How the West lost Turkey and India is paying the price – Firstpost

I visited Turkey some years ago as part of a delegation from the Royal College of Defence Studies, London. Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the Prime Minister, and the Kemalist character of Turkey—defined by Atatürk’s vision of secularism, European integration, and military guardianship—was visibly present.

We were briefed by officials at the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the EU representative office in Ankara. It was evident that Kemal Pasha’s dream of a European Turkey was floundering. The EU wanted Turkey’s strategic location and large military-industrial base but balked at fully integrating a Muslim-majority nation. The conditions placed upon Turkey for EU accession were politically awkward and perceived as patronising. The result was a wounded national pride—and the beginning of a long geopolitical drift.

That drift now affects us in India directly. Turkey under Erdogan has recast itself from a secular republic aspiring to European norms, to a confident, assertive, and increasingly power-seeking leadership role in the Islamic world. Operation Sindoor made this real for India: as Pakistan reeled, Turkey stood firmly by its side—diplomatically, rhetorically, and strategically; hoping to gain from it.

From Europe’s Rejection to Erdogan’s Reimagining

When Europe effectively closed the door on Turkish accession, it handed Erdogan the perfect opportunity to remake the country’s identity. With the secular military sidelined and public opinion more receptive to Islamic nationalism, Erdogan recast Turkey’s foreign policy through the prism of Muslim solidarity and civilisational assertion. The Arab Spring, Syria, Palestine, and Kashmir became not just foreign policy issues but ideological battlegrounds.

Turkey’s alignment with Pakistan deepened during this phase. Though their diplomatic ties date back to the early years of both republics, the modern warmth is more strategic. Pakistan gained a powerful ally that regularly supports it in international forums like the UN and OIC. For Erdogan, Pakistan offered both a military partner and a religiously resonant cause—particularly the issue of Kashmir, which plays well with Turkish domestic audiences and the broader Muslim world. General Pervez Musharraf was instrumental in bringing transformational effect to Pakistan-Turkey relations because of his lifelong obsessive fondness for everything Turkish going back to his young days when his father was posted to Ankara.

Sectarian alignment between the two also plays a role, albeit not a deep one. Both countries are Sunni-majority and largely follow the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. This common ground provides a religious-cultural comfort level, even though Turkey’s religious landscape is shaped more by Sufi traditions and state control, while Pakistan’s is influenced by powerful clerical networks and sectarian actors. Their real bond, however, is not theological but political – both governments use Islamic identity for global positioning and to challenge India’s rise as a pluralist, secular democracy.

Why India Failed to Influence Turkey

India, despite its global rise, has failed to gain strategic traction with Turkey. One reason is the mismatch in worldviews. Erdogan sees himself as a leader of the Islamic world; India, with its strong ties to Israel and growing alignment with the West, is viewed as part of an opposing camp.

Second, Indian diplomacy has been marginally reticent in engaging Turkey’s domestic political landscape. While India has cultivated strong ties in the Gulf and Southeast Asia, it has remained reactive and restrained when it comes to Turkey.

Third, India’s burgeoning ties with Turkey’s rivals—Greece, Armenia, and Israel—though grounded in mutual interest, have confirmed Ankara’s perception of India as strategically adversarial. This despite India’s proactive action of launching Operation Dost as a humanitarian and disaster relief operation after the devastating earthquake hit Southern Turkey in Feb 2023. India’s support was almost the first to reach Turkey.

Economically, the India-Turkey relationship lacks sufficient weight to act as a lever. Trade is modest too. This limits India’s ability to shape Ankara’s choices through economic means.

What’s at Stake for India?

The implications of Turkey’s hostility go beyond diplomatic sparring. Turkey’s backing gives Pakistan added legitimacy in global forums and bolsters its Islamic narrative. Ankara’s support to Islamabad on Kashmir complicates India’s diplomatic messaging in Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, where Turkey is investing heavily in soft power and religious outreach.

More concretely, defence cooperation between Turkey and Pakistan is growing. Joint military exercises, arms deals, and drone collaborations are becoming more common. This has implications for South Asia’s strategic balance and could introduce new military technologies into Pakistan’s arsenal. The recent Ukrainian drone attack—Operation Spider Web—would have given Pakistan ideas on utilisation of drones in an imaginatively pro-active way against India.

Turkey’s religious diplomacy also poses a softer but insidious challenge. Through state-backed institutions and media, it is projecting itself as a leader of the global Muslim ummah. This can shape narratives that influence Indian Muslim communities indirectly, especially in an era where identity politics is increasingly global.

What Must India do?

India needs to develop a coherent Turkey strategy grounded in realism, not nostalgia about shared civilisational roots.

India must respond clearly to Turkish provocations, whether on Kashmir or Pakistan. Silence has sometimes been mistaken for weakness. New Delhi should be willing to call out Ankara, including at multilateral forums.

Deepen ties with Turkey’s adversaries—Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, and Israel—not just diplomatically, but in defence, culture, and trade. A robust regional counterweight will force Turkey to reconsider its positioning.

Invest in projecting India’s narrative as a secular, multi-religious democracy. Partnering with moderate Muslim countries—like Indonesia, UAE, Egypt and now increasingly even Saudi Arabia—can help isolate Turkey’s harder posturing.

While current trade levels are modest, Turkey’s dependence on tourism, select exports, and access to Asian markets gives India some room to explore economic influence, directly or via third parties.

Turkey’s turn under Erdogan is not temporary. It reflects a deeper shift in identity and ambition—one that rejects the rejection of the West and seeks frontline Islamic leadership, casting aside all ‘Kemalian’ thought.  In aligning with Pakistan, Turkey is not just supporting a traditional ally—it is staking a claim in a multipolar Islamic world where India is seen as the ‘other’.

Fortunately, India is no longer a passive observer in West Asia or Southeast Asia. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, New Delhi has made significant and sustained inroads into the Middle East and beyond. The burgeoning strategic and economic partnerships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Oman reflect a quiet but profound shift—one that positions India as a key partner in regional stability, infrastructure, and counter-radicalism.

Simultaneously, India’s enhanced ties with Indonesia—the world’s largest Muslim-majority country and a democratic, pluralistic nation—serve as a counter-narrative to the Islamist posturing of the Turkey-Pakistan axis. These relationships are not merely transactional but represent a convergence of long-term visions.

As Ankara and Islamabad try to cobble together a pan-Islamic bloc rooted in grievance and revanchism, India must do more to support the Saudi–UAE axis in West Asia and reinforce its alignment with moderate Muslim powers like Indonesia. By doing so, New Delhi can effectively dilute the ideological resonance of the Turkey–Pakistan combine and reaffirm its own civilisational model as a viable and inclusive alternative in the Islamic world.

The writer is a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.