Russia must keep Trump in play, use his inclination, desire to end the conflict to its advantage: Kanwal Sibal – Firstpost
A powerhouse of knowledge and experience, ambassador Kanwal Sibal, the former Indian foreign secretary, received the Padma Shri in 2017 for his distinguished services in the field of public affairs. As a career diplomat, ambassador Sibal has 41 years of experience in diplomacy. He was India’s envoy to Türkiye, Egypt, France and Russia, and Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington DC. He was also a member of India’s National Security Advisory Board and now adorns the post of JNU Chancellor.
Ambassador Sibal, who has written several columns for News18 and Firstpost, is quite active on X (formerly Twitter) where he shares his sharp takes on geopolitics. Firstpost had the chance recently to catch up with ambassador Sibal and seek his insights on the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the Trump effect, the US-Europe quagmire, the role of China, India and much more.
The interview has been abridged for brevity and length.
What is the reason behind West’s Russophobia? Is it cultural, civilizational, existential, or something else entirely?
The fact is that Russia looms very large in Europe. It’s the biggest country in the world. Huge military power, world’s biggest nuclear power sitting on enormous resources… In Europe, there has always been this geopolitical conundrum on how to deal with this giant! Russia has been – when it was the Soviet Union – a peer power of the United States. So, Europe has been caught in between the foremost global power and its challenger.
Remember that Europe was decimated during the Second World War. Not only did the continent lose its colonies, but the Europeans were also considerably weakened and suffered terrible economic damage. They had no choice but to come under the wings of the US, that had an ideological antipathy towards communism and employed a policy of containment towards Russia.
US animosity, ideological and otherwise towards Russia, therefore, became a part of the European thinking. In addition, of course, to their own historical experiences of fighting Russia – the Crimean War, for example.
Now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was an opportunity to deal with Russia on a more rational basis. Communism is no more. Russia has been greatly weakened. So why not build a positive relationship with Russia from the security as well as from the economic point of view?
But the opposite was followed, again because of the US view on how to deal with Russia. The (Zbigniew) Brzezinski doctrine… dealing Ukraine from Russia. Since Russia was no longer an empire or a European power, it was an opportunity to permanently strategically weaken Russia.
And what was the dynamic behind it? The expansion of NATO and the expansion of EU. In other words, neither the security architecture nor the economic architecture in Europe was built in a positive way by the transatlantic alliance.
Russia wanted to have an agreement with the EU. I was then the ambassador to Russia. The EU said that, look, we can’t give you any special treatment. Russia was asked to measure up to the standards of Western democracy before it can be treated as a partner… I sent a message to our own government (New Delhi) that this is remarkable. The foreign policy of Europe towards Russia is dependent on the domestic policy of Russia. How do you build a relationship on this basis?
So that is where the Russophobia comes from. Russia’s size, its governance system… which is dictated by Russia’s domestic compulsions. And then of course, each country has its own personality and tradition. How does it matter if Russia does not measure up to the West’s democratic standards?
The biggest hypocrisy in this is Washington reached out to Mao who was emblematic of the communist ideology and everything that the Western world rejected as a basis of cooperation with another country.
So, what was the problem with Russia? There has never been a direct clash between the US and Russia, unlike with China during the Korean War. Even today, the US has anti-China alliances, troops stationed in the western Pacific, military bases, the seventh Fleet (that has a continuous forward presence in the Indo-Pacific)… There’s the whole issue of Taiwan. But nevertheless, America’s largest trading partner is China. So, if they can make these pragmatic compromises between geopolitics and geo-economics, what’s the problem with doing the same with Russia?
Europe stitched a trade deal (CAI) with China in 2020, the very year PLA troops killed 20 Indian soldiers at Galwan. Europe, even under transatlanticist Joe Biden, would never fully commit to an anti-China stance and would always keep trade channels open. Yet it wants the US, India, and everyone else to go all-in in its fight against Russia. Where does Europe’s sense of entitlement come from?
China is a massive economic market and Germany’s biggest trade partner. The Europeans have a vested interest in the Chinese market. India is rising. But even so, compared to Europe’s trade ties with China, the trade relationship with India is not comparable.
Second, China is everywhere. They know they can’t dictate to China. They can’t sanction China (unlike Russia) because the cost of sanctioning would be enormous. If China is the manufacturing hub of the world and controlling sensitive and critical emerging technologies, how can you deal Beijing with muscles as you can do with Russia?
