How Turkiye’s pro-Pakistan stance will cost it dearly – Firstpost

When a nation perceives geopolitical realities through ideological blinkers, it often risks alienating crucial global partners. This is what happened with Turkiye. Its recent posture following the heinous terror attack in Pahalgam, where innocent Indian lives were lost, reveals Ankara’s insensitive and uncalculated diplomatic stance. It was also Turkiye’s serious misjudgement of India’s strategic resolve. To India, Ankara’s support for Pakistan, even in the wake of such brutality, signals that its foreign policy continues to be shaped by neo-Ottoman Islamic identity politics than realpolitik.

For India, a nation that has endured decades of cross-border terrorism orchestrated from Pakistani soil, Turkiye’s immature response post-Pahalgam has not just struck a wrong chord but it is unforgivable and politically and humanely insensitive. Ankara’s casual dismissal of India’s non-escalatory counter-terrorism strike, Operation Sindoor, as “provocative” was not only ill-informed but also diplomatically reckless.

What is even worse are the reports claiming Turkiye’s alleged supply of military equipment, drones, arms and ammo to Pakistan. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) trackers while analysing flight path data have indicated that one or possibly as many as six C-130E Hercules aircraft landed in Karachi suggesting a significant transfer of military equipment to Pakistan. The supplies reportedly included Bayraktar TB2 drones, Songar and Yiha drone systems, T-155 Fırtına self-propelled howitzers, and MAM-L smart micro munitions, among other advanced weaponry. Additionally, on 30 April, Turkiye had sent a high-level military intelligence delegation headed by Lt Gen Yasir Kodioglu to Pakistan.

While Ankara dismissed such reports as mere logistical coincidences and cited “refuelling stops” and “pre-scheduled visits” by its top military officials, symbolisms matter in diplomacy. Turkiye made no effort to delay such high-level engagements amidst India-Pakistan tensions. This pattern of thoughtless solidarity with Pakistan only showcases Ankara’s deeply entrenched aspirational pan-Islamist ambitions, even at the cost of alienating emerging powers like India. Unfortunately for Ankara, this choice is not without consequences. At least, not this time.

Even historically, India and Turkiye have continued to share lukewarm ties and the relations have been marred by Ankara’s consistent endorsement of Pakistan’s narrative on Kashmir. Yet, in recent years, both countries made considerable efforts to repair and re-energise their relations particularly through economic cooperation and diplomatic outreach. Bilateral trade between the two nations had reached $11.2 billion in 2023–24, with efforts underway to increase it to $15 billion by 2025. India exported petroleum products ($3.1 billion), automobiles ($1.4 billion), and pharmaceuticals ($710 million) to Turkiye, while importing machinery, iron and steel, chemicals, and construction materials. At least 310 Indian companies had ongoing commercial ties with Turkish counterparts and over $340 million in investment and procurement agreements were either under negotiation or expansion by 2025.

If India decides to scale back these engagements especially by discouraging its private sector and state enterprises from trade and FDI with Turkiye, the ripple effect on Ankara’s already-ailing economy could be significant.

Turkiye’s economy with a 65 per cent inflation, record unemployment of over 10.6 per cent, and a lira depreciation of more than 40 per cent in 2024, is heavily reliant on external trade and tourism revenue.   Indian trade contributes about 3.6 per cent of Turkiye’s total global imports and exports. Additionally, Indian tourist footfall over 3.3 lakh in 2024, contributed close to $250 million. This represent one of the largest Asian inbound markets. A decline of even 30–35 per cent in Indian trade and tourist activity has the ability to negatively affect Turkiye by $2.5 billion annually.

Moreover, Indian infrastructure and technology firms especially lucrative for urban mobility and solar energy projects in Ankara and Izmir are now reviewing their commitments. There are indications that India’s exit from these public-private partnerships could delay project timelines and increase borrowing costs for Turkiye by nearly 8–10 per cent.

India also demonstrated its commitment by dispatching one of its most seasoned diplomats, Ambassador Muktesh Pardeshi, G20 Secretariat official, to engage Ankara through strategic diplomacy. Ambassador Pardeshi’s appointment symbolised New Delhi’s intent to de-hyphenate the Turkiye-Pakistan-India triangle and pursue ties based on mutual benefit. But Ankara squandered this opportunity too. Instead of building bridges, it dug deeper trenches.

What will hurt Turkiye the most this time is the anger and disappointment of the Indian public. The collective memory of Indians does not erase easily. Indians will remember that Turkiye chose to stand with Pakistan and speak out against India’s security actions especially after India had stood by Ankara during its worst earthquake in February 2023 through Operation Dost.

