Pakistan’s proxy warfare and the weaponisation of denial – Firstpost

The terror attack in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, which claimed the lives of 26 civilians, mainly Hindu tourists, was not merely an isolated incident of extremism but a symptom of a deeper strategic pathology. The attackers, equipped with high-grade weaponry and military-grade intelligence, operated with the sophistication more typical of state-trained operatives than independent extremists. Their origins, later traced to infrastructure in Muzaffarabad and Karachi, raise questions not only about logistics but about state will and strategic intent.

When States Author Terror

The discourse on Pakistan’s role in regional terrorism is not a new one. It is deeply entrenched in scholarly analysis and policymaking circles alike. Christine Fair’s detailed examination of the Pakistan Army’s strategic culture in Fighting to the End lays the foundational premise that the Pakistani military, steeped in a revisionist ideology, engages in perpetual competition with India, even when victory is unattainable by conventional standards. Fair asserts that the military views itself as the ideological guardian of the nation-state, sustaining conflict through asymmetric means to bleed India by a thousand cuts. This cultural militarism, far from being rogue or incidental, is embedded in the formal institutional logic of the Pakistani military establishment.

Adding credence to Fair’s claims is a theoretical understanding from structural realism. John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism posits that states in an anarchic international system are perpetually driven by survival and the maximisation of relative power. For a state like Pakistan, which finds itself in a structurally inferior position relative to its eastern neighbour, the sponsorship of violent non-state actors becomes not a deviation but a rational strategy to erode Indian power asymmetrically. Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and other groups are not simply insurgent networks; they are, by this lens, state instruments functioning under plausible deniability. Yet the explanation is not confined to realist logic alone.

Stephen Walt’s theory of balance of threat allows a finer understanding. Pakistan’s military may not merely perceive Indian capabilities as threatening, but rather India’s intentions—rooted in a liberal democratic and secular national identity—may appear fundamentally antagonistic to Pakistan’s ideological foundations. Thus, alliances with violent jihadist networks are sustained not only for tactical gains but for counterbalancing what is seen as an existential cultural and political threat.

The 2025 Pahalgam attack, in which the terrorist group initially claiming responsibility—The Resistance Front—later withdrew its statement, reflects the depth of strategic manipulation behind terrorist violence. Forensic data and communication intercepts indicated the use of safehouses linked to state-backed infrastructure. More damning was the revelation that one of the attackers had served in Pakistan’s paramilitary frontier forces, a common pattern in past attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai siege. This blurring of lines between state and non-state actors is a hallmark of proxy warfare—one of the most obfuscating strategies in modern conflict.

Martha Crenshaw, a leading scholar on terrorism, has long argued that terrorism does not emerge in a vacuum but is the product of deliberate political choices. When seen through her framework, the Pakistani state’s recurrent links to terrorism are not episodic failures of governance but manifestations of calculated political behaviour. The state finds utility in these relationships, and the cost of disassociation appears higher than continued patronage. In this framework, the sponsorship of terrorism becomes an instrument of policy, shaped by political opportunity structures and institutionalised preferences.

The Price of Diplomatic Paralysis

Meanwhile, U.S. Congressional reports have repeatedly flagged Pakistan’s dual role in the global war on terror. Since 2001, billions of dollars in military assistance were provided with the expectation that Pakistan would assist in neutralising Al-Qaeda and later the Taliban. Yet, reports from 2007 onwards revealed that significant funds were diverted to build up conventional military assets against India. Congressional testimonies from intelligence officials highlighted how the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) maintained links with groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba, allowing them to operate in protected zones in North Waziristan and Punjab.

In light of these findings, the concept of state complicity must be reexamined not as passive negligence but as a form of strategic authorship. The state is not failing to prevent terrorism; it is often instrumentalizing it. This understanding is supported by Michael Doyle’s notion of illiberal peace—where authoritarian states may appear externally cooperative while internally sustaining practices that undermine liberal international norms. Pakistan, while formally allied with the U.S. and other Western states, has consistently sustained a domestic-security architecture that shelters and trains violent actors to project influence.

The moral hazard created by international funding and diplomatic leniency has further entrenched Pakistan’s duality. For decades, global powers have attempted to court Islamabad for geopolitical access—first during the Cold War, and more recently during the Afghanistan conflict. This transactional logic has disincentivised meaningful structural reforms. The acknowledgment by Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif last month that the state had historically backed terror outfits, couched in justifications about Cold War exigencies, ironically validates years of international scepticism. However, even this admission has not translated into visible dismantling of terrorist ecosystems.

From a constructivist viewpoint, Pakistan’s behaviour may also be rooted in its identity formation. As scholars like Alexander Wendt argue, state interests are not merely given but socially constructed. Pakistan’s identity—largely formed in opposition to India—makes the perpetuation of conflict ideologically sustaining. The use of terror as a policy tool is normalised within this context, and terrorist groups are often cloaked in nationalist and religious legitimacy.

The failure of the international community to impose punitive costs on this behaviour has only emboldened its continuation. India’s appeals for global sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Pakistan post-Pahalgam have been met with sympathy but little concrete action. The United Nations Security Council issued a condemnation, yet stopped short of naming Pakistan directly. The United States and United Kingdom called for restraint, but refrained from linking the attack to state complicity despite mounting evidence.

This diplomatic impasse reveals a paradox in international relations: the fear of destabilising a nuclear state often results in the toleration of destabilising behaviour. It is the classic case of what Barry Buzan refers to as a “regional security complex”—where insecurity in one state (Pakistan) feeds a persistent chain of reaction in its neighbours (India and Afghanistan), and vice versa. In such an environment, cycles of provocation and retaliation become entrenched, with terrorism serving as both symptom and accelerant.

Yet, the costs are no longer regional. The operational reach of Pakistani-sponsored groups has extended beyond South Asia, with evidence of sleeper cells and financial conduits connecting to networks in Europe and North America. The globalisation of jihadist ideology, often nurtured in Pakistani madrassas and training camps, has created a transnational threat environment.

To address this challenge, the international community must abandon its ambivalence. Tactical responses, such as drone strikes or diplomatic censures, are insufficient in the face of an ideologically entrenched and institutionally embedded practice. What is required is a structural disincentivisation of state support for terrorism: targeted sanctions, conditioned aid, and multilateral diplomatic isolation, coupled with internal reform incentives.

In the end, the 2025 Pahalgam attack is not merely a local tragedy—it is a geopolitical signal. It demonstrates the resilience of proxy violence as an instrument of state policy in the post-Westphalian order. It calls for a reimagining of counterterrorism not as the pursuit of individuals, but as a confrontation with institutional complicity and ideological indoctrination. Until such confrontation occurs, terrorism will continue to be less an aberration and more a deliberate instrument of power projection.

Tehmeena Rizvi is a Senior Fellow at Bluekraft Digital Foundation and is pursuing PhD from Bennett University. Her areas of work include Women, Peace, and Security (South-Asia), focusing on the intersection of Gender, Conflict and Religion. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.