The emerging divide in US-Japan relations – Firstpost

The US–Japan alliance is considered the most enduring partnership in the Indo-Pacific. However, recent developments indicate a growing unevenness in this crucial bilateral relationship. Once a predictable and resilient alliance now appears misaligned, particularly in expectations surrounding defence spending, diplomatic access, and international crises.

Japan’s anxieties resurfaced with the return of a Donald Trump administration, although initial gestures offered reassurance. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, despite not having a prior personal relationship with Donald Trump, was among the first world leaders invited to the White House. This early outreach mirrored the treatment of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. By contrast, the Australian Prime Minister was kept waiting and, even after re-election, has yet to be hosted in Washington. For Japan, this suggested that they might successfully recalibrate ties with Washington. Growing inconsistencies in US demands and Japan’s limited diplomatic access to key American officials are causing unease in Tokyo, particularly given the Ishiba administration’s relative inexperience.

There are three clear signs of emerging strain. First, the US appears to be making broad demands on its allies in Europe and Asia regarding defence spending. The recently concluded NATO Summit in The Hague focused almost exclusively on persuading member states to raise defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP. While this was directed at NATO members, similar expectations are now surfacing in US dealings with Indo-Pacific partners like Japan, Korea and Australia.

In fact, Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba declined an invitation to attend the NATO summit, despite a recent tradition of Japanese PMs participating in the post-Ukraine context. This absence was interpreted as a deliberate signal that Tokyo does not wish to be drawn into the same defence-spending framework that NATO members have accepted.

Japanese officials have reportedly encountered mixed messaging from Washington. On one hand, Japan is being informally asked to raise its defence spending to 3 per cent of GDP, a significant increase from its current level of 1.8 per cent, with a planned rise to 2 per cent by 2027. On the other hand, US interlocutors are framing this expectation as a part of trade negotiations, linking it to tariff reductions. This dual messaging is complicating Japan’s internal policy environment. Tokyo wants such increases to be seen as sovereign decisions, not concessions made under US pressure, particularly with Upper House elections looming in July. Ishiba is wary of appearing weak or reactive in the face of American demands.

A second sign of strain lies in the way US officials are extending NATO-style expectations to Indo-Pacific allies. During the Shangri-La Dialogue, US defence officials suggested that Australia should aim for 3.5 per cent of GDP in defence spending. The same figure is now increasingly being floated in Washington’s dealings with Tokyo.

This recalibration appears to stem from people like Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of Defence for Policy. Japanese officials reportedly find it difficult to engage with Colby’s office, which they view as pushing unrealistic and uncoordinated demands. Complicating matters, is confusion in Tokyo about whether the 5 per cent NATO target applies to Indo-Pacific allies, 3.5 per cent for defence and 1.5 per cent for infrastructure resilience, which Japan may find more manageable than significantly raising direct defence outlays. The NATO-IndoPacific4 communique is unclear on this.

The US justifies these expectations by framing them in the context of preparing for a possible Taiwan crisis, which Washington believes could be triggered by China by 2027. However, the abruptness and unilateral nature of these expectations are generating friction rather than fostering alignment. Japan feels cornered by demands that neither respect its political sensitivities nor offer strategic clarity.

Reflecting this discontent, Tokyo has postponed the US–Japan “2+2” ministerial meeting between their foreign and defence ministers, originally scheduled to coincide with the upcoming Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July beginning. While Japan remains committed to participating in the Quad event, it has declined to hold the bilateral dialogue at this time. Tokyo insists it prefers to wait until after the July 20 Upper House elections, when Ishiba hopes for a stronger domestic mandate. Observers in both countries doubt this will significantly alter Washington’s expectations or attitude.

Another manifestation of unevenness lies in Japan’s cautious stance on US military actions. Japan has not explicitly supported the US attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, despite its alliance obligations. Ishiba remarked, “It is difficult for Japan to make a definitive legal evaluation at this point.” Japan agrees that Iran must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons but is reluctant to condone an action lacking United Nations authorisation. For a country that places strong emphasis on international law, Japan fears that overt support for legally questionable military strikes could set dangerous precedents. This is especially relevant given the risk of China or North Korea engaging in similar actions in Japan’s neighbourhood.

Japan’s current reticence is different from its past behaviour. In 2017, when the US struck Syria in response to chemical weapons use, then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed understanding, albeit without giving outright support. In 2019, following attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, the US asked allies to join a naval coalition. Japan delayed participation for months and eventually sent its Self-Defence Forces independently, avoiding association with the US-led effort.

Japan’s nuanced diplomacy reflects its effort to balance alliance solidarity with its national legal and economic considerations, particularly its better relations with Iran and its dependence on stable energy imports.

The inconclusive Trump-Ishiba meeting on the sidelines of the G7 taught Japan that doing more on defence is not getting it leeway on trade tariffs.

Mistrust Growing?

In sum, the emerging unevenness in US–Japan relations stems from several sources: inconsistent and opaque US demands, lack of diplomatic access to key American policymakers, pressure to commit to steep defence increases, and divergent interpretations of international law. These issues are further exacerbated by a sense in Tokyo that Washington’s strategic messaging lacks coordination and is poorly timed with Japan’s domestic political calendar.

The Ishiba administration appears intent on managing the alliance with caution and asserting Japan’s strategic autonomy where possible. Yet the reality remains that alliance management under Trump 2.0 is proving more complicated than anticipated. Japan may be unwilling to say “no”, but it is increasingly finding ways to say “not yet”.

As regional instability intensifies and Washington raises the stakes in its strategic competition with China, how the US and Japan recalibrate their expectations of each other may well determine the future balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

The author is a former ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN and the African Union. He tweets @AmbGurjitSingh. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.