Tourism, one of Turkiye’s major soft power industries, will take a major hit. More than 3.3 lakh Indian tourists visited Turkiye in 2024 contributing substantially to the hospitality sector. Several reports suggest a 28 per cent drop in bookings from Indian travel agencies for Turkiye, with Greece, Egypt, and the UAE now preferred over Istanbul or Antalya. Academic exchanges too are being cut. Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), Jamia Millia Islamia, Hyderabad University, IIT Roorkee, Kanpur University (terminated MoU with Istanbul University) and Maulana Azad National Urdu University have declined to sign MoUs with Turkish universities.

India’s Ministry of Civil Aviation and Bureau of Civil Aviation Security has also refused approval for airport security MoUs with Turkish entities such as Celebi. The Indian government is further considering curtailing imports of Turkish-made construction materials, automobile parts, and consumer goods.

One of the most concerning vectors of Turkiye’s influence in India lies in the operations of Diyanet, the state’s Directorate of Religious Affairs, which has strategically funded Islamic scholarships and fellowships for Indian Muslims. Over 300 active Diyanet-sponsored scholarships were recorded in 2024 which specifically focused on students from South India and Jammu & Kashmir. These scholarships often take recipients to Istanbul or Ankara-based Islamic institutions where several centres have been reported to engage in anti-India narratives particularly concerning Kashmir.

There are at least eight Diyanet-linked cultural centres operational in India in Hyderabad, Kozhikode, Lucknow, Srinagar, etc. These centres have allegedly been fostering religious education that subtly projects Ankara’s Caliphate narrative and undermines India’s secular ethos. Over the years, the Indian security establishment has grown increasingly wary of this “soft indoctrination” strategy. It is interesting to note that amidst Turkiye’s plummeting economy and high inflation rates with its currency at its lowest record of depreciation, Ankara has been offering lucrative jobs in Islamic theology, translation, diplomacy, and NGO work to Indian Muslims educated under its fellowship programmes.

In that context, the termination and refusal to renew MoUs with Turkish institutions is not merely a symbolic gesture of isolating Turkiye in response to its pro-Pakistan stance post-Pahalgam; it is also a strategic move to counter the growing challenge of Diyanet-led soft indoctrination in India. These academic disengagements signal a broader intent to curb Ankara’s use of educational and cultural platforms to subtly propagate ideological narratives that undermine India’s secular and sovereign fabric.

Turkiye forgets that Indian Muslims, the second-largest Muslim population globally, overwhelmingly identify with the Indian state, not with transnational Islamic ambitions. India’s understanding of Islamic extremism as a threat emanates from Pakistan’s use of religion to fuel terrorism, not Islam as a faith. If Turkiye wants to be a peace partner, its gaze should turn toward India’s inclusive Islamic mosaic, not towards Pakistan’s exported jihadism.

Turkiye’s antagonism is not new. It blocked India’s entry into the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for decades despite India housing more Muslims than most OIC members. Even when India was invited as a ‘Guest of Honour’ at the 2019 OIC summit in Abu Dhabi, Turkiye, alongside Pakistan, tried to sabotage the invite. Erdogan’s repeated rants on Kashmir especially post-Article 370 removal have featured prominently in UN General Assembly speeches. It has always echoed Pakistan’s narrative. Thus, it is clear that Erdogan’s Turkiye is not neutral; it is ideologically bound to Islamabad even if it comes at the cost of economic interests and diplomatic goodwill.

India has begun to exercise measured but firm disassociation from Ankara. This includes dismantling Diyanet networks within India; curtailing tourism and urging travel advisories against non-essential travel to Turkiye; reviewing trade, especially in sectors with Turkish dependence, and exploring alternatives in Greece, the Balkans, and the UAE; and public diplomacy campaigns to counter Turkiye’s disinformation on Kashmir. Ankara must understand that sympathy for terrorism has a cost. Operation Dost, India’s humanitarian effort during Turkiye’s earthquake was a gesture of friendship. Turkiye’s response post-Pahalgam was a gesture of betrayal.

Turkiye had a chance to reposition itself as a bridge between East and West. With shared civilisational ties, Sunni Hanafi linkages, and economic complementarities, India could have been a natural partner. But under Erdogan’s pan-Islamist vision, Turkiye chose ideology over pragmatism. By supporting Pakistan, a country that exports terror, Ankara has chosen short-term solidarity over long-term strategy. India, and Indians, will not forget this. This time, Turkiye’s naive and immature stance will cost it economically, diplomatically, and in public perception.

Dr Manjari Singh focuses on contemporary Middle Eastern affairs and is the author of ‘India and the Gulf: A Security Perspective’. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.