How China’s massive defence spending doesn’t ensure strategic security for it – Firstpost

China’s latest defence budget hike—a 7.5 per cent climb to $258 billion—may seem to herald a new era of military assertiveness. Yet a closer look reveals the money, even accounting for a massive purchasing power parity advantage (where, say, an aircraft would cost 1/4th of what it costs for Western peers), is not adding up to a more secure China.

Beijing’s modernisation drive is unmistakable. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now operates three aircraft carriers, with a fourth nuclear‐powered vessel under development—an effort aimed squarely at matching US supercarriers. Complementing this is a navy that, by some measures the world’s largest, recently staged a bold deployment across Australian waters, signalling its ability to project power far from shore.

On the tech front, the PLA is not content to rest on conventional assets. The development of a purported sixth-generation fighter aircraft underscores its appetite for leaps in capability, while the rapid expansion of unmanned systems—from the Wing Loong-2 (GJ-2) drone to the Rainbow-4 reconnaissance and strike craft and newly unveiled KVD002 medium-altitude, long-endurance drone operating at both theatre command and group army levels—pivots towards modern, networked warfare.

Yet behind these impressive headlines lie substantial fiscal and institutional challenges. Nearly 35 per cent of China’s defence spending is swallowed by salaries and pensions—a necessary expense but, given an ageing China, a larger drag for a war-ready force.

Moreover, Beijing has long perfected the art of budgetary camouflage. Significant sums are routinely hidden off the official balance sheet in the guise of research and development projects, covert military-civil fusion initiatives, and undisclosed contingency funds. Such practices obscure the true scale—and effectiveness—of its spending.

Almost all of the nuclear weapon modernisation programme, like in peer countries, is off budget.

A budget primed for war

President Xi Jinping’s recent pronouncements further stoke concerns. Insisting publicly that the armed forces must be primed for future wars—and indeed must win them—Xi’s rhetoric is a stark reminder that Beijing is not content with deterrence alone.

However, there are reasons not to sound the alarm. The recent dismissal of top generals and even two defence ministers has exposed deep-seated internal fissures. Endemic military corruption means that a significant portion of the budget may ultimately prove wasteful. Money by itself can do only so much.

China has not fought a war since its 1978 clash with Vietnam, leaving its modern hardware untested in the crucible of battle. A purge of two military generals, including the arrest of Admiral Miao Hua, a member of China’s topmost party post, the Central Military Commission, points to a crisis in military leadership.

Furthermore, China’s ambitions are set against a backdrop of overextension. Its strategic commitments span from Taiwan to the high Himalayas bordering India, from the contested South China Sea to an ongoing rivalry with the USA, all pursued amid a slowing economy.

China’s aggressive military spending has kicked off an arms race. All its adversaries, the USA, Japan and Korea, are ramping up defence budgets. Japan has declared a $280 billion five-year defence spending programme and doubling of its defence budget by 2030.

South Korea’s defence spending will rise from $45 billion to $55 billion in 2029. India needs very quickly to spend at least 2.5 per cent of the GDP on its defence, just in light of China’s jump. The US is also spending more money on the Indo-Pacific. All that spending is adding up and matching any Chinese security advantage.

In the final analysis, while China’s bolstered defence spending and technological leaps warrant close scrutiny, they must be weighed against internal inefficiencies and overstretched commitments. Just an attack on Taiwan could cost China $2 trillion in military employment alone.

China faces the old imperial dilemma of overspending on war and losing the prosperity of peace. It undid Rome and imperial Britain as well as Germany; China may not prove an exception to that rule.

The writer is a senior journalist with expertise in defence. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.