How shift from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR doctrine signals India’s outreach to larger Global South – Firstpost

During his two-day state visit to Mauritius last month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced his vision of MAHASAGAR – “Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions” for the Global South. Exactly a decade ago, he had similarly expounded his vision of Security And Growth For All in The Region (SAGAR) in Mauritius.

Just as sagar in Sanskrit means ‘sea’ whereas maha sagar alludes to “ocean”, the idea of MAHASAGAR goes beyond SAGAR to encompass trade, development, capacity building, sustainable growth and mutual security for a shared future. The reference to “security and growth across regions” imbues the idea with a new cachet denoting a far more expansive scope. It suggests a framework that builds on India’s outlook for the G20–essentially looking further afield to build a community of shared values and aspirations among developing nations of the Global South.

Such a strategy builds broad support for India and strengthens its strategic autonomy and multi-alignment in an era of geostrategic uncertainties. It helps create a constituency that supports India’s initiatives at the multilateral level and advances its interests in multilateral fora.

The concept of MAHASAGAR is also an expression of India’s growing economic and political heft and its intention to extend its arc of cooperation beyond the immediate environs of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) to encompass a broader constituency among the Global South, building upon its successful G20 presidency.

As Chair of the G20, India reached out to developing countries through the Voice of the Global South Summits. The African Union (AU) was ushered in as a result of India’s efforts and made a member of the G20.

Without maritime security, the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) would be vulnerable to disruptions of the type recently witnessed in the Red Sea. Enhancing maritime cooperation and security is therefore an integral part of MAHASAGAR.

Free and open conduct of trade and commerce and the security of undersea cables are the foundation for economic growth and progress. Navies have a key role to play in protecting the maritime commons. The Indian Navy has the weighty task of ensuring free and unimpeded commerce on the high seas, given that 90 per cent of India’s trade is seaborne.

India’s trade and prosperity are vulnerable to the vagaries of regional conflicts from West Asia to the South China Sea (SCS) as well as the Taiwan Strait. The challenges are multifold. From attempts to create a mare clausum in the South China Sea to piracy and armed robbery, from illegal fishing and smuggling to potential sabotage of undersea cables, the threats are real and manifold.

Today, global uncertainty abounds. Strategic stability in the maritime environment must be considered against the backdrop of the simultaneous impulses of cooperation and competition. On the one hand, there is a broad consensus at the plurilateral level on enhancing cooperation in addressing maritime security challenges such as piracy, smuggling, drug trafficking and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR). There are various cooperative structures in place in which India is an active participant. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), a brainchild of the Indian Navy, is one of the most robust. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is yet another. Information sharing is acquiring momentum under the International Fusion Centres (IFCs), particularly the IFC-IOR for the Indian Ocean Region hosted by the Indian Navy.

Among the new developments is India’s growing cooperation in the the Gulf of Guinea with the European Union (EU) under the rubric of the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP). Similarly, India is now participating as a full member in the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) under which a number of Combined Task Forces (CTF) are focused on security issues in the Gulf, Red Sea and the Arabian Sea.
The phenomenon of Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is on the rise and affects a number of littoral nations. There is growing global concern at the presence of China’s distant fishing fleets, from the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans to the Indian Ocean.

Many countries of the Global South remain vulnerable to IUU fishing in their waters due to a lack of capacity to deal with the problem. They are also susceptible to blandishments such as easy developmental finance, which comes with strings attached.

Geopolitical competition among major powers is likely to constrain the development and implementation of a cooperative framework based on the values enshrined in the concept of MAHASAGAR.

The strategic presence of the US, UK and France is generally regarded by India as a factor for stability in the Indian Ocean. Western powers align with the vision of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) framework in which India, US, Japan and Australia are committed partners with shared values. At the same time, there are other factors that bind countries together in the Global South. For instance, India has traditionally sided with Mauritius in its long-standing dispute with the UK on the question of sovereignty over the Chagos archipelago. Under MAHASAGAR, India must seek to build consensus with different constituencies on different issues.

It is relevant to note that the Global South is a geopolitical concept. It has no clear geographical identity or criteria for membership. Its spread is expansive, across Asia, Africa and Latin America. Both landlocked and maritime nations are part of the developing world that denotes the Global South.

The challenge for the Indian Navy lies in correlating the concept of MAHASAGAR to the maritime geography and security and capacity-building of its Areas of Interest (AOI).

Harnessing the wealth of the oceans for collective progress is an important issue. Ocean wealth now includes deep seabed resources for critical minerals where the International Seabed Authority (ISA), an adjunct of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is the regulatory body. It does not, however, include the US, the world’s biggest economic and military power, since it has not ratified UNCLOS. That limits the kind of cooperation that members of the Global South can have with non-members of UNCLOS or a member like China that is frequently accused of violating the principles of UNCLOS in the maritime domain.

Another relevant factor is the notion of the “extended neighbourhood”. In India’s case, the term “neighbourhood” has evolved considerably since Prime Minister Modi advocated the notion of SAGAR in Mauritius in 2015.

However, it is not just India’s definition of neighbourhood that is evolving. More relevantly, China’s notion of its neighbourhood is also expanding in keeping with its growing economic, political and military interests. The question then is how to reconcile the respective notions of “neighbourhood”, especially when conflicting interests rub up in overlapping geographies.

In this age, the tyranny of distance is no longer an impediment. Traditional neighbourhoods have collapsed given modern communications, satellite networks, undersea cables and, in the case of navies, their growing reach with expeditionary capabilities.

