateral system anchored in the UN, IMF, World Bank, and WTO, increasingly resembles an orchestra rehearsing without a score: the institutions remain, the instruments are not tuned, and harmony is absent. This does not bode well for the G20—a counterpart that includes the 10 strongest developing economies—especially after the high of India’s historic presidency.

Divergences appeared on Russia. In 2024, the G7 had presented a unified front—reinforcing sanctions, vowing long-term support to Ukraine to fight on “as long as it takes,” and positioning Russia as the primary threat to peace and security in Europe and a disruptor of international order. This year, however, US President Donald Trump’s assertion that Russia’s expulsion in 2014 had been a “mistake” signalled a change of tack.

The Chair’s Summary supported Trump’s efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in Ukraine, noted Ukraine’s willingness for a ceasefire, and called on Russia to do the same—possibly reflecting a pragmatic softening of position among European powers towards ending the war. The only concession was that sanctions against Russia should be used to bring it to the negotiating table.

But the US narrative, now coloured by President Trump’s America First predilections and a focus on transactional diplomacy, underscored the deepening trust deficit in the Western alliance, as the subsequent NATO summit also indicated. President Trump’s abrupt and premature departure from the summit—to address the Iran–Israel escalation without consulting allies—was a symptom.

In all of this, China—the authoritarian challenger to the G7 and its Western liberal order—emerged as the antipodal geopolitical and economic gainer. In contrast to the 2024 G7 Communiqué, which contained 28 direct and indirect ‘frenemical’ references to China—accusing it of economic coercion, cyber aggression, support to Russia’s war machine, and human rights violations in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, including explicit legal invocations of the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific—the 2025 summit retreated into euphemism and strategic ambiguity.

Combatting China’s weaponisation of economic interdependence, its export controls, forced tech transfers, and cyber-enabled interference was now couched as a clarion call for Western collective capacity-building defensive frameworks—signalling concern without escalation. Also, the seeming retreat from global development cooperation and multilateralism seemed to vacate the space for China to occupy.

In 2025, the Chair’s Summary reaffirmed commitment to a “free, open, prosperous, and secure Indo-Pacific” and explicitly named China for destabilising actions in the East and South China Seas and stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.

Yet, without a full communiqué, the framing was more symbolic than strategic, reflecting continuity in posture but caution in pressure.

The competition-cum-threat perception about China was specifically evident in three of the six most action-oriented, G7 leaders’ joint statements—on the Critical Minerals Action Plan, Transnational Repression, and the Kananaskis Common Vision for the Future of Quantum Technologies. The first signalled G7 action beyond rhetoric, in response to China’s near-monopoly on rare earth elements and its recent export curbs causing price spikes and global supply chain disruptions. India formally endorsed the Action Plan, along with Australia and South Korea, positioning itself not merely as a stakeholder but as a co-author of the emerging mineral security order, opening avenues for standard-setting, technology sharing, and investment partnerships.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) for Prosperity joint statement reaffirmed the G7’s commitment to human-centric, secure, and trustworthy AI, introducing initiatives like the G7 GovAI Grand Challenge, the GAIN network, and a comprehensive AI Adoption Roadmap—including measures to accelerate AI adoption in the public sector and among SMEs. However, the omission of any framework for frontier AI regulation or safety standards was conspicuous—especially given the G7’s own Hiroshima AI Process. The pivot appears to be from shared global governance—which the AI Action Summit in Paris in February 2025 had set out in a Declaration on inclusive and sustainable AI—to a laissez-faire approach favoured by the US and UK. India, with its robust AI programs and ambitious plans, will no doubt continue to engage with these initiatives.

On quantum technologies, the G7 called for a “trusted ecosystem” for open and secure innovation—a framing that subtly reflects awareness of China’s accelerating capabilities in the field. While not explicitly exclusionary, the repeated emphasis on collaboration among like-minded partners and protection of sensitive technologies signalled a preference for tighter convergence within existing alliances—which India could join.

The 2025 G7 Leaders’ Statement on Transnational Repression marks a significant shift—outlining concrete tactics like spyware-enabled surveillance, forced returns, and diaspora intimidation, and signalling a coordinated pushback against authoritarian overreach. It builds on the 2024 framing, where the G7 had grouped transnational repression under Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)—alongside “malicious cyber activities”—with “indirect but unmistakable references to China, including mentions of economic coercion and support to Russia’s war effort”. This year, however, no country is named. The language is more operational but also more cautious—retreating from last year’s sharper references. Still, the behaviours described remain clearly recognisable, and the targets evident.

The G7 Leaders’ Statement on Countering Migrant Smuggling, vowing to “dismantle transnational organised crime networks,” reflected growing hardline anti-immigration policies aggressively espoused by the US and now echoed in parts of Europe. These will have implications for Indians emigrating to these countries.

Amidst these fractures, India’s participation as a “guest” became a means to thaw its relations with Canada and share its perspectives. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called India “an essential actor in global governance and sustainable development”, positioning it not just as an emerging partner but as a systemic player.

India used this strategic space with finesse. Its support for traceable, ethical critical mineral supply chains, responsible AI governance, and Global South development priorities marked a shift from transactional engagement to agenda-setting. In many ways, India stepped into the leadership void—not by dominating, but by convincingly articulating.

India also recalibrated the security discourse. In the wake of the Pahalgam terror attack and Operation Sindoor, PM Modi advanced a broader framing: cross-border terrorism as part of a hybrid threat ecosystem, alongside cyberwarfare, spyware, and foreign information manipulation—which was also on the radar of the G7. While the G7’s declarations avoided specifically focusing on terrorism, the threat’s scope—from the US to Europe—made this omission glaring.

India’s choice of strategic multi-alignment and its agility to interact with and within organisations like the G7, G20, and Brics—while engaging bilaterally with strategic partners in the G7—must remain central. We must continue to engage with G7 initiatives, which may become important platforms to build on our path towards Viksit Bharat. This, of course, must be done while engaging and cooperating wherever and whenever it serves our interest and advances our security and development objectives.

India’s presence at Kananaskis offered a rare note of strategic clarity. While the G7 grappled with internal discord and diminishing purpose, PM Modi’s emphasis on inclusive development, Global South priorities, and equitable energy transitions gave the summit a broader relevance. In a gathering that risked becoming a ritual without resonance, India’s conduct lent meaning to the very cooperation others invoked rhetorically. As the multilateral and plurilateral grammar of international institutions evolves, India is not merely navigating the space between blocs—it is helping to reshape the script.

Whether the G7 chooses to follow remains uncertain.

The author is a former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Deputy Executive Director of UN Women and a former Ambassador of India. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.