India in a ‘G-Zero’ world must be a balancer and not a bystander – Firstpost

The intensifying US-China rivalry has given rise to a fragmented geopolitical and economic landscape that defies neat classifications like “bipolarity” or “multipolarity”. What we are living through now is a “G-Zero” world—one marked not by a stable distribution of global power but by a dangerous vacuum, where no single actor or coalition commands enough authority to shape international norms.

Coined by political scientist Ian Bremmer in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the G-Zero concept emerged as a critique of the post-Cold War illusion that liberal democracies would lead an integrated, rules-based order; instead, it captured the growing reality of power diffusion and institutional dysfunction. For India, this is both a moment of elevated opportunity and rising concerns.

The Trade War that Redefined Global Economic Geometry

The economic fracture between the US and China, catalysed by the Trump administration in 2018, has now hardened into a structural feature of global affairs. The trade war, initially framed as a tactical lever to correct imbalances, has morphed into a strategic contest underpinning national security, technological supremacy, and ideological dominance.

According to the WTO secretariat, the US and China together account for 28 per cent of the world’s merchandise trade, having emerged as top traders over the past two decades.

By 2025, this rivalry had escalated dramatically. In a bold and combative move, the re-elected US president announced up to 245 per cent tariffs on a wide range of Chinese imports, from semiconductors to syringes. China struck back by freezing orders for Boeing aircraft and tightening its grip on exports of rare earth elements—materials that power everything from electric vehicles to wind turbines.

Each move by one superpower was swiftly mirrored by retaliation from the other, creating an atmosphere of deepening mistrust and weaponised interdependence. While these two economic titans slug it out, the rest of the world are forced to duck, weave, and improvise.

The Mirage of Multipolarity

This conflict plays out against a broader narrative of an emergent multipolar order. But is this truly multipolarity or merely a cover for fragmentation? Superficially, it appears that middle powers like India, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia are enjoying more agency. On closer examination, however, this agency is often reactive and constrained.

India, for example, continues to participate in US-led strategic initiatives like the Quad and I2U2 while also maintaining a $118 billion trade relationship with China and relying heavily on Russian arms imports. Similarly, Saudi Arabia courts Chinese investment while still dependent on US military backing. These are not moves of unfettered autonomy, but of tactical hedging.

Even ASEAN—once the flagbearer of “centrality” in Asia’s security discourse—finds itself fractured, with countries like Cambodia and Laos increasingly tilting toward Beijing’s orbit. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which once seemed to offer decentralised development, now faces pushback from countries such as Sri Lanka and Zambia grappling with debt distress.

Meanwhile, the US is narrowing its economic alliances through “friend-shoring” policies like the Inflation Reduction Act, while China is promoting a surveillance-laden digital Silk Route. Both are creating exclusive ecosystems that disrupt global supply chains and inhibit cross-border cooperation, even in areas like climate change, where geopolitical rivalry has already stalled nearly 40 per cent of multilateral carbon reduction initiatives.

The G-Zero Paradox for Middle Powers

Caught in this crossfire are middle powers—states too big to be ignored but too weak to set the rules. Countries like Vietnam and Mexico, once envisioned as alternatives to Chinese manufacturing, now face punitive U.S. tariffs. The narrative of “strategic autonomy” rings hollow when even sovereign policy decisions—like sourcing soybeans or solar panels—are influenced by the whims of the US-China chessboard.

Technological decoupling, too, has failed to deliver a clear winner. SMIC, China’s leading chipmaker, defied US sanctions by producing 5nm chips, while American solar companies scramble under tariff-induced constraints. In agriculture, China’s pivot to Brazilian soybeans has bankrupted US farmers and triggered food price inflation in global markets.

This is not a new equilibrium. It is a vacuum—an unstable, high-risk zone of G-Zero fragmentation, where institutions lack teeth and middle powers lack security.

India: Balancer or Bystander?

India’s position in this chaotic order is uniquely complex. Its strategic visibility has undeniably grown through its leadership of the G20, deepening engagement with the Quad, and its multilateral activism in BRICS and SCO. But visibility is not the same as leverage.

