How Al Qaeda and Islamic State are radicalising Muslim spaces in Indian hinterland – Firstpost

Today, India’s biggest security challenge comes from Islamism and its manifestation in the form of home-grown radicalisation and extremism. Kashmir has been a militancy hotbed since 1990. A multitude of Pak-sponsored terrorist groups have remained active in Kashmir and continue to do so. The most prominent ones are Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, and Jaish-e-Mohammad.

Besides, Al Qaeda (AQ) affiliate Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind and local units of IS have also made Kashmir their playground; however, Pak-sponsored groups continue to call the shots. Post-370, Pakistan changed the strategy and tactics, bringing in new groups like The Resistance Front and the People’s Anti-Fascist Front, with secular-sounding names to project an indigenous face of the militancy and dupe watchdogs like FATF.

What is most concerning today is the spread of Islamism in the Indian hinterland, i.e., beyond Jammu and Kashmir. Though the phenomenon started in the 90s, in recent times, ideological extremism and its carriers in the form of terror outfits like AQ Indian Subcontinent and Islamic States—Khorasan Province have made considerable gains in finding a firm foothold in several Indian states. Home-grown terror outfits like the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and its new avatar, Indian Mujahideen (IM), wreaked havoc in a range of Indian cities like Ahmedabad, Delhi, Jaipur, Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Coimbatore in the 2000s.

Indian agencies successfully busted the IM modules and neutralised them. Likewise, in recent times, the Indian security agencies have successfully busted AQIS and ISKP modules in India. Given this track record, there is a ray of hope. However, what differs in the current scenario from the 2000s is that today radicalisation and Islamism are far more widespread and have taken deeper roots among the Indian Muslims.

Over the last 12 years, the Indian Muslims have been fed a narrative that the Modi government is anti-Muslim, despite no proofs to prove such false claims. Islamist organisations like PFI, academics, a range of human rights activists and organisations, and foreign NGOs like the Open Society Foundation have left no stone unturned in arousing and radicalising Indian Muslims.

The Modi government’s tough approach towards terrorism and measures taken in vital national interests like the CAA-NRC, triple talaq, and the abrogation of Article 370 have been portrayed as anti-Muslim. Alarming levels of radicalisation are manifesting in many ways.

Against CAA-NRC, massive pan-India Islamist-led protests popularly known as the Shaheen Bagh agitation were orchestrated. There were celebrations among the Islamists over the Taliban’s return to power, HTS’ ouster of the Asad regime in Syria, the ouster of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh by the Islamists, and the persecution of minorities after that. During this year’s Eid celebrations, local Islamists protested the Waqf amendment by wearing black bands, waving anti-Israel posters, and shouting anti-Israel slogans.

Even today, as I write this piece, Murshidabad in West Bengal is burning. Islamists have erupted into massive communal violence and gone on a rampage, killing Hindus. Between 2014 and 2024, 6214 communal riots have taken place. Most interestingly, the riots that are taking place are not because of any concrete local or regional issue. They are borne out of a pan-Islamist consciousness woven with a religious flavour, with local issues like the CAA-NRC, Waqf amendments, and disputes over religious processions. Indian Muslims today, unlike in the 1990s and 2000s, are firmly integrated with global Islamic issues, trends, and forces.

In such a situation, it becomes very easy for the global Islamist organisations and terror outfits to develop robust roots in remote regions of the Indian hinterland.

This phenomenon has a specific modus operandi and trajectory that must be studied and investigated. Rohan Gunaratna’s book, Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for the International Community, provides brilliant insights into this phenomenon. Gunaratna, an eminent counter-terrorism expert with a clever combination of field knowledge, which includes interrogating a range of terrorists like a typical field intelligence officer or a detective, and theoretical perspectives, was one of the first scholars to educate the global counter-terrorism community about Al Qaeda. His historical briefings to the US Congress after 9/11 played a pivotal role in the investigation of 9/11.

Once again, in his book on Sri Lanka’s Easter Sunday Massacre, he shares his insights about how ISIS staged simultaneous bomb explosions in several high-end hotels and churches of Sri Lanka on April 21, 2019, Easter Day, killing more than 200 people and injuring 500 civilians. Gunaratna informs us that the Easter Sunday massacre was one of the most lethal ISIS attacks outside its central territory in the Syria-Iraq region. It happened precisely a month after President Trump celebrated the victory of US forces against ISIS in Baghouz. Gunaratna says that this attack portrayed its ‘global reach’ and the ‘changing complexion of the threat’… and ‘mounted by the adherents of IS, the attack is a critical milestone in the emerging threat landscape of transnational terrorism’.

Today, in India, when the concoction of widening communal rifts, rapid spread, and penetration of Islamism, sweeping demographic changes, and sabotage by the inimical foreign state and non-state entities threatens our national security, particularly the internal security, transnational terrorist organisations like IS or AQ can easily find deep roots in urban and rural spaces of India inhabited by the Muslim population.

This threat becomes alarming given IS’ changed strategy to decentralise along ideological and operational lines and expand its activities through local units, provincial groupings and regional wilayats.

