India must rethink its internal security priorities – Firstpost

The recent outbreak of communal violence in Murshidabad, West Bengal, is not an isolated incident; it reflects an advanced stage of deep-rooted cancer in India’s internal security domain, fraught with structural, ideological, and political fault lines. The violence, sparked by protests against the 2025 Waqf (Amendment) Act, brought to light the increasing influence of radical Islamist groups, linkages to extremist organisations across the border in Bangladesh, and proxy wars by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The failure of law and order machinery and the politicisation of the event added fuel to the communal flare-up and loss of innocent lives. Unless such issues are addressed at the deep root level with an iron fist, such incidents will spread like fire and engulf the already fragile and vulnerable internal security domain. Viksit Bharat cannot happen if the Surakshit Bharat edifice is not addressed as a priority without any fear or favour.

Murshidabad: A Border District Under Stress

Murshidabad, the seat of Bengal’s Nawabs, shares a long and porous 125-kilometre border with Bangladesh, placing it at the crossroads of regional dynamics, demographic fault lines, and socio-economic challenges. Its Muslim-dominated population (67 per cent) and vulnerabilities to cross-border radicalisation, refugee influx and transnational smuggling, including narcotics, make it a soft target for extremist networks and the growth of anti-national elements.

Security agencies have been flagging the activities of Islamist radical groups like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and others for years. However, the petty politics turned a blind eye. These groups use these border districts as safe havens for recruitment and radicalisation of society. The growth of anti-national narratives and ideological indoctrination were embedded in the recent unrest, which was characterised by premeditated mobilisation, attacks on public infrastructure, and the spread of anti-national narratives.

Structural Drivers Behind the Violence

Several interrelated factors have contributed to the steady radicalisation trends visible in Murshidabad and similar districts:

• Cross-border Radical Linkages: With the new dispensation in power and influence of Pakistan’s ISI, Bangladesh faces challenges from Islamist radical JeI groups like JMB, HuJI, and Hefazat-e-Islam. These groups are active in cross-border fuelling situations with supporters and madrasas in Indian districts.

• Unregulated Madrasa and Religious Infrastructure: The presence of unregistered madrasas and independent religious trusts, often outside of government control, offers a haven for extremist ideologies and activities.

• Digital Radicalisation: Online extremism is also a growing concern, with encrypted messaging apps and social media being used to spread provocative material. This is especially true for accounts run from across the border. Several WhatsApp video calls from Bangladesh have been detected during the recent protests, highlighting this malice.

• Marginalisation of Moderates: Marginalisation of moderate community leaders, leaving a vacuum filled by extremist clerics.

• Political and Administrative Gaps: Limited intelligence coordination, inadequate early-warning systems, and delays in enforcement responses continue to hinder the timely containment of such disturbances.

External Linkages and Regional Security Implications

The involvement of regional actors adds a concerning dimension to this issue. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has historically exploited eastern India’s demographic and communal fault lines through proxy extremist networks. The ISI’s operational strategy includes financial and logistical support to radical elements, smuggling networks, and information warfare campaigns aimed at destabilising sensitive districts. Proxy Islamist groups are growing in these areas for subversion and recruitment. Furthermore, cross-border arms, fake currency, and narcotics networks are funding extremist cells. These are being fuelled by online propaganda warfare, inflaming communal tensions via fake accounts and radical content originating from Dhaka and Karachi.

The recent ingress of ISI in Bangladesh’s radical forces has an anti-India agenda. Reports indicate that certain cross-border groups involved in radical mobilisation receive support from informal transnational networks, further complicating border management and counter-radicalisation efforts.

Politicisation of Internal Security

A serious and recurring malady in state-centre security management has been the politicisation of communal incidents and blame games with little regard for national implications. These are coloured by vote-bank appeasement of extremist religious groups and soft-pedalling or denial of radicalisation threats to avoid political fallout. Inaction or selective enforcement by law enforcement agencies under political pressure is undermining public trust in governance.

