Waiting for a war everyone sees coming – Firstpost

Few fault lines in global power politics are as flammable and so consequential as the Taiwan Strait is. War between China and Taiwan is no more a far-off possibility. It is a live variable shaped by daily movements, doctrinal changes, and the steady disintegration of the presumptions behind deterrence. Taiwan today is a barometer of the state of the liberal international order, the legitimacy of deterrence theory, the stability of the world economy, and the integrity of alliance politics.

China has until today refrained from military escalation, and the world has kept “strategic ambiguity”, avoidance of unambiguous commitments to Taiwan’s defence, but has quietly prepared for the possibility. This has managed the cross-Strait relationship over more than two decades through a precarious equilibrium.
However, now there is a breakdown of this equilibrium. Beijing has specifically mandated that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) be ready for an invasion by 2027. Satellite pictures verify the building of forward-operating sites close to the Taiwan Strait and the deployment of nuclear-capable aircraft. For Taiwan, China’s grey-zone warfare, i.e., cyber intrusions, economic pressure, and disinformation campaigns, has become a daily reality.

Taiwan has responded urgently in parallel. Under record defence spending, doctrinal changes towards asymmetric warfare, and civil mobilisation projects like Kuma Academy, President Lai Ching-te has supervised Taiwan is getting ready to impose costs, postpone conquering, and oppose collapse, not just survive.

The real concern, though, is not how effectively Taiwan gets ready. It is, if the rest of the world is ready to back it.

Pete Hegseth’s clear warning at the Shangri-La Dialogue that a Chinese invasion “could be imminent” marks the demise of strategic ambiguity as a policy concept. The U.S. has embraced uncertainty since the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to discourage Taipei from attesting to independence and Beijing from invading. But in a reality where China is openly preparing for war and Taiwan is progressively de facto autonomous, this dual deterrence theory loses relevance.

Once a useful strategic instrument, ambiguity today runs the danger of being seen as incoherence. As China probes red lines and practices amphibious assaults, clarity—not caution—may be the better deterrent. After all, deterrent is about resolve rather than only military power. How can enemies be supposed to be discouraged if allies are unsure of what the United States will do should a Chinese attack?

Further, Taiwan generates more than 90 per cent of the most advanced chips and over 60 per cent of the semiconductors used worldwide. One cannot stress its centrality to the global tech economy. Global supply systems would not only be interrupted but also collapse if Taiwan were attacked or blockaded. Industries, including automotive ones, would stop. The development of artificial intelligence would pause. From weapons to cellphones, everything would suffer manufacturing delays.

Taiwan becomes a “choke-point economy” from this vulnerability. Unlike oil-rich Gulf states, Taiwan’s geopolitical significance is found inside its fabs, particularly TSMC, the crown jewel of worldwide chip production, not on its territory. Thus, a war over Taiwan is a systematic shock to globalisation itself rather than a regional conflict. None of the 21st-century economic security plans could afford to overlook this.
Furthermore, a model of 21st-century warfare is the Taiwan crisis. China’s approach is hybrid, not only kinetic. It combines cyberattacks on Taiwanese infrastructure, electromagnetic warfare to disrupt communication, disinformation campaigns on social media, and economic coercion to compel companies and countries interacting with Taipei.
Under this framework, Taiwan’s security extends beyond force deployments and naval readiness to encompass data protection, satellite resilience, and psychological preparedness. In any future battle, the first salvos might not be missiles but viruses. Emphasising “whole-of-society” resilience, Taiwan reflects this knowledge. The battlefield of the future is virtual as much as physical.

Taiwan is a normative challenge to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), not only a geopolitical puzzle. With its vibrant democracy with civil liberties, free elections, and strong institutions, Taiwan presents a mirror reflecting what China might have been. For Xi Jinping, letting a culturally Chinese democracy blossom right off his shore is ideologically unacceptable. Taiwan’s existence negates the CCP’s assertion that authoritarianism is required for order and development.

This renders the Taiwan problem existential for Beijing rather than merely a geographical one. It also qualifies Taiwan as a litmus test for democratic solidarity. Where else can moral authority be claimed if the world cannot defend a free, open civilisation threatened by an expansionist autocracy?
Furthermore, Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea are becoming increasingly unstable. Japan promised to double its defence budget. Under AUKUS, Australia has escalated military cooperation. The U.S. is being granted access to critical military bases by the Philippines. Still, behind this activity is uncertainty. One can count on the United States. Will Europe get involved? With what threshold should one intervene?

Many ASEAN nations, meanwhile, still hedge. Strong trade ties with China help them to postpone confrontation. But hedging, by nature, gets more difficult as uncertainty disappears. As Hegseth pointed out, depending on China economically hampers crisis decision-making. Hedging becomes paralysis eventually.

The idea of deterrence relies on a rational actor model, in which nations precisely estimate the costs and benefits. But the Taiwan issue exposes the limits of this approach. China would consider the symbolic loss of Taiwan as more important than any financial outlay. Domestically, political dynamics—nationalism, elite competitiveness, historical grievance—may overwhelm reason.

In democratic societies, too, the populace may be reluctant to participate in distant battles, particularly after protracted operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. This results in deterrence tiredness, a hollowing out of trustworthiness resulting from perception rather than competence. China could be planning on such deterioration.

In strategic analysis, the human cost is too often absent. Taiwan has a population of 23 million individuals. Long-term psychological anguish, refugee crises across East Asia, and thousands of civilian casualties might all follow from an invasion. Taiwan is an island; there are no overland escape routes unlike Ukraine. Even as the likelihood of violence rises, the humanitarian preparedness for a Taiwan contingency is essentially non-existent.

Finally, the waiting game is ending. Taiwan is a moral challenge, a test of will, a fault line of world order, not only a line on the map. Strategic ambiguity is an invitation to miscalculation rather than a cover. The world must choose today whether deterrence is to be revived or merely remembered.

Aditya Sinha (X:@adityasinha004) is OSD, Research at Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.