A detailed study of Gunaratna’s book can help security experts understand their modus operandi, ie, how they expand, recruit and train cadres, create networks and ideological spheres of influence, arrange safehouses, weapons, and logistics, and take advantage of weak political leadership, democratic freedoms, and poor intelligence machinery. His findings are based on the interviews with Noufer, the key IS ideologue in Sri Lanka and the successor of Zahran, the mastermind of the attack; Milhan, the head of the IS military wing of Sri Lanka; and a critical study of foreign and domestic investigations of the attack.

The book informs that traditionally, Sri Lankan Muslims followed a syncretic version of Islam rooted in Sufi beliefs and lifestyle, which had integrated well with the local culture and lifestyle over the years. The gradual spread of Salafi-Wahhabi ideology challenged the Sufi ideologues and beliefs and damaged their credibility as the repositories of Islamic knowledge and piety.

Gradually, the Salafi-Wahabis organised themselves into groups like All Ceylon Thowheed Jamaat, All Ceylon Jamiyathul Ulama, All Ceylon Thareekathul Mufliheen, and Kattankudy Thowheed Jamaat. Such groupings challenged and eroded the legitimacy and popular support of Sufi institutions and lay Sufi followers. Then, they also had clashes with Sufis over the control of mosques.

Zahran, the key mastermind, orchestrated one such violent clash with Sufi Muslims. Within the Salafi-Wahhabi groups, a race started to outdo each other in extremism and orthodoxy. Zahran and his band of followers represented an extreme strand of Salafism in Sri Lanka. The Salafi-Wahhabi entities were better organised and received better funding vis-à-vis the Sufis from the foreign sources and domestic individual donations.

Gunaratna also busts certain myths, like economic deprivation being a significant cause for terrorist recruitment. In the Sri Lankan IS cell, Ilham and Inshaf, both suicide bombers, came from one of the most respected and wealthiest Muslim families of Sri Lanka.

Even other IS cadres like Milhan and Hasthoon had foreign exposures, were well-read, and had elite educational backgrounds. They were inspired and indoctrinated by Zahran’s extremist Wahhabi teachings. Also, the motivation for the attack came from global events, not the local ones. The author’s interviews revealed that the attack on Muslims in two mosques of New Zealand and ISIS’s defeat in Baghouz were the main catalysts for this attack.

Also, an interesting aspect of Salafism in Sri Lanka is the influence of Thowheed preachers from Tamil Nadu. Tamil Nadu and Kerala, the two South Indian states, have witnessed a rapid spread of Wahhabism because of a robust exposure of their Muslims working in the Middle East to Wahhabi trends there. Notably, the perpetrators of the Easter Sunday massacre also travelled to India before the attack. These linkages indicate a robust connection between the various IS cells operating in South Asia.

The author also gives a detailed account of the protocol followed by ISIS before opening a local branch in any country. He writes (page 106) –

• First, it was to raise ‘awareness’ of the Muslim community.

• Second, was to consult among the leaders and elders of Islamic movements.

• Next, a leader had to be selected.

• Afterwards, disparate organisations would have to be merged and consolidated before starting to operate.

• Finally, it was only after a significant attack that the IS leadership in Iraq and Syria would declare or claim the opening of a theatre, vilayat, or IS province.

The recovery of a huge IS arms cache in a police raid at Wanathawilluwa suggested that the local IS cells had made elaborate preparations for simultaneous attacks in all 25 districts of Sri Lanka. Reportedly, the IS also managed to establish safe houses across the country and hide its arms and equipment in them. As regards radicalisation, the book reveals that the online content played a crucial role. Besides, many members of the Sri Lankan IS cell had radicalised in foreign countries like the UK and Australia. Many of them also travelled to Syria and Iraq.

Finally, Gunaratna also gives some excellent policy recommendations – most, most importantly, beefing up the intelligence machinery and intelligence coordination and exchange between the countries. He suggests creating a subcontinental database on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Further, to stamp out fanaticism, he suggests that the national and global Muslim leaders should revamp existing systems. This includes –

• Screening and registration procedures for local and foreign clerics

• Blacklisting of hate preachers

• Regular re-education and re-certification of existing clerics

• Rehabilitation programmes for radical and violent clerics

• Development of a comprehensive and holistic curriculum for student clerics, including possible audiences and counter-terrorism dialogues with survivors of the radical Islamic sect

• Regular reviews of key texts

• Banning texts that advocate violence

• Establishment of a consultative process where Islam and other religions are mainstreamed. Singapore has such a body in the form of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, where key religious leaders meet to resolve conflicts.

To conclude, it must be argued that India needs to take this existential threat from Islamic extremism seriously. Its fragile neighbours, like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, make India’s position even more vulnerable. Hence, India needs a long-term roadmap and a multipronged strategy to address this challenge.

The author is a Cornell University graduate in public affairs, bachelors from St Stephen’s College, Delhi and has done his PhD on Jaish-e-Mohammad. He is a policy analyst specialising in counterterrorism, Indian foreign policy and Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.