How India’s communication strategy is hitting its target – Firstpost

The Indian government has put to use hard-learned lessons from the aftermaths of the
Uri surgical strike (2016),
Balakot airstrike, and the air skirmishes
that followed (2019) in its Operation Sindoor communications strategy. And despite some difficult moments and
seeming reverses, so far, the strategy has served India well.

A Pattern from Past Conflicts

Previous Indian successes on the battlefield were undermined in almost identical ways: Pakistan stage-managed a counter-narrative following Indian action; Western media and ‘analysts’ on these Pakistani official tours supported the Pakistani version; the issue then became controversial in the Indian media and political opposition; and the Indian government and armed forces were pressured to release and defend their battlefield-damage assessments. In other instances, firefighting disinformation and negative news shifted focus from the armed forces’ strategic goals.

The
number of terrorists actually killed in the Uri strike, whether terrorists were
killed at all in the Balakot airstrike, and whether a Pakistan Air Force (PAF)
F-16 was shot down in air skirmishes were all called into question in this manner. In the last instance,
reluctant Indian armed forces were forced to make
sensitive information public to support their claims.

In the same post-Balakot dogfight, Pakistan falsely claimed to have downed
two Indian fighter aircraft, wrongly announced the death of an Indian pilot, and showed
video footage of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman being manhandled by civilians. This created substantial pressure on the Indian government to manage public morale.

Western reportage filtering back into Indian media resulted in the opposition
demanding the release of video footage of the Uri strike and
proof of the Balakot strike. There was also considerable frustration with the Western media’s soft-pedalling of proof provided by the Indian government or media–The Print’s
outstanding reporting on the downing of an F-16 in 2019 is a case in point.

India’s communications handicaps were clear: one, evidence of inflicted damage lay in enemy territory; two, controversies played out in hostile territory–the Western media. The media landscape, however, has changed since 2019, with many Indians now trusting domestic online analysts and commentators over conventional media sources. There is also greater awareness that Western media’s hostility towards India is structural: tainted by financial incentives and their home country’s strategic interests. This is visible also in the Indian government’s greater willingness to
call out the Western media for both condescension and bias.

These experiences have likely shaped the principles of India’s current communication strategy: (1) Tightly controlled information; briefings restricted to dry facts released by designated officials; (2) Silence on real-time discussion of ‘operational details’; (3) Announcing successes with proof; (4) Engaging with foreign media on India’s terms; (5) Communicating for and with foreign governments; (6) Tailoring messaging to outsource aspects of context-setting, analysis, and public morale management to online commentators.

Let us examine how these principles played out.

Information Control

Daily briefings were initially held by a team consisting of Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, Colonel Sophia Qureshi, and Wing Commander Vyomika Singh. The Press Information Bureau (PIB) and the Ministry of Defence’s Additional Directorate General of Public Information (ADGPI) put out press releases and online messages. These were the only sources of information.

The briefing team was aptly chosen: as Operation Sindoor was named to evoke the red vermillion worn by married Hindu women–in response to terrorists singling out and massacring Hindu men in front of their wives at Pahalgam on April 22–women military officers on the podium signified women power, professionalism, and national unity. A short intro film showing past attacks on India by Pakistan-based terrorists was also screened on the first day. That apart, the briefings were to the point, factual, and technical (with photographs or videos of strikes shown at times).

After the deplorable trolling of Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri (and his family) for merely announcing the
ceasefire, later briefings were conducted by the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of all three armed services. Details of some operations were now shared–perhaps as more information became available and the
DGMOs were better placed to decide on disclosures. The emphasis on intelligent control of information was maintained all through.

Silence on Operational Details

Minutes after India announced Operation Sindoor, Pakistan
claimed to have downed several Indian jets, including Rafales. PIB issued generic disclaimers about ‘misinformation’ and
fact-checked fake posts purporting to show visuals of downed jets.

Similarly, Indian embassies approached for comment merely responded
‘disinformation’ and no more. Even Indian diplomats interviewed on foreign television channels wouldn’t be drawn into confirming or denying these rumours.

Announcing Successes with Proof

The
DGMOs provided satellite images, videos, photographs, and other data as proof of successful hits.

What about Pakistan’s losses? ‘[W]e would not like to
hazard a guess out here, I have the numbers and we are getting into technical details to establish it,’ said Indian Air Marshal. Contrast this with the Pakistan defence minister getting called out on international television for citing social media posts as proof of downing Indian planes.

This measured, professional approach may just be paying off. By the time of writing, the narrative has shifted in India’s favour in several quarters, with even the perceivedly anti-India New York Times conceding that ‘[w]here India appears to have had a
clear edge is in its targeting of Pakistan’s military facilities and airfields.’

Subsequently, ‘sources’ have revealed tactical details like India disguising drones as fighter jets to ‘
bait and disable Pakistan’s Chinese-supplied air defence systems’. Perhaps the shaping of narrative goes on.

Dealing with Foreign Media on India’s Terms

As detailed above, India refused to be drawn into discussions about operational matters, especially possible losses. That this is wise can easily be established by contrasting press claims country-wise (and so, vested-interests-wise): defence competitors of France like the US (which has offered
to sell India F-35s); Pakistan’s arms supplier and US adversary,
China; and Rafale-manufacturer,
France.

Further, Indian diplomats, rather than politicians, were fielded to engage with the foreign press. Some diplomats’ interviews were masterclasses in messaging control. The Indian High Commissioner to the UK, Vikram Doraiswami, for example, responded to a question about Pakistan downing Indian jets by asking why Pakistan was
still escalating the conflict if it had indeed done so.

