Making sense of the US-declared ceasefire – Firstpost

After 12 tumultuous days of aerial exchanges between Israel and Iran, and the United States’ unprecedented direct airstrike on Iranian soil, the region seems to be returning to a tense and uneasy calm. The escalation, marked most notably by two allegedly staged US strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure and Iran’s retaliatory, symbolic strike on the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, home to significant American military presence, culminated in a ceasefire announcement by the American President. Reportedly similar strikes were also conducted on other US installations in the region particularly in the Gulf.

Just hours later, Tehran and Tel Aviv also confirmed a halt to hostilities, with the US affirming that Iran had expressed readiness to return to negotiations. However, a few rounds of missile salvos were still exchanged after the ceasefire was announced, raising doubts about its immediate enforcement. The next 10 to 12 hours will serve as a crucial incubation period to ascertain the effectiveness and longevity of this ceasefire, and whether it marks a genuine de-escalation or merely a pause in hostilities.

The speed and choreography of this diplomatic development suggest that it had been premeditated. The strategic staging of attacks, wherein critical infrastructure was largely spared, casualties were limited, and targeting appeared symbolic rather than crippling, indicated a performance of strength more than a war aimed at decisive victory. For Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv, it was crucial to display military capability to domestic and international audiences without crossing thresholds that could draw them into a prolonged and uncontrollable conflict. Iran’s attack on Al Udeid, one of the most fortified American bases in the region, appeared designed to demonstrate deterrence without provoking full-scale retaliation. Considering that the US maintains over thirty military bases across more than ten countries in the Middle East, a genuine escalation from Iran would have likely triggered widespread confrontation.

At the heart of this ceasefire lies a revealing contradiction, that is, none of the core strategic objectives of the parties involved have been met. Western intelligence suggests that Iran had shifted its 60 per cent enriched liquid uranium stockpiles well in advance of the strikes, rendering the targeted nuclear infrastructure largely devoid of its primary payload. While the operation succeeded in striking infrastructure, it failed to destroy the actual enriched uranium.

Israel, despite its advanced intelligence capabilities, was unable to locate or destroy these relocated assets, exposing significant operational gaps. Iran, meanwhile, did not mobilise its formidable network of regional proxies — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Popular Mobilisation Forces or Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and Liwa Fatemiyoun in Syria — pointing to either a deliberate choice to limit escalation or a calculated pause to conserve strength for a later stage.

What makes the abrupt ceasefire particularly unusual is the historical context. This was the first time Israel had engaged in direct combat with a state actor in over half a century, since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, while for Iran, it marked its first state-to-state confrontation in over three and a half decades. Given the rare nature of such a conflict, the sudden return to negotiations without clear victory or fulfilment of strategic goals raises questions.

It suggests that future wars may not necessarily be fought to resolution, but rather staged and paused due to the unsustainable cost of maintaining deterrence. This new modality gives way to a pattern of deniable, diffuse, and deeply destabilising confrontations, where integrated multi-domain state conflicts — spanning cyber, information, conventional, and psychological fronts — take centre stage. These are conflicts not designed for battlefield dominance but for endurance and the shaping of perception. As such, they need to be theorised and studied in greater detail as a new paradigm of contemporary warfare that operates within the constraints of both strategic ambiguity and fiscal realism.

The costs incurred over this short but intense period are significant. Preliminary estimates suggest that Israel spent over $1.2 billion on defence operations, including missile defence systems, emergency civilian protections, and infrastructure repairs. Iran, while less transparent with its figures, is believed to have spent close to $800 million, particularly on protective redeployment of sensitive assets and launch operations. The United States, aside from the direct strike costs which are estimated to exceed $250 million, had to rapidly redeploy aircraft and military hardware from threatened bases in the Gulf region. The logistical and strategic costs of this movement, particularly from Al Udeid and bases in the UAE and Kuwait, are expected to reach several hundred million dollars.

Hence, the staggering financial burden incurred by all parties may have played a decisive role in prompting a strategic pause. When the cost of sustaining deterrence begins to outweigh the perceived gains of escalation, even adversaries with entrenched hostilities are compelled to reassess their trajectories. In this case, economic prudence intersected with military calculus, pushing all sides toward a temporary cessation, not as a resolution, but as a necessary breather from the spiralling costs of confrontation.

