Prof Max Abrahms – Firstpost

Max Abrahms, professor of political science and public policy at Boston-based Northeastern University, is an expert in international security especially in the areas of terrorism, American foreign policy, great power competition and the Middle East (West Asia). Firstpost had a recent opportunity to interview Prof Abrahms – who regularly appears on global outlets such as BBC, CNN, New York Times, USA Today, Washington Post, etc., to speak on violent extremism and international security, on several issues including the trajectory of Israel-Hamas conflict, the developments Syria, Iran and more. Prof Abrahms speaks on complex topics with clarity and insight. The interview has been lightly edited for brevity and grammar.

Q How do you interpret the recent wave of attacks by Israel on Hamas? What lies ahead?

A Immediately after the October 7 (2023) terrorist massacre, Israel stated that the goal was the eradication of Hamas. There was a lot of international pressure, including from the Biden administration, for Israel not to succeed in that goal. When Donald Trump got elected, there was a lot of enthusiasm that now Israel could take the gloves off. However, Trump wanted to score an important diplomatic victory by securing a deal between Israel and Hamas. He wasn’t overly concerned with the specific terms of the deal. In fact, Trump basically implemented a deal the terms of which had already been worked out by the Biden administration.

Israel and Hamas went along, even though the terms were surprisingly unfavorable towards Israel. Specifically, it required Israel to release over a thousand Palestinian terrorists and to withdraw from Gaza, effectively preserving Hamas. Over time, it seems the Trump administration has come to realize that the terms are inadequate and quite unfavorable towards Israel. Jerusalem has therefore seized on what it sees as a violation of the deal in order to carry out its goal of, if not eradicating Hamas, doing much more to substantially degrade its capabilities.

What happens now to the hostages?

Well, the hostage situation can be looked at from different perspectives. From the perspective of the families, it always makes sense to advocate as strongly as you can to release them. However, the leader of a nation must understand that if you negotiate by releasing terrorist prisoners, it will incentivize subsequent hostage-taking. This is not just logical, it has been empirically demonstrated in large statistical studies.

So, countries known for negotiating over hostages are more likely to have their citizens kidnapped because terrorists see the utility of the strategy. Israel has developed a ‘reputation’ for trading terrorist prisoners to get back their hostages. The most notorious case was the so-called Shalit deal in 2011 (when Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was released in exchange for 1027 Palestinian prisoners, some serving life sentences for carrying out terrorist attacks).

Israel’s policy is very well known to Hamas, and it may well have led to its decision to take 250 Israeli hostages on 10/7. I believe governments should not negotiate on hostages because it’s a short-sighted policy which ends up killing even more citizens. (Benjamin) Netanyahu has been under a tremendous amount of domestic pressure to try to get those hostages out. The strategic move would have been to act in a more cold-hearted manner and focus on the mission of destroying Hamas over the release of the hostages.

How do you see the conflict shaping up from here? Also, what’s your opinion on Trump’s purported Gaza deal?

Trump has never felt beholden to carry out everything that he has floated in the policy world. We are in a new era with respect to Gaza. I certainly expect to see continued kinetic operations against Hamas. I don’t expect there to be a large-scale Israeli military reoccupation of the Gaza Strip. But I think this will take the form of attacks mainly from the air. And it remains unclear at this point what will happen in terms of administering Gaza, as well as the fate of the Gazan population. I’m seeing reports that Americans and Israelis would like the Gazans to go to Syria, but that eventuality will depend on the willingness of Palestinians. I do not see Trump forcefully transferring Palestinian population. He is probably trying to entice them to leave on their own.

What has the bombing so far of Gaza Strip achieved in terms of meeting the objectives of Israel? What can possibly be achieved if this campaign continues? Isn’t this time for a political solution?

It has been common since the 10/7 attack to say that there’s no military solution and to go even further and say that because it’s so obvious that there’s no military solution, Israel must simply be motivated by vengeance or some sort of genocidal intent.