Indian High Commissioner to Singapore Shilpak Ambule countered a suggestion that India hadn’t provided proof of
Pakistan’s involvement in the Pahalgam massacre, stating that India had submitted proof to the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee for years, including on the terrorist group involved, an offshoot of Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, The Resistance Force (TRF).

Communicating for and with Government

From the very start, India aimed its communications at the community of world governments. Operation Sindoor was lucidly framed: as a response to the Pahalgam massacre and directed at terrorists; non-escalatory, as the Pakistan Army was not targeted; designed to avoid collateral damage; and placing the choice of escalation in Pakistan’s court.

Indian diplomats in foreign media stuck to this line. They retained focus on Pahalgam and emphasised that the off-ramp was available to Pakistan, even while asserting that India would respond to escalation with force.

Meanwhile, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, and Foreign Secretary Misri briefed counterparts around the world and envoys about India’s actions and approach.

The next step was briefing
70 foreign service attaches (defence attaches) serving in India. This was a way of dealing directly with the grown-ups of the strategic world. Unlike in the media space, these military professionals would appreciate India’s restraint and scale of success in strategic terms. It was also an opportunity to showcase India’s defence prowess and Indian-manufactured defence technology.

Trusting the Influencer Ecosystem

India has a massive YouTube ecosystem of political commentators and defence analysts, with several of them being retired military, civilian, and diplomatic officials. The government appeared to trust them to declutter complex military information for their audiences and highlight successes.

It was these analysts who discussed threadbare the import of Indian strikes on Pakistani airbases along with satellite images and other technical details. This was an invaluable exercise in educating the public on India’s military platforms and operational successes and in effectively countering enemy disinformation. For instance, online analysts quickly debunked visuals purportedly showing Indian jets shot down by pointing out that the
images showed drop tanks and not wreckage.

These channels also helped prepare their audiences for any possible battlefield losses by emphasising strategic goals. Overall, the online ecosystem played a major part in managing public morale.

Missteps and Curveballs

The real narrative curveball, however, came with President Donald Trump
announcing the ceasefire and stating that the United States had brokered it. Coming as it did when India was toying with Pakistan’s air defences and hitting military targets at will, the suggestion that America stopped the fighting was spun as a minor face-saver for Pakistan. India asserts, quite rightly, that the Pakistan DGMO’s
‘frantic’ calls to his Indian counterpart were, in effect, pleas for peace. Feeling cheated out of a crushing win, there was anger amongst Indians.

PM Modi’s speech on May 12 addressed these concerns by announcing the following: that Pakistan had pleaded for a ceasefire; Operation Sindoor was now India’s permanent policy on cross-border terrorism; the Indus Water Treaty would remain in abeyance; India would no longer tolerate ‘nuclear blackmail’; there would be no talks with Pakistan until terror stopped; and when talks occurred, they would only be on terror and the return of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In essence, PM Modi asserted that Pakistan had achieved none of its strategic goals, that there was no scope for talks or mediation, and that Pakistan was now on probation.

So, at this time, it’s surprising to see talk of India
losing the narrative war. So who’s winning? Pakistan, which has withdrawn into a delusory propaganda bubble where it claims victory? Does that claim fool anyone beyond its borders?

Are political noises about the United States brokering a peace a loss? India certainly had no interest in Pakistan being handed a face-saver, but, having demonstrated its military superiority, India also had no interest in prolonging the conflict–India’s restraint and leaving the escalatory off-ramp open for Pakistan to show as much.

And ultimately, whose ‘narrative approval’ is one seeking? The Indian media and public must display the same self-confidence that their leadership has in their messaging strategy. Meanwhile, one hopes the Indian government will make this evidence-based, assertive, and professional communication approach its default.

Post Script: Phase 2

Since the initial writing of this piece, the Government of India has formed seven all-party delegations of Members of Parliament (MPs) to visit and brief foreign governments about Operation Sindoor, its context, and India’s policy towards terror going forward. This is the next step in India’s efforts to communicate directly with foreign governments.

All-party representation in these delegations is also intended to project a united front and limit political controversy about security matters at this time. A move that seems to have worked so far. Additionally, as former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has pointed out, multi-party composition may create space for foreign media to
look past any anti-BJP biases they might hold. These delegations have been remarkably on message even as MPs have brought their own flair to its articulation. In fact, opposition MPs on these delegations have been able to voice opinions on matters like the US brokering a peace deal more openly than ruling party MPs may have been able to.

Meanwhile, more evidence of India’s strikes has been put out, only now with added commentary and reactions from military personnel involved in the planning and execution of Operation Sindoor. Increasingly, private sources along with journalists are bringing out or confirming evidence shared by the Indian armed forces.

A few opposition moves to create a controversy around the external affairs minister’s comments have also not fully taken off so far, in part, because Operation Sindoor is ongoing and operational matters have not been fully disclosed. In India’s democratic system, disclosures to parliament (or its committees) or the public are inevitable, and a degree of controversy will perhaps accompany them. But the government clearly intends to retain the focus on strategic and security matters for the time being, and its information management is designed to allow it to do so. In all, the Government of India’s approach has held to the principles discussed in this article as it moves past the crisis-communication stage into a new normal.

The writer is the published author of two novels (Penguin, India and Westland, India) based out of the San Francisco Bay Area. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.