Interpreting PM Modi’s new Lakshman Rekha post Pahalgam – Firstpost

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent assertion that “every act of terror will be treated as an act of war” has resonated powerfully across India. In the emotionally charged aftermath of attacks by Pakistani terrorists at Pahalgam, this statement has stirred both pride and anticipation among the Indian public. For many, it’s the literal implication which holds good; that India will respond with military force each time a terrorist strike occurs within its borders. However, such an interpretation risks oversimplifying a complex national security strategy shaped by realism, restraint, and calibrated escalation. It needs a nuanced understanding.

At the outset it is necessary to clarify that the Prime Minister’s assertion was a message of warning which contributes to the overall deterrence through communication of intent. Left in the grey zone, this has a more powerful effect, with the adversaries put on virtual notice not to expect inaction on the part of India, to any deliberate act of provocation.

PM Modi’s declaration is not merely a tactical or doctrinal shift. It is first and foremost a political message—a signalling exercise aimed at multiple audiences. Domestically, it reinforces the government’s image as strong on national security, appealing to a public that has long demanded a tougher line on cross-border terrorism. Internationally, it communicates India’s growing impatience with the persistence of terror networks operating from Pakistan, despite repeated assurances and pressure from the global community.

However, political signalling must not be conflated with operational doctrine or strategy. The Indian state’s response to terrorism—especially state-sponsored terrorism—has evolved significantly over the last two decades, particularly after the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and more recently, the 2016 Uri and 2019 Pulwama attacks. While military options are now clearly on the table, they are neither automatic nor uniform. As with everything in the domain of military operations, national interest comes first and it may not always lie in a military option. India has clearly moved on to the thought process of ‘hybrid to fight hybrid’. Other domains of the hybrid spectrum, other than military, may sometimes offer options suiting national interest in a much more focused way.

The Indian public may view surgical strikes or airstrikes as the default response to any cross-border terrorism. This shift in perception began after the 2016 Uri attack, which saw India conducting publicly acknowledged trans-Line of Control (LoC) surgical strikes. The 2019 Balakot airstrikes following the Pulwama terrorist attack further deepened this belief, portraying India as a nation ready and willing to respond militarily even when faced with the risk of escalation. However, conventional military responses to terrorism are neither always appropriate nor always effective. Not every attack warrants an overt strike. Some such attacks as part of the Pakistan proxy war strategy are designed to provoke precisely that—a disproportionate Indian response that could be exploited diplomatically or escalate into full-blown conflict. Terrorist groups understand this well and often operate below the threshold of what could justify a conventional war.

India, therefore, must—and does—respond asymmetrically across a spectrum of covert and overt tools. These include intelligence-based neutralisation of operatives, cyber operations, economic and diplomatic isolation of Pakistan, as well as counter-terrorism diplomacy in multilateral forums like FATF and the UN.

India’s doctrine vis-a-vis Pakistan-based terrorism has undergone a subtle but significant transformation. The traditional posture of “strategic restraint” has now been replaced with a model that might be termed “controlled escalation”—a strategy that combines overt retaliation with a careful calibration of risk.

This doctrine includes several core elements, as under:

• Credible Deterrence Below the Nuclear Threshold: India aims to demonstrate that it can punish Pakistan for terrorist acts without triggering a full-scale war or breaching the nuclear threshold. Operation Sindoor was a landmark in this regard, showing that even when no military targets are initially in the crosshairs, a powerful message can still be sent.

• Flexible Response Spectrum: India now retains the right to choose the time, place, and mode of its response—ranging from kinetic strikes to covert operations. This flexibility avoids predictability and complicates Pakistan’s planning and messaging.

• Non-Kinetic Measures: Since 2016, India has also shown greater willingness to use economic diplomatic offensives, and cyber capabilities to pressure Pakistan, particularly in the aftermath of major attacks.

• Legal and Institutional Consolidation: India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), UAPA, and amendments to intelligence frameworks have been geared toward enabling pre-emptive action and post-attack accountability. These legal measures are vital components of a counter-terror doctrine that goes beyond military retaliation.

Strategic Restraint Still Holds Value

Despite the muscular posturing, it is important to recognise that restraint remains a crucial element of India’s strategic culture. This restraint is not borne of weakness but of strength and maturity. India understands that Pakistan remains a nuclear-armed state with a volatile internal structure. Full-scale war is undesirable for both sides, and it is in this context that India continues to prioritise deterrence and disruption over devastation.

Moreover, global geopolitical dynamics—including the role of the U.S., China, Gulf countries, and the wider international community—require India to balance assertiveness with diplomacy. Strikes like the ones in Operation Sindoor succeeded not only because of military precision but also because India had carefully prepared the diplomatic ground, ensuring progressive international understanding and support.

The Problem of Attribution

A significant challenge in treating every terror attack as an ‘act of war’ is the issue of attribution. While some attacks bear the clear imprint of groups like Jaish-e-Mohammed or Lashkar-e-Taiba, which operate with the complicity of Pakistani agencies, others may involve local radicalisation, transnational jihadist inspiration, or decentralised execution. Reacting militarily in such situations risks overplaying a response, thereby undermining India’s legitimacy and international standing.

India, therefore, must retain the right to investigate and verify before responding, even as it sends an unambiguous message that it holds the Pakistani establishment responsible for enabling a terror ecosystem. In the case of Operation Sindoor, although there was much criticism of the fortnight’s delay in response, I continue to believe that this was necessary. It did not undermine the capability and effect of India’s response but rather enhanced the credibility through correct target profiling.

Managing Public Expectation

The gap between public expectation and state doctrine is a major challenge today, especially because of the surfeit of information available in the public domain. Continuous exposure to patriotic rhetoric, television debates, and social media campaigns has created a narrative where anything less than a military strike is seen as weakness. But national security cannot be crowd-sourced. It requires patience, precision, and a lot of secrecy.

Political leadership must walk the fine line between reassuring the public and maintaining operational discretion. While declarations like ‘every act of terror will be treated as an act of war’ serve a strategic purpose, they must be backed by clarity in communication—especially when no visible response follows a smaller-scale attack.

War is not waged for public satisfaction—it is a tool of last resort in a complex matrix of power, diplomacy, and security. PM Modi’s statement must be understood as a doctrine of “strategic resolve” rather than a promise of immediate retaliation in every instance. It’s akin to Pakistan being on perpetual notice; we could respond any time to a provocation. Tenterhooks is what we would like that establishment to be on.

For India, the true measure of success lies not in the spectacle of a strike but in the slow, methodical degradation of the terror infrastructure, the insulation of society from extremist narratives, and the long-term isolation of Pakistan’s support to terror. War, in this context, is as much about intellect, ideas and influence, as it is about airstrikes, air defence and artillery.

The writer is a Member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.