I think that that is an incorrect, although popular view. The October 7 terrorist attack was the second-most lethal terrorist attack in world history, only after 9/11. Israel is geographically a very small country surrounded by terrorists not just in Gaza, but also in the West Bank, into the north of the country and in Lebanon as well as in Syria. For its national self-preservation, Israel needs to communicate that if you commit a mass casualty terrorist attack, there will be serious consequences for perpetrators and their supporters.

It is impossible to directly measure the effects of deterrence. It is therefore hard to quantify the deterrent benefits of a forceful counterterrorism response. I believe Israel’s enemies know that they’re in a different era than they were before 10/7 and that if Israel is attacked, the reprisal will be substantial. So, the strategic benefits of a strong Israeli response are not necessarily quantifiable, but I do believe that they exist.

I also think that there’s been more progress made against Hamas than is sometimes reported. It is true that Hamas is still around and has a large membership. And in that sense the Israeli response has not succeeded at this point. However, Hamas has been suffering attrition in terms of its military capability. On the anniversary of Operation Al Aqsa Flood (the 10/7 terrorist attacks on Israel), Hamas wanted to demonstrate that Israeli counterterrorism operations have failed. Hamas very much wanted to show its continued vitality but was barely able to muster any kind of an attack.

When Israel took out its leadership again, Hamas wanted to commit a big attack inside of Israel, but was unable to do so. Hamas’s military capability is more degraded than people understand in terms of its weaponry. Israel controls the Philadelphia Corridor and has destroyed countless tunnels. Everything that’s going in there from the UN, from various NGOs, is under observation. Gaza is much more sealed off than it was before 10/7. So, the Hamas threat is diminished in a way that the media doesn’t tend to report.

Does Israel still see Hamas as a political entity that can represent the Palestinian people, or has that issue been taken off the table after October 7?

My recurrent area of research for over two decades has been on the political effects of terrorism. My main finding has been that terrorism tends to backfire politically on the perpetrators. Yes, terrorism by its very definition is terrifying. It gets a lot of media attention. Sometimes it can kill quite a large number of people. But the political effects tend to be negative. And that has certainly been the case for the Palestinians.

The Palestinians would have had a state if they had bought into Oslo (the 1993 Oslo Accords). And even after Oslo there were more generous offers. Gaza would be a fully independent Palestinian territory if terrorist rejectionists hadn’t toppled these peace processes. The 10/7 terrorist attacks have been deeply counterproductive. It destroyed the peace camp inside Israel, and now there is no serious discussion among Israelis about a future Palestinian state. So, Hamas is seen as completely unacceptable, not just in terms of its military wing, but also its political wing. In fact, Israelis no longer see any distinction between the two. It’s not even clear that Israelis would work with a, you know, Palestinian Authority alternative. Looking back, say in 10, 20 years, people will identify Operation Al Aqsa Flood as the event which permanently destroyed the prospects of any Palestinian state.

That’s a significant statement. Is the two-state solution off the table? That remains the position of many countries, including India. Won’t Israel face diplomatic pressure on this issue?

Terrorism has different effects on different audiences. For the target country, in this case Israel, it makes them more hardline, more right-wing, more bellicose. Right after 10/7, Israel had a very forceful counterterrorism response, especially in Gaza, but also in the West Bank, even extending into Lebanon as well as into Syria.

The effect of Operation Al Aqsa Flood was different though for the international community. We have seen this very vividly in the West, in America, European countries, Canada and even in Australia… We’ve seen the rise of the global Intifada movement where large numbers of citizens as well as foreigners in these countries have come to sympathize and identify more with Hamas.

None of these global Intifada riots have any real effect on relations between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza or the West Bank. They might destroy an Anne Frank Memorial, they might destroy the public transportation system or shut down a university for a day in any western country. It might lead to a rise in anti-Semitic attacks against a Chabad House or a Hillel (Jewish organizations), but it will not improve the life of one actual Palestinian.