The Murshidabad unrest exposed critical operational failures: delayed police deployment and inadequate crowd control allowed protests to turn violent; poor intelligence coordination and preventive action failed to intercept radical mobilisers; Absence of digital monitoring infrastructure enabled unchecked dissemination of provocative content and the State administration’s reluctance to crack down on radical elements for fear of communal backlash.

Key Internal Security Risks

The Murshidabad unrest points to several strategic risks:

• Expansion of Radical Influence: Continued tolerance of informal radical networks risks transforming sensitive districts into operational hubs for extremist groups. National security is under threat with the expansion of JMB, ISI, and Islamist sleeper cells in India’s east.

• Social Cohesion Erosion: Repeated incidents of unrest weaken inter-community trust, increase alienation, and potentially lead to recurring cycles of regional unrest.

• Border Security Vulnerabilities: Porous borders combined with local logistical networks create opportunities for infiltration, smuggling, and subversive activities. The one border, one force concept has been ignored for too long.

• Digital Misinformation Warfare: The rapid spread of communal misinformation and incitement material, much of it originating from outside the border, amplifies tensions and undermines governance.

• Political Polarisation: Deepening of communal politics, erosion of state neutrality, and governance paralysis.

Policy Recommendations

To address these challenges comprehensively, India must adopt a multi-layered, apolitical, and intelligence-driven strategy that balances hard security with community integration.

1. Border Management and Intelligence Network

• Strengthen the BSF’s surveillance infrastructure with drones, riverine patrols, and electronic monitoring. Go in for the ‘one border, one force’ concept.

• Establish integrated district intelligence coordination cells, ensuring seamless information sharing between state police, BSF, and central agencies.

• Enhance collaboration with Bangladeshi agencies for joint monitoring and dismantling of cross-border extremist networks. Jointly crack down with Bangladesh on JMB and radical madrasa networks.

2. Regulation of Religious Institutions and Madrasas

• Ensure mandatory registration of all religious trusts, madrasas, and faith-based organisations/trusts.

• Introduce curriculum audits to standardise educational content and discourage sectarian teachings.

• Monitor foreign funding sources and enforce compliance with transparency guidelines.

3. Counter-Radicalisation and Community Reach

• Launch district-level deradicalisation programmes involving educators, psychologists, and community leaders.

• Initiate employment and vocational training schemes focused on high-risk demographics.

• Build community policing models that prioritise trust-building and grievance redressal.

• Revisit toxic teachings in the education system and eradicate them.

4. Digital Surveillance and Information Management

• Establish dedicated digital monitoring units at the district level to track radical content and misinformation.

• Partner with social media platforms to streamline content moderation protocols.

• Launch counter-narrative campaigns emphasising constitutional values, pluralism, and national security.

5. Depoliticisation of Communal Issues and Ensuring State Neutrality

• Promote a non-partisan, zero-tolerance approach toward communal unrest and radical mobilisation.

• Strengthen institutional accountability mechanisms to prevent selective enforcement or political patronage of extremist groups.

• Involve civil society and neutral community figures in conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts.

6. Economic and Infrastructure Development

• Invest in infrastructure, healthcare, and trade facilities in Murshidabad and similar border districts.

• Integrate these regions into national economic and logistics corridors to curb reliance on illicit cross-border networks.

• Promote inclusive welfare schemes to address socio-economic marginalisation.

The Strategic Way Forward

Murshidabad’s unrest should be viewed not merely as a localised incident but as a strategic early warning for India’s internal security management along its eastern border. The threats to national security are more dangerous in the internal domain than in the external domain. As the nature of threats becomes increasingly hybrid, blending ideology, digital mobilisation, cross-border logistics, and political sensitivities, the response must be holistic and preventive rather than reactive.

India’s internal security policy must prioritise border district stability, community resilience, and intelligence-led governance models. The focus should remain on neutralising radicalisation networks, deradicalisation strategies, fostering inclusive local economies, socio-cultural harmony and depoliticising internal security responses.

Murshidabad must be remembered not just as a flashpoint but as a lesson. India cannot let Kashmir-like situation spread along its other borders.

The author is former Director General, Mechanised Forces. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.