The end of ‘Five Eyes’ as we know it – Firstpost

The Five Eyes alliance, comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, originated from World War II, when British and American cryptographers worked together to break Axis codes. The success of this partnership led to the 1946 UKUSA Agreement, formalising an intelligence-sharing arrangement that would expand to include the other three nations. Over the decades, Five Eyes became the backbone of Western intelligence, providing unparalleled access to intercepted communications, cyber threats, and human intelligence operations. From tracking Soviet movements during the Cold War to dismantling terror networks post-9/11, its reach has shaped global geopolitics.

Yet, cracks have appeared. Disagreements over China, privacy concerns, and diverging foreign policies have strained trust among members. The biggest uncertainty, however, may come from within. During his first term, Donald Trump dismissed intelligence briefings, clashed with allies, and even declassified sensitive Five Eyes material in a political spat. With Trump’s return to the White House, will Five Eyes remain an unshakable pillar of Western intelligence, or will it fracture under the weight of ‘America First’ realpolitik?

Unsurprisingly, fractures within five eyes are already evident. Member states have started pursuing divergent foreign policy objectives and geopolitical priorities. A key source of strain is Australia’s changing strategic calculus, which includes recalibrating its relationship with China amid rising economic dependencies. In contrast, the United States has doubled down on its containment strategy, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Similarly, differing positions on military aid to Ukraine highlight the alliance’s fragmented approach to global security.

The shift away from issuing joint Five Eyes statements, seen in the case of the Gaza conflict, toward individual or sub-group communiqués signals a growing breakdown in the alliance’s ability to project collective foreign policy coherence. This divergence aligns with the relative gains problem (Grieco, 1988), wherein states prioritise national interests over collective security, thus undermining alliance cohesion.

Unilateral actions by key members, particularly the United States, have exacerbated trust deficits within the alliance, an issue compounded by the unpredictability of U.S. foreign policy. A senior Trump official recently discussed expelling Canada from the alliance over trade disputes. It also exemplifies the potential for leveraging intelligence-sharing mechanisms for non-security-related political objectives.

Similarly, episodic suspensions of intelligence-sharing, such as the US’ temporary withholding of intelligence from Ukraine, have introduced strategic uncertainty. From a game-theoretic perspective (Axelrod, 1984), such unilateral policy shifts disrupt the repeated interactions necessary for maintaining cooperative equilibria in intelligence-sharing alliances. In institutionalist terms (Keohane, 1984), the erosion of predictability and binding commitments weakens the alliance’s long-term viability, as partners may hedge their intelligence-sharing commitments in anticipation of future policy volatility.

The US’ increasingly transactional approach to intelligence-sharing further threatens the foundational principles of the Five Eyes alliance. There is growing concern that Washington views the alliance primarily through a cost-benefit lens, assessing intelligence-sharing not as an intrinsic strategic good but as a mechanism to advance direct U.S. interests. This shift aligns with principal-agent theory (Miller, 2005), where the U.S., as the dominant intelligence producer, may impose conditionalities on allied access to classified intelligence, treating intelligence-sharing as a discretionary privilege rather than an automatic reciprocal obligation.

The perception that the U.S. disproportionately subsidises the alliance while allies “free ride” on American intelligence infrastructure has created scepticism among Washington’s security establishment. If this transactional logic intensifies, it could lead to greater intelligence compartmentalisation within the alliance, with selective intelligence-sharing based on political alignment rather than institutional norms.

The emergence of AUKUS, the trilateral security agreement between the US, UK, and Australia, has amplified concerns about a two-tiered hierarchy within Five Eyes, where Canada and New Zealand risk being sidelined from privileged intelligence-sharing arrangements. From the perspective of network theory in intelligence-sharing (Zegart, 2011), Five Eyes has traditionally operated as a distributed intelligence network with a high degree of information symmetry. However, AUKUS introduces an asymmetrical intelligence architecture, reinforcing the dominance of the US, UK, and Australia while relegating Canada and New Zealand to a lower tier. This bifurcation further exacerbates relative power disparities within the alliance (Waltz, 1979). It creates strategic insecurity among the excluded members, potentially incentivizing them to seek alternative intelligence partnerships or recalibrate their strategic postures in a manner that weakens Five Eyes as a unified bloc.

Concerns over the integrity of intelligence-sharing mechanisms have also escalated due to perceived vulnerabilities within the US security apparatus. The nomination of individuals with controversial views on intelligence oversight, coupled with past high-profile intelligence leaks (e.g., Snowden disclosures, WikiLeaks, Pentagon leaks), has heightened fears that classified intelligence shared with Washington may be compromised for political or strategic reasons.

According to organisational failure theory (March & Olsen, 1989), intelligence alliances function effectively only when information security protocols remain uncompromised. The potential for insider threats (Anderson, 2008) and the risk of intelligence being selectively leaked for political gains have led to increased wariness among allies, prompting a shift toward selective intelligence-sharing practices that could erode the comprehensiveness and efficiency of Five Eyes intelligence coordination.

Finally, the changing threat perception, particularly the rise of China as a strategic competitor, has contributed to shifting intelligence priorities within Five Eyes, further straining internal cohesion. While all members recognize China as a significant challenge, their geographical positions and economic dependencies lead to varied strategic assessments. The U.S. and U.K. favour a containment approach, while Canada, Australia, and New Zealand exhibit greater hesitancy due to trade dependencies and domestic political considerations.

This divergence from a strategic hedging framework (Medeiros, 2005) suggests that Five Eyes members pursue distinct balancing strategies, which misalign their intelligence priorities and disrupt shared threat assessments. This misalignment leads to capability-trap effects (Posen, 1993), where intelligence-sharing mechanisms become less effective due to varying operational priorities among members. If this trend continues, Five Eyes may transition into a fragmented intelligence-sharing structure characterized by differentiated intelligence flows rather than a unified and coherent security architecture.

Five Eyes is no longer the cohesive bloc it once was. If current trends persist, the alliance may transform into a more fragmented intelligence-sharing framework, where strategic alignment, rather than institutional commitment, dictates the flow of intelligence. Whether Five Eyes can adapt to these changing times or succumb to internal rifts remains an open question, but its era of unquestioned unity appears to be fading.

Aditya Sinha (X:@adityasinha004) is a public policy professional. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.