So, all of those developments in the West are important but completely ineffectual when it comes to the future Palestinian state. If anything, it reinforces the perception among Jews that an Israeli state is necessary because outside of Israel, Jews have discovered that they’re less safe than they once thought.

I want to shift your attention to Iran… How do you see the targeting of Houthis by the Trump administration? What are the prospects of a larger war against Iran?

Trump and Biden have very different views about the Houthis. Under Biden, the Houthis were delisted as a foreign terrorist organization by the US State Department. Trump reversed that and directly connected the Houthis to its Iranian sponsor in a way that Biden never did. What Trump is saying now is different. He is saying that not only is it incontrovertible that Iran arms the Houthis, trains them and provides them with the so-called intelligence, but that Iran will be held responsible for Houthi attacks against American assets, especially ships.

The Houthis have not backed down. Iran is in a very precarious state right now. It must understand that if it does not rein in the Houthis and the Houthis continue to attack American vessels, there is a very good chance that the US will strike not just the Houthis, but other Iranian targets as well (this interview was conducted before the Trump administration undertook military strikes against the Houthis).

These might be the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) targets outside of Iran, perhaps in Syria, for example. The burden is on Iran to rein in the Houthi threat, otherwise the Trump administration could well strike targets inside Iran, and that could certainly include Iranian nuclear assets. This administration is very serious about this, especially if you listen to Marco Rubio in the State Department as well as Mike Waltz in the National Security Council. They’re not making a distinction between the Houthis and Iran. They are deeply concerned with the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons. And Houthi attacks against American ships will only provide a convenient pretext to deal with that threat.

Wouldn’t that spark a larger war in the Middle East? A direct attack on Iran may have repercussions for a president who claims to be on the side of peace and wants to leave the legacy of a peacemaker. Wouldn’t you agree?

The term neoconservative has been very much maligned since the Iraq War, where consensus soon emerged that regime change is very dangerous and it can be counterproductive in terms of the country as well as the region, and especially with respect to fomenting more terrorism. It would be a harder sell for the Trump administration to openly embrace regime change in Tehran. His MAGA base would respond unfavorably to that. However, I think it’s important to make a distinction between regime change, wars and military strikes against a nuclear facility, as well as military strikes against terrorist proxies of Iran. I think that the American public would be okay with the latter, but not the former. There isn’t going to be too much pushback about bombing the Houthis. I do think the public would go along with striking Iranian nuclear assets. You won’t, however, see an open, explicit campaign by the Trump administration to replace the Iranian leadership. That is a bridge too far in the aftermath of the Iraq war.

But if a direct war with Iran leads to loss of American lives, wouldn’t that result in a backlash against Trump from his MAGA base? Also, how do you react to statements that on Iran, America has outsourced its foreign policy to Israel?

I’m certainly familiar with that way of seeing things. I don’t accept the idea that Iran poses a threat only to Israel. That is certainly not the view of the Emiratis. It is certainly not the view of the Saudis. Even in Bahrain, the government is concerned with Iran. In terms of stoking dissidence, the main chant of Houthis is not just ‘death to Israel, death to the Jews, but death to America’. Ever since the Iranian Revolution, there has been a very strident anti-American view in the Iranian leadership. I wouldn’t go so far as to say that the US and Israel have identical threat perceptions and interests in the Middle East. But the fact of the matter is that they are substantially overlapping. And that is true when it comes to containing the Iranian threat, as well as the counterterrorism goals of taking out radical Sunni terrorists.

The Trump administration is right now in the middle of a negotiation between Ukraine and Russia, though we do not know which way the negotiations are proceeding. The trouble in Middle East could intensify and expand. Trump’s cabinet is full of China hawks. For a president who wants to limit America’s footprints – some would even call him an isolationist – do you think Trump is opening too many fronts at the same time?

This is certainly the view in the Pentagon, especially if you listen to someone like Elbridge Colby, who is expected to be confirmed as the undersecretary, as well as his underlings like Mike Domino, who’s tasked with the Middle East. Pentagon’s view is that the US should try to disengage from the Middle East as well as settle the conflict in Ukraine to focus American attention on what they see as the bigger threat, and that is the rise of China and its challenge to US hegemony.