India doesn’t figure as that kind of an important player. Therefore, it can be talked down to. India is more manageable. There’s less cost to Europe to be patronizing towards India. (They can) disregard objectively the importance of our ties with Russia and lecture us…
A part of this patronizing attitude occurs because India was once a colony. Europeans can play with our domestic politics, try and mould public opinion… stuff they cannot do in China. They see India as much more vulnerable. And then there is the English-speaking class in India which is an obvious target for them in terms of influencing ideas and the role they play in our society in shaping opinion, thinking, policies…
In China, there’s no question of local dissent being tied up with foreign interests. In India, however, you can see the connection between the foreign elements, whether Soros or other NGOs, activists and ‘democracy promotion’ organizations, ‘religious freedom’ organisations, V Dem (Gothenburg-based V-Dem Institute), etc. Their linkages with local politicians, local parties, local journalists and everything else make them believe that they can deal with India more efficiently. We have a political class and a civil society that is deeply tied to organizations and institutions abroad. That is our Achilles heel.
But now the Europeans have sent a very high-powered delegation to New Delhi. The entire college of EU commissioners came to India, sought the prime minister’s counsel and called India “a trusted friend”. Is this shift in stance forced due to what Trump has done to the transatlantic alliance?
The same Von der Leyen (EU Commissioner) who came to the Raisina Dialogue a few years ago (in 2022), tried to make us feel morally culpable for adopting a neutral position. Now the language is different. With Trump coming in and the fissures that have developed between the US and Europe, Brussels must develop alternatives.
China is a competitor. And once the official position is that they are a “systemic rival” with whom relations must be “de-risked”, they can’t really build up a competitor. Moreover, the Europeans are very unhappy that China had created a 17 +1 grouping (CEE mechanism), that they were trying to create divisions within Europe.
India stands out as a viable option, as an alternative strategy – big country, rising economy, good prospects of cooperation, fifth-largest economy poised to become the third largest by 2030. India being a democracy gives them a sense of comfort. It means we are malleable, penetrable, vulnerable to influence and things like that.
I’ve been told by foreign diplomats that when they talk to Indian interlocutors, it’s always a broad-based intellectual exchange where there’s real dialogue. But with China, you know, they speak the same language right from the top to bottom – the direction is given by the top CCP leadership, and everybody sings the same tune. They will never give you their own thinking or any original viewpoint.
That explains why Von der Leyen came with 22 of the 27 commissioners to see if this whole process of the FTA can move forward. There’ll be hurdles down the road but nevertheless it’s an opportunity both for Europe and for us. It’s not that we should turn our back. On the contrary. If we can widen our options, we have to develop very close ties with the US. But why become dependent on the US? Therefore, we should also reach out to Europe and keep our strategic autonomy not only political but also economic.
The Europeans have decided that they are going to ‘rearm’. Germany is taking some steps towards it. How do you see this? And for a continent that had so far outsourced its foreign policy to the US can it take on the double challenge of both Russia and the US, if it sees Washington as an adversary?
Europe’s actions seem illogical, irrational at many levels. Britain, for example, is signing a 100-year security agreement with Ukraine. I read the text. It’s a military alliance where apart from building up forces of Ukraine and everything else, they will undertake joint maritime patrols in the Black Sea, including the Sea of Azov, which the Russians have declared as ‘inland water’. That’s a clear challenge (to Russia). Is Europe preparing for a 100-year period of confrontation with Russia?
Number two, there’s a lot of economic mess in Europe. Britain is in serious trouble. France is in a ruptured situation. (Emmanuel) Macron has lost control of the Parliament. Germany is in a political and economic mess. If Europeans are going to spend so much money on defense, raising it from 2 per cent to 3 per cent and maybe some to 5 per cent, this will come at cost of their social programs. So, social unrest may increase. Can they up their defence expenditure without social costs?
Third, what is the €800 billion plan for rearmament? That means it’ll increase the indebtedness of individual European countries as the debt levels are becoming unmanageable, especially for countries like France. What’s the perspective? Permanent hostility with Russia? They build up… let’s say… this big war machine. To use against whom? They can’t use it against Russia.
If America doesn’t want to use it against Russia except through proxies, whom will they use it against? Europe can’t directly challenge Russia, so how would they justify it to the public? That is why Europeans are creating this fear psychosis that ‘if Russians win in Ukraine, they are going to walk on the streets of Paris and attack even Portuguese’ and stuff like that. And that the neighboring countries, Poland and the Baltic states and Romania have ‘existential threat’. One may wonder at the quality of leadership that Europe has.
I want your opinion on the much-touted phone call between Trump and Putin, which went for 90 minutes
There’s a lot of skepticism whether there can be a reasonable agreement between the US and Russia on Ukraine. Despite all the goodwill that Trump may have with regard to beginning the process of normalization with Russia, can he do it? Putin’s said that even when the sanctions are lifted, then they adopt a new way to impose another form of sanctions. There is a limit to the kind of normalization process that is necessary to resolve the conflict.
