New strategic era in West Asia – Firstpost

It may be too early to learn lessons from the Israel-Iran war, but there are certainly some quick takeaways for India. Because Operation Sindoor is not over, and terrorism from Pakistan is unlikely to end as long as the army is in control there. Don’t forget also that everyone is watching the war calibration carefully. Lessons will be learnt by all sides in this for their own purposes. And that’s where we need to think and analyse and plan for the future.

Deep Intelligence

The first aspect of the war is that Israel had access to precise intelligence on the ground in terms of a continuous feed. Fodrow, Natanz and others were static bases and needed no great intelligence capability. But the targeting of some 14 scientists is a different game altogether.
Reports indicate that the majority were killed by explosive-laden drones, indicating a very high level of internal penetration into Iran. Israel has always had a formidable intelligence capability. But this was something else, and it’s an open question what kind of deep assets it used when the ‘go’ command was given. Such assets are not built overnight. That is worrying in terms of future wars. That means India has to not just up its technical intelligence for the future but also use technology to guard against such locally launched attacks – which could be on intel agencies, on high officials, and on personnel of sensitive installations. So far, the thrust of defence expenditure has been in securing the country’s borders. Time to look inwards.

Sindoor as Template

The second aspect is rather the reverse. In many ways, the US operation, ‘Midnight Hammer’, was a textbook copy of ‘Operation Sindoor’. Trump’s announcement of having targeted ‘only’ nuclear sites, clear signs of talking to Iranians, and most of all, a series of moves to end the war quickly, something that the US is not known for. Those moves included allowing China to continue to buy oil – though sanctions remain – thus ensuring that outside powers did not take a hand. Iran was mollified by leaving open the possibility of sanctions relief. Then was his weighing
heavily on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, to end his continuing strikes. Since the US could at any time stop its missile interception assistance for Israel, this arm-twisting was likely to have had a telling effect.

The Standoff War

Another takeaway from both operations is the ‘stand-off’ wars. Prior to US entry into Iran, Washington made sure that Israel had managed complete air superiority with bombing and missile raids. Even then it used a formidable array of aircraft that included the famed Stealth B-2’s, practically invisible to radar, and fighter aircraft from its many bases in West Asia. And to make trebly sure, some
’two dozen’ land-attack cruise missiles were fired from a submarine which was entirely undetected, at Isfahan. All attacks were at the extreme west of Iran, indicating that aircraft had no intention of doing a flyby and ‘loitering’ in the war zone.

The blueprint of overwhelming force is used since even one aircraft lost would have been the political end for President Trump. No cities were hit, and US intel would have known full well that the major sites had been evacuated. But the lesson is that when there are no serious casualties, escalation is unlikely. This was also the case in Sindoor, where casualties were few. India did not have such a luxury of a package of aircraft (not to mention bases from where fighters could take off and provide protective cover), nor did it even enter Pakistan. But both provide a lesson in ‘stand-off’ wars. That means a line of technology development that includes, vitally, the ability of continuous satellite monitoring. India’s own space programmes need to take note, and quickly.

Control of the Narrative

Another issue to assess is control of the narrative. Even today, the imagery that is being discussed all over the internet is that of Iran. The damages to Israel were kept under wraps, with even the last missile strike by Iran, which mowed down three buildings at Beersheba, with casualties estimated at 4, which seems incredible given the clearly apparent destruction. But Israelis have long been used to violence and have safe rooms, standard procedures for quick evacuation and bunkers. What was hidden even more was the cost that Israel had to take on, with one estimate putting this at
$3 billion in immediate costs, while tax authorities estimate costs at more than
double the sum of claims stemming from the October 7 attack plus all 615 days since. And that’s just claims for damages to property.

Apart from this is the loss of man hours and its effect on gross domestic product. But the point is that none of this was apparent in an independent media, with the opposition swiftly putting aside rivalry in a show of national solidarity. It was only after a truce was declared that the Opposition lambasted Trump for interfering in the criminal charges against Netanyahu, which began in 2020 for fraud and breach of trust. Israel, like India, enjoyed widespread support after the first Hamas attack, which, however, rapidly deteriorated as its war entered its 629th day.

Even the recent meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation saw a split – as did the G-7 meeting – over the question of the Iran war. In the end, the general consensus is that Iran can still make the bomb, perhaps in months. The takeaway of this lesson is probably that warmaking seldom wins friends and, in today’s world, may not even deliver desired objectives. Far better to build up a narrative, as Defence Minister Rajnath Singh did recently when he refused to sign on to a joint statement of the Shanghai Organisation Cooperation while calling out the double standards on terrorism.

But overall, here’s the sum of it all. Internally, India has managed Kashmir without inordinate use of force; in fact, with ‘one hand tied behind its back’. That, together with the manifold changes after the revocation of Article 370, had integrated Kashmir to the rest of India even more, not the other way around. That’s something Tel Aviv should learn. But India has to, in turn, learn from Israel the contours of future war, where the enemy could be already well within the gates, wreaking havoc when it is given the signal. In this, both Pakistan and China are better placed than India. Time to reverse that, either with human assets – which are difficult for obvious reasons – and with technology. Future iterations of Operation Sindoor need to keep this clearly in the forefront.

The author is Director (R&A) at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.