I understand the logic of prioritizing in order to formulate an effective grand strategy, but even if it’s true that the US wants to focus mainly on countering China, that doesn’t necessarily mean that withdrawing from the Middle East will facilitate that objective. Withdrawing American troops from Syria, for example, could open up a number of problems in the Levant, which would ultimately require the US to invest more heavily later. Particularly, it will empower Erdogan and Türkiye to expand what it sees as a modern-day Ottoman Empire into Syria. It runs the risk of reenergizing the Islamic State and frankly, there’s a very real risk that Syria could descend into a full-scale civil war.

I was a big opponent of the so-called ‘rebel program’ when Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (leader of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, or HTS) was part of the opposition to Assad, and I continue to be an opponent now that he is the leader of the country. There is no evidence that the regime in charge in Damascus is able to govern Syria. Not with respect to the Alawites (sect of Islam that follows Alawism), not with respect to the Kurds, and not with respect to quelling radical Sunni terrorists in that country.

We have seen Türkiye make substantial incursions into Syria and more surprisingly, Israeli incursions as well. So, the US may well want to focus on China, but that doesn’t mean that other issues in the world are just going to go away.

You preempted my question on Syria. What happens now to the huge mess that we are seeing there? Is this opportunity for Türkiye to move in?

The US has been very inconsistent and conflicted on Syria. When the Arab Spring extended into Syria, the immediate thought of the Obama administration was to side with the protesters and to facilitate deposing Assad (former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, who has been deposed and has since escaped to Moscow). But it then became clear, especially in the immediate aftermath of the intervention in Libya, that the opposition to Assad was full of extremists.

I always opposed the toppling of Assad. My views were similar to Tulsi Gabbard’s. I have a high regard for Gabbard (US Director of National Intelligence) and I think that she understands the radical Islamist threat facing the US and around the world. She was correct on Syria. Her views have been borne out by watching the bloodletting against the Alawites, the reentrance of the Islamic State, as well as the very concerning involvement of Erdogan inside Syria.

I think that Syria is now a geopolitical battleground between the two strongest regional powers – Türkiye and Israel. Neither has any real respect for Syrian sovereignty. Israeli moves in Syria are intended primarily to contain Turkish influence, prevent a major Sunni terrorist front coming out from that region against Israel, as well as trying to sever the ‘land bridge’ between Iran and Lebanon to ensure that Hezbollah does not regain its military capability.

Israel is going to continue to operate inside of Syria, especially if the US withdraws its forces, because it can. Israel cannot rely on the Syrian government to fight against either the Sunni terrorists or to break the linkage between Iran and Hezbollah.

On top, you have an interesting ethnic demographic dimension in Druze (the third largest religion in Syria), who are very popular in Israel and are seen as very loyal Israelis. They are overrepresented in the Israeli military and in security positions. That might not be understood around the world, but the Druze mean a lot to Israelis. And Israelis will continue to come to their aid in Syria. There have even been appeals by the Alawites for Israeli protection because none of the minorities trust the terrorist regime in Damascus.

Despite the violent attacks carried out against Alawites and Christian minorities, the EU astoundingly came out in support of the ruling HTS. The European Commission even invited the HTS to an official conference in Brussels. Europeans speak about ‘values’ all the time. What about protection of minorities as a value?

I oppose the international communities’ attempts to normalize this terrorist regime in Damascus. The question is, how do you explain it? Why is the EU and frankly, countries around the world, so interested in meeting with the leader of Syria? You need to go back to the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The opposition to Assad was not only tolerated but supported by many countries around the world because they were fighting against Assad. Now that these same extremists have taken power, there continues to be residual support for them. Even if we all agree that Assad had a tremendous amount of blood on his hands, used chemical weapons, had dungeons where plenty of innocent dissidents were tortured, that doesn’t mean that we should have an unrealistic view about his successor.

The views expressed in the interview do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.