Trump, Tehran, and the return of Pakistan in the US crisis diplomacy – Firstpost

In a significant development, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir met with US President Donald Trump at the White House on June 18, 2025. This marked the first meeting between a Pakistani Army Chief and a US President in over two decades, reviving high-level military diplomacy reminiscent of the Cold War and post-9/11 era. The timing was critical—coinciding with escalating tensions in West Asia following Israel’s military campaign against Iran. Trump’s decision to host Munir for a one-on-one lunch underscored Washington’s intent to secure Islamabad’s cooperation—or at least its neutrality—should the regional conflict intensify.

Subsequently, the Pakistani government announced its intention to recommend Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, citing his role in averting a broader war between India and Pakistan. Soon after, on June 21–22, the US launched coordinated airstrikes alongside Israel on key Iranian nuclear sites, deploying B-2 stealth bombers and Tomahawk missiles in what Trump hailed as a “spectacular success”. Reports suggest that US military planners may have benefitted from Pakistani intelligence assessments of regional dynamics. General Munir also met CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla, who praised Pakistan as “a phenomenal partner in the counterterrorism world”.

This episode, along with other recent US measures, highlights the continued utility of the US–Pakistan security relationship—one not grounded in enduring strategic trust but sustained by recurring tactical necessity. Islamabad’s value to Washington lies in its situational relevance, especially during periods of regional volatility, rather than in any foundational alignment of long-term interests.

Between Tehran and Washington

Pakistan’s political and military elites, along with sections of the media, have long projected a narrative of Muslim solidarity, frequently invoking the concept of the Ummah to position themselves as defenders of Islamic unity against perceived common adversaries. However, when the moment arrives for meaningful action, Islamabad has consistently backtracked—revealing the hollowness of its rhetoric.

A recent episode once again exposed this duplicity. Senior Iranian official and IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei claimed on state television, “Pakistan has assured us that if Israel uses a nuclear bomb on Iran, they will attack Israel with a nuclear bomb.” The statement generated significant attention in the region, suggesting an extraordinary commitment. Yet Islamabad promptly disowned the claim.

Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif categorically denied it, asserting: “Our nuclear capability is for the benefit of our people and the defence of our country… We do not pursue hegemonic policies against our neighbours. We have made no such commitment.” Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar echoed this in the Senate, calling the Iranian claim “irresponsible and fabricated” and reiterating that Pakistan had made no such statement.

In a further move that underscored the strategic calculations guiding its actions, Islamabad even closed its border with Iran—hardly the behaviour of a state claiming Islamic solidarity. While the language of Muslim unity is often used for domestic consumption in Pakistan, its foreign policy decisions are shaped largely by geopolitical alignments—especially its longstanding and evolving relationship with the United States.

Adding to the complex picture, recent media reports have alleged that Pakistan has allowed the US to deploy its Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) system from Pakistani territory to monitor Iranian military activity. While unconfirmed, such reports are credible given the broader trajectory of US-Pakistan military cooperation and Pakistan’s recurring willingness to offer logistical access in times of crisis.

The military establishment in Rawalpindi maintains deep institutional ties with the Pentagon, which has enabled Pakistan to access advanced Western military hardware—though almost always under strict end-use monitoring. A prominent example is the US-supplied F-16 fighter jets, delivered under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programme, authorised solely for counterterrorism missions. Yet during the 2019 Balakot standoff with India, Islamabad was accused of using F-16s against Indian targets—a violation that raised eyebrows in Washington.

Strategic Dependencies and Tactical Gains

Despite its strategic dependence on the United States, Pakistan has consistently leveraged this relationship to advance its regional objectives—most notably to challenge India. During the Cold War and especially in the post-9/11 era, Islamabad’s alignment with Washington—initially as a bulwark against Soviet influence and later as a frontline ally in the War on Terror—enabled it to secure substantial military and economic assistance. Between 2002 and 2013 alone, Pakistan received over $26 billion in US aid, including advanced weapons systems and counterterrorism support. Despite credible allegations of harbouring the very terror proxies that the US was fighting in Afghanistan, this assistance continued. US diplomatic cover also allowed Pakistan to advance its nuclear programme in the 1980s and 1990s, as a Congressional Research Service report observed: “As Pakistan’s nuclear activities grew, US support continued due to broader geostrategic developments.”