India continues to walk a diplomatic tightrope. It abstains from critical UN resolutions that could antagonise Russia or China, even as it seeks cutting-edge technology transfers from the US. Its non-alignment—repackaged today as “multi-alignment”—is not ideological but operational: a pragmatic way of navigating conflicting imperatives.

India’s balancing act is further illustrated by its calibrated response to global conflicts. On the issue of Russia-Ukraine war, New Delhi has consistently called for dialogue and peace without directly criticising Moscow—an approach shaped by historical ties, defence dependencies, and energy interests.

This careful posture is echoed in its handling of tensions with China: India pursues military modernisation and strengthens partnerships like the Quad, yet avoids overt escalation, preferring strategic caution over confrontation. Its repeated abstentions on UN votes signal a desire to uphold strategic autonomy, but they also raise difficult questions about India’s commitment to the very principles it champions—sovereignty, international law, and global leadership. This tension between values and interests underscores the ambiguity of India’s current foreign policy—neither passive nor assertive, but persistently navigating the margins between moral rhetoric and realpolitik.

While India benefits from the “China Plus One” manufacturing shift, this optimism is tempered by systemic vulnerabilities. The imposition of US tariffs on Indian steel and pharmaceuticals—justified on “national security” grounds—exemplifies how even friends can turn protectionist. At the same time, India’s dependence on Chinese electronics and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) makes complete decoupling economically implausible.

Opportunities Amidst the Unravelling

Despite these contradictions, India is not without tools. Its diversified engagement strategy has allowed it to sign FTAs with the UAE, Australia, and the EU and attract global capital inflows across sectors. It continues to advocate for UNSC reforms and represent the Global South in multilateral forums with credibility.

The real question is: Can India convert this reactive positioning into a proactive agenda?

This requires institutional clarity, economic resilience, and visionary leadership. India must accelerate self-reliance by investing in its manufacturing base, renewable energy, and critical technologies like semiconductors. The Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes need better execution and targeted support for MSMEs. Defence indigenisation must go beyond rhetoric, focusing on reducing dependency on legacy Russian platforms while selectively sourcing tech from Western allies.

India’s diplomatic flexibility should be channelled into global norm-building. Whether through spearheading climate alliances like the International Solar Alliance or building mineral partnerships to counter China’s stranglehold on rare earths, India must transition from being a balancer to becoming a builder.

Risks of Ambiguity, Rewards of Vision

India’s refusal to fully align with any one bloc has given it breathing room—but that window is narrowing. As the US and China pressure nations into economic and security camps, fence-sitting will become increasingly untenable. The risk is not just of supply chain disruptions or trade barriers, but of diplomatic isolation and diminished global influence.

Moreover, internal contradictions weaken India’s credibility. Participation in the Quad is at odds with active BRICS membership. US partnerships in AI and clean tech sit uneasily with continued defence purchases from Moscow. To stay relevant, India must define what kind of global order it wants—and how it intends to shape it.

The world is not waiting. Regional arms races are heating up, from Japan’s record $68 billion defence budget to Saudi-China missile deals. The BRICS+ expansion—including states like Iran and Ethiopia—exposes ideological incoherence, not strategic unity. Institutions like the New Development Bank are being outpaced by Bretton Woods institutions. In this flux, India must resist the temptation to muddle through.

In a G-Zero world, India’s challenge is not merely to navigate chaos—it is to lead with coherence. That means defining strategic priorities, executing them with discipline, and investing in institutional capacity. It means moving beyond “wait and watch” diplomacy towards a bold but balanced engagement model that combines autonomy with alliance-building.

India is not yet a rule-maker in the international system. But it is no longer just a rule-taker either. The next decade will determine whether it becomes a rule-shaper—a middle power with major ambitions, strong will and the strategic clarity to realise them.

Amal Chandra is an author, policy analyst, political commentator and columnist. He currently serves as a program official at the Central University of Gujarat. He tweets @ens_socialis. Anusreeta Dutta is a doctoral researcher at BITS Pilani (India)-RMIT (Australia), with prior experience as a political researcher and ESG analyst. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.