Today, the Atlantic and the Pacific theatres are increasingly interlinked through evolving security paradigms such as AUKUS and Five Eyes. China’s presence in both oceans is growing. There is a need now to look to the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans as a seamless space just as the colonial powers such as Portugal and Spain did at the time of concluding the Treaty of Tordesillas and the Treaty of Zaragossa in the 15th and 16th centuries.

In their time, as colonial powers, they assumed that they were dividing the oceans into distinct spheres of influence, but they were proved wrong. Portugal expanded eastwards into the Indian Ocean, whereas Spain, going full circle, went westward and yet ended up to compete in the Indo-Pacific with a presence in the Philippines because the earth is spherical! Today, it is even harder to create, or to accept, exclusive spheres of influence under the global notion of MAHASAGAR which is, for India, an inclusive concept founded on the principle of “One Earth One Family One Future”.
The geographic boundaries of MAHASAGAR should remain flexible and based on pragmatic assessments as well as the evolving geostrategic landscape. India should flexibly choose partners, following the principle of multi-alignment.

At the same time, India must recognise the gaps between its aspirations and capacities. Limitations in naval capabilities may undermine India’s ability to act as ‘First Responder’ & ‘Preferred Security Partner’ under the rubric of MAHASAGAR.

These limitations will have to be addressed through effective navy-to-navy collaboration with key stakeholders, enhanced cooperation in the maritime arena through mini-laterals and multilateral institutions and strengthening rules and norms for establishing good order at sea. More importantly, this would call for an expansion of the expeditionary capabilities of the Indian Navy, focusing on a major expansion in the construction of additional vessels such as Landing Platform Dock (LPD), Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), and Landing Ship Tank (LST).

India will have to make greater efforts to enhance cooperation with regional and extra-regional partners in addressing non-traditional maritime security threats such as piracy through enhanced surveillance, joint naval exercises, and collaborative efforts to strengthen Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).

One example would be to expand India’s naval cooperation, HADR and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Guinea, on the basis of the collaboration in place with the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) in there, especially with the Italian, French and Spanish navies.

Countries like Ghana, which was involved in a knowledge-sharing session in this context, could also be engaged. India could take the lead with Nigeria and a few others in the region to develop a cooperative framework for a synergised approach to address piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea.

India could propose, in tandem with leading local partners like Nigeria and Ghana, a new cooperative mechanism named “Gulf of Guinea Naval Symposium”. The model for cooperation could be based on the IONS.

Within the concept of MAHASAGAR, India should leverage its capabilities to support partners through technology sharing, concessional loans and grants.

Particular focus should be given to Small Island Developing States (SIDS). India has currently committed $70 million in addition to $350 million in concessional loans and credit lines to SIDS through the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).

Often it is difficult or time-consuming for MEA personnel from non-resident embassies to mount surveys and feasibility studies or to monitor execution of developmental and capacity-building projects in small island nations of concurrent accreditation. Indian Navy ships, on the other hand, are self-contained and self-sufficient with all manner of skilled tradespeople who can execute repairs, renovations and even construction of small projects. The timeframe in which the navy can execute such jobs is infinitely shorter than the labyrinthine route of the bureaucracy.

Perhaps a separate budget could be allocated to the Indian Navy to work in tandem with MEA and deliver such projects to island countries which are frequently destinations for the Indian Navy’s port calls or friendly visits or are located in its AOI.

Lastly, making the Indian Navy an integral part of the MAHASAGAR would call for a rapid expansion of all-round naval capability to support India’s expanded vision for maritime security cooperation under MAHASAGAR. Apart from building a bigger navy in terms of vessels, India must develop its capacity for soft power engagement through training programmes such as Indian Ocean Ship (IOS) SAGAR, both at sea and shore-based. This suggests an increase in the number of training slots given to friendly nations, increasing the number of bilateral or plurilateral exercises and friendly visits by sports and cultural delegations sponsored by the Indian Navy.

The Indian Navy has a great record of delivering medical assistance to others in times of need. MISSION SAGAR is a successful example that demonstrates the support rendered by it during the Covid pandemic. China has five permanent hospital ships, one of which, the Peace Ark, is deployed regulary in the IOR. There is a strong emphasis in MAHASAGAR on mutual and holistic security, especially within the Global South. India should therefore consider having one or more dedicated hospital ships capable of independent and sustained deployment in areas of interest. The east coast of Africa could be an area of deployment of such ships.

To overcome the challenges of speed and scalability, the budgetary outlay for all MAHASAGAR-related activities will naturally have to be enhanced in a planned manner. India will need to scale up the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) through outcome-based programmes with clear timelines.

To realise the fullest potential of MAHASAGAR, India should also consider strengthening its participation in all existing multilateral and regional cooperation frameworks such as IONS, IORA, BIMSTEC, ADMM Plus and the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC). India should also work to strengthen UNCLOS and the sustainable use of oceanic resources in the wake of its signing the High Seas Treaty, formally known as the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement.

In summation, the next step is for stakeholders in India to try and build a consensus on the key elements of MAHASAGAR. It can be a dynamic concept, open to change and modification as per circumstances and objectives. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was initially an amalgam of existing infrastructure and connectivity projects both at the central and provincial levels. The BRI is not the best example around, though, given its tendency to create dependencies and adversely impact the environment. India should play to its strengths.

The author, a former Ambassador of India to Japan, is currently the Director General of the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.