A major strategic reorientation occurred under President George W Bush, who began to view China as a long-term competitor and India as a natural counterweight in Asia. This shift culminated in the 2005 US–India Civil Nuclear Agreement and a series of foundational defence and intelligence-sharing frameworks, gradually moving US policy away from the traditional India–Pakistan hyphenation toward a merit-based approach that treated each country separately.

Today, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on Western-led financial institutions such as the IMF. Despite claims of pursuing a geo-economic realignment, the country lacks both the economic strength and policy autonomy required for independent strategic decision-making. Its frequent IMF bailouts—most recently the $2.4 billion package in May 2025—often carry geopolitical undertones. That package, approved during heightened tensions with India amid “Operation Sindoor”, included a $1 billion tranche strongly backed by Washington. While the Indian government criticised the move as indirectly rewarding destabilising behaviour, the US viewed Pakistan’s support—or at least its neutrality—as critical to managing the emerging crisis in West Asia.

Indeed, this most recent US outreach to Pakistan must be understood in the context of the ongoing war in West Asia. Following Israel’s large-scale military strikes on Iranian territory, the United States joined the conflict by deploying B-2 stealth bombers and cruise missiles to destroy key nuclear facilities in Iran. The stakes have escalated dramatically, with fears of a regional spillover. In this environment, President Trump’s decision to host Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, at the White House was no symbolic gesture—it was a calculated move aimed at securing Pakistan’s intelligence cooperation, logistical assistance, and ensuring its neutrality in the event of further escalation. Trump also praised Pakistan’s restraint during the earlier India–Pakistan standoff and signalled interest in enhanced trade ties—gestures that, while welcomed in Islamabad, served broader US strategic goals in a fast-changing regional theatre.

In international affairs, diplomacy, praise, and financial assistance are rarely altruistic. They are transactional tools shaped by realpolitik. Trump’s renewed engagement with Pakistan—through security cooperation, economic incentives, and high-level diplomacy—reflects not sentimentality but strategic calculus. As Washington navigates simultaneous crises across Asia, maintaining influence in Islamabad remains a useful card in its geopolitical playbook.

Beyond Transactionalism

Unlike the narrowly defined, security-centric relationship between the United States and Pakistan—centred almost exclusively on military and intelligence ties between Rawalpindi and the Pentagon—the India–US partnership is multidimensional, resilient, and future-oriented. It spans a wide array of sectors: defence, trade, technology, education, and civil society, and it is reinforced by a thriving Indian-American diaspora. Foundational defence agreements such as LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA have significantly enhanced military interoperability and intelligence sharing, while the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) has propelled collaboration in cutting-edge areas like AI, quantum computing, and semiconductors.

India’s role as a key pillar of the US Indo-Pacific strategy is affirmed in key policy documents, including the National Security Strategy and the Indo-Pacific Strategy, both of which emphasise India’s centrality in maintaining a free, open, and rules-based regional order. Multilateral frameworks such as the Quad further consolidate this alignment, elevating India’s strategic profile in US regional planning.

However, the durability and breadth of the India–US partnership do not insulate it from friction. The United States’ enduring defence ties with Pakistan continue to pose complications for India—particularly when military aid or strategic gestures toward Islamabad appear to ignore or undermine Indian security concerns. These legacy linkages, though rooted in tactical necessity, send conflicting signals that complicate New Delhi’s strategic calculations.

What distinguishes the India–US relationship, however, is its structural depth and long-term convergence of interests. While Washington’s interactions with Islamabad are shaped by expediency and short-term needs, its partnership with New Delhi is built on shared values, mutual respect, and a strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific. For India, the challenge lies in managing these contradictions without losing sight of the larger trajectory—and in continuing to shape a relationship with the United States that remains indispensable, even amid the shifting tides of global diplomacy.

Conclusion

Geopolitics is not about emotions or loyalties—it’s about leverage and interests. Pakistan’s renewed spotlight in US diplomacy does not signal enhanced strategic weight but rather its utility in a specific crisis scenario. Islamabad remains a dependent actor with limited ability to craft or pursue an autonomous foreign policy. Its rhetorical allegiance to Islamic solidarity is overshadowed by its realpolitik alignments.

India must remain vigilant but not alarmed. The India–US relationship is resilient, enduring, and poised to be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century. Temporary tactical adjustments in US regional posture should not cloud the larger strategic picture.

Imran Khurshid is a visiting research fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.