How purges have been a Chinese strategy to muzzle dissent – Firstpost
On September 13, 1971, a Chinese Trident 1E airliner crashed in Inner Mongolia; everyone on board was killed. The special flight carried Marshal Lin Biao, China’s defence minister and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Lin, Mao Zedong’s heir apparent, was also one of the architects of the dreaded Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The official narrative says that Lin was fleeing to the Soviet Union after a failed coup against Mao when his aeroplane ran out of fuel. Observers, however, believe Lin was fleeing an impending purge in the military; some leaders had gained too much power for Mao’s liking. Was the crash an accident? A year later, when US President Richard Nixon asked Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, about what happened to Lin, Zhou smiled and cryptically said, “Lin left on a trip to Moscow and disappeared en route.”
Many Instances
On December 27, Caixin, the Chinese economic publication, published an impressive chart, “The Military Brass Ensnared in China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign.”
The article observed: “More than 80 generals have been ensnared in China’s anti-corruption campaign since it kicked off in the wake of the 18th National Party Congress held in October 2012.”
According to the Caixin compilation, “13 full generals, 18 lieutenant generals, and more than 50 major generals have fallen from grace in graft probes in the past dozen years.”
Another story came back to mind: on October 21, 2018, it was announced that the head of the Chinese Government’s liaison office in Macau had died by falling from the building at his residence. According to The South China Morning Post (SCMP): “Hong Kong officials and politicians expressed shock over the sudden passing of Zheng Xiaosong.” He had been ‘suffering from depression’, an official statement issued by the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO) said.
It is true that life can be depressing for a Chinese general. In the case of Zheng, the 59-year-old officer had taken up the post in Macau just a year earlier.
Nothing New under Beijing’s Sky
One could therefore say that there was ‘nothing new under the sky’, especially after Li Shangfu was sacked from his position as defence minister in October 2023 and Wei Fenghe, Li’s predecessor, was stripped of his rank as general in June 2024, after he had served as defence minister from 2018 to 2023. Xi Jinping sacked Li Shangfu with no explanation after he had disappeared for nearly two months; promoted in March 2023 and sacked in October, Li became the country’s shortest-serving defence minister.
Were the generals really ‘corrupt’ or have they only displeased the ’emperor’? Probably the latter.
Two More Generals
More recently, on December 26, two more Chinese generals fell.
The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress announced that You Haitao, a Lt Gen since 2014, who was promoted to deputy commander of the PLA Army in 2016 and had earlier served as deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region, was investigated.
Vice-Admiral Li Pengcheng, 61, was also removed from China’s top legislature. Li had taken over as the naval commander of the Southern Theatre Command (STC) after his predecessor, Ju Xinchun, was himself dismissed from the NPC in December 2023 along with several senior members of the PLA Rocket Force overseeing China’s nuclear weapons. According to the SCMP: “The downfall of the two generals comes amid a slew of personnel changes within the PLA, with several senior officers brought down by corruption charges.”
The senior-most one was Admiral Miao Hua, a member of the powerful Central Military Commission and director of its political work department, who was placed under investigation in November 2024.
A New Full General
On December 23, the Central Military Commission held a promotion ceremony at the Bayi Building in Beijing. Chen Hui, political commissar of the PLA Army, was officially promoted to the rank of general. He has been a long-time Air Force officer and was confirmed “as the new army political commissar to oversee ideology, political education, and unit morale,” according to state news agency Xinhua.
Chen replaced Qin Shutong, 61, who served in the PLA Air Force for some two decades before being appointed the PLA Army political commissar in January 2022.
Today, Qin’s whereabouts are unknown.
Observers have noted that Qin’s 2022 promotion happened while Admiral Miao was also in charge of military personnel promotion. Is his fall linked to Admiral Miao’s losing his job? Probably.
At the function, four high-ranking Chinese generals were absent.
China Central Television’s “News Broadcast” showed the full generals (three stars) seated in the first three rows facing the rostrum; it included current Defence Minister Dong Jun (himself rumoured to be under investigation), Xu Xueqiang, Minister of Equipment Development, and Xu Xisheng, Rocket Force Political Commissar.
However, Li Qiaoming, commander of the PLA Army; Qin Shutong, former political commissar of the Army; Yuan Huazhi, political commissar of the Navy; and Wang Chunning, commander of the Armed Police Force, were missing in action.
Interviewed by Voice of America (VOA), scholars who noted the absence of these generals observed that it “may mean that the PLA will launch a new round of anti-corruption storm following the collective corruption case of the Rocket Army.”
Disagreement with Xi Jinping
Katsuji Nakazawa, an editorial writer at Tokyo-based Nikkei, in an in-depth analysis, noted: “The People’s Liberation Army, the powerful military of the Chinese Communist Party, is in political disarray amid a feud over Xi Jinping’s handling of the country’s leadership system. The feud surfaced at the beginning of this month, with the politically potent PLA being pulled into a series of unusual episodes.”
Nakazawa recounts in The Nikkei: “On December 1, the Central Theatre Command (CTC) of the PLA posted an article on its official social media account announcing a study session held by the 83rd Group Army (of the CTC).”
The article was accompanied by a photo of a 16-character political slogan hanging on a wall; it was what the 83rd Group Army was presumed to study on during the seminar.
The Nikkei explained: “The slogan is made up of four tenets—ji ti ling dao (collective leadership), min zhu ji zhong (democratic centralism), ge bie yun niang (individual consultations), and hui yi jue ding (decision by meetings).
It means that “democratic centralism must be implemented thoroughly under the collective leadership system, important issues must be discussed individually and properly, and decisions must be made at meetings.”
It is completely the opposite of what Xi Jinping has been preaching, “In today’s China, the slogan comes off as highly defiant. More significantly, this act of defiance came from within the military.”
The 83rd Group Army’s public advocacy for collective leadership, despite President Xi having concentrated power in his own hands since 2012, is telling. Is there dissent in the PLA?
Probably, Nakazawa asserted, “Word of the 83rd Group Army’s study session quickly reverberated across the country after it received extensive coverage in The Paper online news outlet and other media.”
New Detention facilities
On December 28, CNN published a well-researched article that found that more than 200 specialised detention facilities nationwide have been set up in China “to interrogate suspects ensnared in Xi Jinping’s widening anti-corruption drive, …as the Chinese leader extends his crackdown beyond the ruling Communist Party to a vast swath of public sectors.”
CNN observed: “Since taking power in 2012, Xi has launched a sweeping campaign against graft and disloyalty, taking down corrupt officials as well as political rivals at an unprecedented speed and scale as he consolidated control over the party and the military. …the supreme leader has turned his relentless campaign into a permanent and institutionalised feature of his open-ended rule.” Another significant message.
Implications
All this means that there is an intense power struggle within the PLA, with some officers siding with Xi Jinping and others dissenting, though most of these officers have, over the years, been selected by Xi himself.
Is such an army ready for a war? It is doubtful, though it does not mean that India should lower her guard and stop preparations to, if necessary, repel the Chinese as it has been done during the past four years.
Most of the officers are probably purged for political reasons, as indicated in The Nikkei article.
Practically, the purges/investigations are bound to translate into more resentment within the PLA, more fear for the future, and more anger towards Xi Jinping; ultimately, it is a vicious circle.
One final question: Can Xi Jinping himself be ‘purged’ one day? It can only be said that it has happened to all totalitarian leaders in the past; in any case, it is a question worth pondering about and watching.
What could be the consequences for the Indian border?
The writer is Distinguished Fellow, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar Institution of Eminence (Delhi). Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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