Junta is on the back foot, but no endgame in sight yet – Firstpost
I am writing this article from close to the Myanmar-Thailand border with the help of elements from the resistance. They are joyful over their victories against junta forces and hopeful that junta rule will soon collapse; maybe a new general would sue for peace to end violence. As long as the junta holds on to the majority of airfields and sea ports and controls the Bamar (Burman) heartland, an endgame does not flicker on the horizon.
The Junta enjoys the support of two P-5 (UN’s permanent five) countries—Russia and China—who will ensure they can keep fighting defensive battles. For the military, the stakes are existential, as it had been in power since 1962, the longest direct/indirect military rule in recent history, next only to Pakistan.
Most dictators, especially generals who have dismantled democratic systems for regime change, would like to hold sham elections to restore democracy to please the Liberals and the United Nations. That is precisely what Senior General Min Aung Hlaing intends to do in Myanmar, like some illustrious predecessors, so that international and regional organisations revive aid and assistance and provide it a veneer of legitimacy. Generals and colonels in Latin America, Africa, India’s extended neighbourhood, and ASEAN have perfected ‘coup-craft’.
Hlaing is trying to enter that distinguished club. Those softly backing him are neighbours Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, the country holding the dubious record in maximum number of attempted and successful coups (30). For generals in Naypyidaw, the Bangkok military—in Saville Row suits—had become their model. But Thailand itself could be transiting into a relatively new system of governance with the monarch himself calling the shots under a democratic façade. The problem for Hlaing, like usurpers elsewhere, in holding elections is control of territory, population centres, and levels of violence by Resistance forces. Credibility is a perfunctory factor.
By last count in December last year, the junta held less than 50 per cent territory, though it held the majority of population centres. Hlaing has been postponing elections for the last four years as an alliance of the National Unity Government (NUG), its People’s Defence Force (PDF), and several Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) constituting the Resistance has made his mission unfeasible. Last November, China, a key stakeholder in Myanmar, had committed to help Hlaing in turning into reality a difficult task—holding elections in 2025.
I recall in 2001-02, PM Sher Bahadur Deuba of Nepal was ordered by King Gyanendra to hold elections that were long overdue. But the civil war against Maoists was turning the tide against the Royal Nepal Army in creating conditions conducive to holding elections. My counsel was sought on the feasibility of elections in Nepal, given that the Indian Army and security forces had enabled elections on time despite the insurgency and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.
Although advice was accompanied with a blueprint for elections, Kathmandu was unable to hold them. King Gyanendra dismissed Deuba for failure to conduct elections. Democracy was restored in 2006, but by then, the king had lost his job, and the RNA its royal title. However, it had not blundered like the junta in Myanmar on the scale and intensity of human rights violations.
The junta, given its history of governing the country, many believe, is still the key stakeholder in any conflict resolution, especially as some ethnic disputes remain unsettled for decades. That the junta, the self-proclaimed defender of Myanmar’s sovereignty, diversity, and ethical values, is dispensable in any endgame is hard to sell. After four years of fighting, the junta’s control of territory is unimpressive. Most border trade routes have been lost to EAOs, assisted at places by the PDF.
Rakhine and Chin states bordering India and Bangladesh are with the Arakan Army and Chin Defence Forces. In the north, contiguous with China, and in the east with Thailand, the trade routes are with an alliance of EAOs and Kachins and Karens. Two military command headquarters—western at Ann and northeastern at Lashio—along with their airports at Thandwe and Lashio were evacuated by the military. 75 towns and cities out of some 370 of them have been captured by rebel groups. Two seaports—India-operated Sittwe, the gateway for its multi-modal Kaladan Connectivity Project promoting the Act East Policy, and China-owned Kyaukphyu—both in the Indian Ocean, are surrounded and are on the Arakan Army’s 2025 target list.
Mandalay, the second largest city after Yangon, is threatened and had come under rocket attack in November. For Junta’s survival, the Bamar (Burman) majority areas in Naypyidaw, Sagaing, Mandalay, the Irrawadi delta, Yangon, Bago, and Magwe must be held at all costs. Though the morale and cohesion of the army are suspect, it is believed that the junta’s crack divisions are deployed in the heartland.
Last November, Hlaing visited China and met Premier Li Qiang, who wanted foolproof security for Beijing’s strategic assets: the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which contains oil and gas pipelines and rail and road facilities from Kyaukphyhu to Kunming. China is insisting on deploying private security companies to operate alongside Junta forces in these locations. Beijing is believed to have recalibrated its support for EAOs and has informed the junta about it. But China is adept at playing the double game, and its commitments not to assist EAOs must be taken with a handful of salt. China virtually controls the economy, and Myanmarese, including the junta, resent this. China is the Big Brother. So, no outcome to the conflict is possible without China’s involvement.
India has also reset its compass but cautiously. New Delhi has been unwilling to annoy the junta and was reluctant to engage rebel groups and EAOs who have seized control of territories alongside Manipur and Mizoram. Around 60,000 ethnic Kuki-Zo refugees are camped in Mizoram and a few in Manipur. Last year, the US had, through Track II, contacted India for jointly establishing humanitarian corridors to provide medicines, food, and fuel for internally displaced persons along the border.
Delhi’s response was tardy and too late. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, a former ambassador to Myanmar, has pressed the pedal. Last November, the MEA think tank, Indian Council for World Affairs, New Delhi, had organised a number of meetings with relevant EAOs and other stakeholders. Joint Secretary (Bangladesh and Myanmar) B Shyam took the precaution of also inviting members from the junta in separate engagements. It is not confirmed if NUG was also invited, though government sources say they have been ‘contacted’.
India has to contend with the Arakan Army, the most powerful group in Rakhine state, whose operational control spills over into neighbouring Chinland, where the Chin Defence Force operates. These rebel groups will determine the fate of India’s connectivity projects, stuck due to change in territorial control and violence across Myanmar’s central region.
Initially, India’s Act East Policy was to have pivoted to Bangladesh. But passage through it had its own vicissitudes. So the multi-modal Kaladan connectivity project was designed by sea (Kolkata to Sittwe), across the Kaladan River and overland through Rakhine state to Paletwa in Chin state but under the Arakan Army, and on to Mizoram. Even after a decade and a half, the project has failed to complete. India has to take proactive and trade risks with the junta in the face of transformed ground reality. The Chinese, as usual, are ahead of the curve.
The Myanmar peace process in its different avatars, like Track I (ASEAN’s 5-point consensus), Track One and a Half, and Track II, has made no headway due to the junta’s intransigence. Elections are slated for now in November 2025. No one can tell whether they can be held even with China’s help. But one thing is sure: Gen Hlaing cannot be dismissed for failure to hold elections.
The author is former GOC IPKF South Sri Lanka and founder member Defence Planning Staff, now Integrated Defence Staff, Ministry of Defence. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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