Is Pakistan’s restrained reaction on Kashmir Day an olive branch towards India? – Firstpost

Pakistan marked February 5, its annual Kashmir Solidarity Day, this year, as it has for the past few decades, as a national holiday. The country’s leaders, cutting across political parties, competed with each other in expressing their commitment to the ‘Kashmir cause’. The army could not be left far behind. In a statement, the Defence Forces leadership paid “tribute to the indomitable spirit of the Kashmiri people, who have endured decades of oppression, state-sponsored brutality, and egregious human rights violations. Their unwavering resolve in the face of tyranny remains a beacon of courage and inspiration for the entire nation”.

The irony of the Pakistan Defence Forces solicitude for the Kashmiris would not be lost on any objective observer, for they are continuing to kill and maim the Baluchi people, and the continued protests of thousands of Baluchi families whose members have just disappeared have never elicited a satisfactory response from the Pakistani authorities. The fact is that Pakistan has, since it came into being in 1947, coveted Jammu and Kashmir as a ‘prize’. Its interest has always been in the land while it continues to shed crocodile tears for the people of Kashmir.

Among the functions held to mark Kashmir Solidarity Day 2025 Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) was notable. He addressed the POK Legislative Assembly. His speech was marked with the usual invective that Pakistani leaders hurl against India, the unacceptability of the constitutional changes on August 5, 2019, an assertion of Pakistan’s ability to handle Indian aggressive designs—in this context he could not restrain himself from mentioning Kulbhushan Jadhav and Abhinandan Varthaman—and Pakistan’s unchanging commitment to the J&K cause. Yet amidst all this negativity, two aspects were also present. These merit attention:

One: there was an absence of any fulminations against the Sangh Parivar and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This was in contrast to the abuse hurled by Shehbaz Sharif’s predecessor, Imran Khan, against the Sangh Parivar and its ideology.

Two: Shehbaz Sharif said that Pakistan wishes to resolve issues, including that of J&K, through peaceful negotiations. That would be in the interest of the people of the region. In this context, he recalled Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Lahore and the Lahore Declaration, which envisaged that the two countries would resolve all their differences through discussions. He said that ‘Lahore’ was the only path between the two countries. Of course, all this was hedged with an emphasis on the need to implement the United Nations Resolutions on J&K and to act according to the will of the Kashmiri people. Notwithstanding all the hedging, Shehbaz Sharif’s message on his desire to resurrect ‘Lahore’ was abundantly clear.

Shehbaz Sharif has always been careful not to ruffle the army’s feathers. It is therefore unlikely that he would have mentioned the Lahore Declaration without Army Chief Asim Munir’s consent. It is also significant that he made these comments in his address to the POK Assembly, and that too on Kashmir Solidarity Day. Thus, his reference to the Lahore Declaration can only be interpreted as a signal to Prime Minister Narendra Modi of his desire to initiate a dialogue process.

This was also a signal to the incoming Trump administration that Pakistan was interested in turning a page on confrontation with India. In all this, Shehbaz Sharif could hardly have forgotten that Prime Minister Vajpayee’s brave Lahore initiative of February 1999 came to naught on the icy Kargil heights because of the crass strategic stupidity of General Pervez Musharraf.

At this stage, three issues may be considered. The first relates to the reasons for Pakistan to reach out to India. The reference to the Lahore Declaration is nothing but that even if it has been done indirectly, it is hedged. The second is what would be the likely response of the Modi government, and the third is the interest of the Trump administration in the affairs of South Asia.

Pakistan continues to be plagued with multiple crises. These are political, security, and economic. The rivalry between Army Chief Asim Munir and Imran Khan is showing no signs of abating, though Munir allowed the Shehbaz Sharif government to reach out to Imran Khan, who continues to be in jail. Munir and also the Sharifs’ difficulty lies in the fact that Imran Khan’s fund of popularity in the Punjab has not eroded to the extent the two would have liked to. Hence, the need for talks.

The talks, which began in December, went nowhere. Khan is convinced that the February 2024 elections were rigged and wants a fresh round of polls. That Munir and the Shehbaz Sharif government and its allies cannot allow. On February 8, Imran Khan’s supporters carried out a massive show of support in Swabi in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, his stronghold. The government did not permit any demonstrations or agitation in the Punjab. On February 9, Imran Khan called off all talks with the government. Despite his denials, Imran Khan hopes that Munir and Shehbaz Sharif will have to bow to some of the Trump people in Washington who, they believe, want him to be released from jail and for fresh elections to be held early.

If the political situation is fraught, the security situation is showing no signs of becoming easier. The Afghan Taliban’s support for the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) is there and will not abate even though the men in Kabul are going through the motions of trying to rein them in. The TTP attacks in KP are continuing and are a destabilising force at a time when the Pakistan economy desperately needs foreign investments. Indeed, the macroeconomic situation has improved with the 24th IMF programme’s commencement, but the need for the rollover of foreign debt is needed. The latest request is to China to roll over $3.4 billion in debt. China will doubtless agree.

Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari has recently visited China. Both countries renewed their vows of their unshakeable all-weather friendship. That will no doubt go on, but Pakistani leaders know that in view of their difficulties on the Afghan border, they will basically need a more or less peaceful LoC and the International Border in J&K. Hence, at this stage, Pakistan does not wish to rock the boat with India. Also, while the Sharifs want to gradually open up trade with India, they know that it would not be easy to do so. Lahore also aimed to improve trade ties between India and Pakistan.

Thus, while Pakistan would wish to begin a normalisation process with India, though it would need the fig leaf of statehood being restored to J&K, there is little interest in the Modi government to really focus on Pakistan. All it wants is that the ceasefire of 2021 on the LoC should continue; Pakistan too does not want to disturb that. Modi’s focus would be on India’s relations with the US and Europe and China and the Indo-Pacific. The issues with Afghanistan are causing apprehensions in Rawalpindi, but Modi is unlikely to impart any serious momentum to the process.

The Trump administration will not meddle in Afghanistan or Central Asia and has little interest in Pakistan, though it would not want China to have a free run. Hence, at most, Modi may be told in his forthcoming visit to Washington that India’s relations with Pakistan should remain stable. It is unlikely that with all his attention on China, Russia, and West Asia, including Iran, Pakistan is anywhere close to being a priority for Trump.

In view of all this, it is hardly likely that Shehbaz Sharif’s Lahore Declaration reference has caused any excitement in the South Block.

The writer is a former Indian diplomat who served as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan and Myanmar, and as secretary, the Ministry of External Affairs. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.