More crucially, none of the actors involved appear willing to be drawn into a protracted and attritional war reminiscent of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has not only imposed enormous costs on both combatants but also drawn in an array of external actors with competing agendas. For Washington, Tehran, and Tel Aviv alike, prolonging the conflict risks inviting further international entanglement, expanding the theatre of war, and triggering regional instability that could spiral beyond control.

This high-cost, low-resolution form of warfare appears to embody a new military and political reality. The notion of grey zone conflict, wherein hostilities are marked by ambiguity, restraint, and psychological impact rather than battlefield victories, seems to be taking centre stage. The recent skirmish between India and Pakistan followed a similar pattern — short-lived, high-profile exchanges with no clear winner but a prolonged state of heightened alert. Wars in this mould are not about conquering territory or toppling regimes overnight but about manoeuvring within a contested space of influence and perception. In this case, the current ceasefire is not an end but a pause, allowing each side to regroup, reassess, and potentially re-engage with greater clarity or force.

In this context, plausible motivations emerge behind President Trump’s rushed ceasefire declaration. First, the US is unwilling to become embroiled in a prolonged war outside its own territory, a surprising departure from its ‘America First’ posture. Second, Congress remains deeply divided over the unilateral strikes; Republicans defend Trump’s authority as Commander-in-Chief, but the question of legislative oversight remains unresolved.

Third, the pause permits intelligence agencies to trace hidden enriched uranium stockpiles more accurately, avoiding hasty assumptions. And fourth, with no credible alternative regime in place to replace Iran’s leadership, the strategic rationale for deeper escalation remains unclear. Together, these factors make continued conflict beyond a certain threshold strategically pointless and politically costly for all actors involved.

Iran, in the meantime, needs time to restructure its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, repair damaged command systems, and possibly redefine how it will involve its regional proxies in the future. Israel, facing internal criticism over its unfulfilled objectives, must channel its intelligence capabilities more precisely and rebuild key military infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the objectives of the United States remain equally ambiguous. The regime change narrative, once a cornerstone of US–Iran rhetoric, has not been pursued with clarity, nor have viable alternatives to the Iranian regime been put forth. This suggests a strategic vacuum at the heart of current American policy, one that leans more toward containment than transformation.

Complicating matters further is the uncertain position of the Arab world. The fragile normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran has created a diplomatic ambiguity where Arab states appear unwilling to side decisively with either camp. Public statements have begun to refer to “brotherly” ties between Arabs and Iranians, but the strategic reality remains fragile. Were Iran to expand its strikes into broader regional territory, especially in Gulf states that host American military installations, the balance could quickly tip into a regional war with unpredictable consequences.

The international community, especially countries heavily invested in the region like India and China, is watching closely. India, with its significant investments in Iran’s Chabahar Port and energy dependencies in the Gulf, faces heightened risk and may be forced to diversify its strategic interests. China, which counts both Iran and several Gulf countries as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, also finds itself in a complex position, balancing economic interests with the risk of instability. The extension of the grey zone in the Middle East may drive these powers to look elsewhere towards Africa, Central Asia, or Southeast Asia for more stable partners and investment corridors.

While official rhetoric suggests the beginning of a diplomatic chapter, the continuation of low-scale missile strikes between Israel and Iran even after the ceasefire indicates otherwise. The reality is that this war has not ended; it has been postponed. It is a strategic intermission, a breather taken not out of choice but necessity. Each party is recalibrating, rearming, and repositioning for a confrontation that may return in weeks, months, or even years. Whether this pause leads to genuine diplomatic resolution or a more destructive second act remains uncertain.

What is clear, however, is that wars in the modern era may no longer be about conclusive victories. Instead, they are becoming prolonged contests of endurance, perception, and influence — a reality the global community must begin to reckon with.

Dr Manjari Singh focuses on contemporary Middle Eastern affairs and is the author of ‘India and the Gulf: A Security Perspective’. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.