Number two, Putin has right from the start, made his position very, very clear. Ukraine cannot be a military threat to Russia. When he talks about demilitarization, Putin is putting limitations on the size of the Ukrainian armed forces. They cannot be supplied with the latest NATO weapons. There is obviously incongruence when you want durable and lasting peace while building up Ukraine militarily. That’s not deterrence. It’s driven by the logic that sees Russia as a threat. This is not a solid base for ushering in the ‘era of peace’.
Number three, the Russians are very sensitive to ‘denazification’. The Western Ukrainians who now have grabbed power and were responsible for the coup d’etat, have had historical links with the Nazis… The Azov brigade, for instance. The other very important thing is the recognition of the four regions that Russians have now incorporated – plus Crimea – as part of Russia.
If the Russians are to get their way fully, it will mean a massive political and strategic defeat for the West. So, they can’t agree to all of Russia’s conditions. But can Russia back off from some of the core things like no NATO membership and recognition of their acquisition of territory, plus limitation on the armed forces of Ukraine? They can’t back off or Putin will be in trouble. So how to narrow this gap?
So, what they have begun with is a relatively minor thing. And Russia has agreed because it helps them. Ukraine has developed effective drone technology with Türkiye’s help, and they have started attacking the energy infrastructure deep into Russian territory. And of course, Russia has been doing the same. The fact that they have agreed to prison exchanges is neither here nor there.
The next step could be maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea where Russia is a bit on the defensive (as predicted by the ambassador, a Black Sea ceasefire was announced Tuesday after days of intense negotiations in Saudi Arabia led by the US. This interview took place on March 19). They’ve had to move out of Sevastopol. Many of their ships were sunk. They’re vulnerable. Türkiye is now openly saying they will not accept Russia’s victory in the Black Sea. They see it as a strategic threat. So, it’s going to be a long haul.
Finally, Russia has to keep Trump in play. He’s a very unpredictable fellow, but for the first time, Russia and the US are talking together! It’s a big, big, big departure from the Biden administration. Russians have to keep him in play, use his inclination, desire to end the conflict to their advantage to the extent that they can. They are tempting Trump – knowing he is transactional and looking for economic gains – with investments in Russia, mining rare earths. Putin thinks Trump is sensitive to economic opportunities, deals, transactions. After all, if you really look at the absurdity of it, Trump is jeopardizing geopolitics due to a deal on rare earths.
Isn’t Trump simply saying the quiet part out loud? The traditional American discourse on Ukraine is very high on morality, but at the end of it, there is an expectation that American companies will go in to reconstruct Ukraine, the energy deals will be struck. Trump is simply saying, look, if you want our help, then what is in it for us?
But that was already happening. The agricultural land of Ukraine is highly fertile. The most fertile in Europe. It has been bought over by American companies such as Monsanto already. BlackRock and JPMorgan Chase are striking rich reconstruction deals. So, this could have continued to happen. But for Trump to say this openly when it can actually be done without saying it…
I think it appeals to his MAGA base. They see it as a ‘win’. Wasn’t the play domestic?
He hasn’t signed that agreement though. Forget what happened in the White House. Even subsequently, when the two delegations met, Trump didn’t sign the minerals deal. In any case, when it comes to reconstruction, the US will not be the only player. Türkiye will come in a big way.
But to answer your question about the future of this peace process, it puts both Putin and Trump in a complicated situation. Trump, because he has put so much of his personal prestige in a quick solution earlier. He is still maintaining a very optimistic posture that it can’t end in failure. At what point will Trump’s determination that it should not end in failure, and Putin’s consideration that I must preserve my interest, intersect? I think that is not going to happen quickly.
Putin surely must know that if he inflicts a strategic defeat on Trump, it won’t be a very good thing for Russia as a whole?
True. But there’s another angle to it. When Trump says that I want Greenland, calls it “very critical for national security”, what does he mean? The Arctic. He wants to counter Russia and Russia’s dominant position in the Arctic. On the one hand, he seeks to normalize ties with Russia. On the other, he is trying to counter whatever geostrategic advantages Russia has in particular geographies.
My final question. Putin has reservations about a Western peacekeeping force. Should India play a role?
So long as it goes to the UN Security Council, and whatever peace plan, durable and lasting peace plan they agree to, is ratified by the UNSC. Then we should go. In fact, all sides will trust us because we are not linked with either party. And we can genuinely be honest peace monitors. We should take that opportunity.
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