What Russia’s reaction to Op Sindoor tells India – Firstpost

War or conflict is often viewed as the failure of diplomacy. Yet, even during a war, diplomacy remains essential to statecraft. Justifying one’s war effort as legitimate, legal, and invariably defensive requires proactive, sustained, wide-ranging diplomatic overtures. War is the ideal time to test the strength of alliances and the resolve of one’s adversaries.

During Operation Sindoor, India’s diplomatic focus was on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the US, European countries and Russia. Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s neutral positions were considered foreign policy successes for the Modi government. In its quintessential didactic habit, the European Union offered unsolicited advice on peace, underscored the fear of nuclear escalation, and was seen as patronising agents. The US initially appeared to throw its weight behind India’s counter-terrorist strike well within Pakistan and eventually, in the course of a mysterious later development, positioned itself as a mediator in a cease-fire. What transpired between these two contradictory stands is in the realm of speculation.

The most surprising element in these diplomatic overtures has been the stance of Russia, a longstanding, time-tested ally of India. The Russian response to Operation Sindoor was well-calibrated, formal, and essentially neutral if one goes by its public statement. There has been no public statement so far from the top leadership. Russia appeared to be noncommittal. Russian Foreign Minister’s spokesperson Maria Zakharova, in her official statement, urged both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint to prevent further deterioration of the situation in the region. She further said that the two countries should resolve their differences through political and diplomatic means in accordance with the provisions of the Simla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999).

Russia’s South Asia Policy

Two imperatives primarily drive Russia’s South Asia policy: first, maintain and deepen its “special and privileged strategic partnership” with India to create a multipolar Asia and a multipolar world. In this, India is the fulcrum of Russia’s South Asia policy. Second, the creation of a firewall on the southern border of Central Asia to check the spillover of Islamic fundamentalism, narcotic trafficking, and refugees emanating from the South Asia region, particularly from Afghanistan.

Ensuring regional stability is vital, and Russia cannot afford one more failing state (Pakistan in this case) in South Asia. Russia views Afghanistan as a key node in its regional security. Given Pakistan’s entrenched penetration and influence on the sections of the Taliban, Russia is left with no choice but to take Pakistan on board in its Afghan policy.

Since the mid-2010s, Russia has cautiously improved ties with Pakistan, focusing primarily on counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing and military exercises (eg, Druzhba). However, evolving developments in the Af-Pak region question the effectiveness and influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan and its northwest tribal region.

Pakistan is no longer in a position to dictate terms in Afghanistan. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has intensified its campaign against the Pakistani state in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In light of these developments, India appears to have failed to convince that Pakistan is the fountainhead of terrorism, not a solution.

Historically, the global geopolitical setting has dictated Russia’s position in South Asia, especially in the India-Pakistan conflict. In 1965, Russia played the mediator role, did not take sides and was instrumental in the Tashkent agreement. In the 1971 war, Moscow sided with India to counter the US-China-Pakistan axis. In the current geopolitical setting, Russia is heavily dependent on China in the wake of its ongoing war with Ukraine. This requires delicate balancing between India and China, and the Russian position on Pahalgam is a balancing act.

Price of Strategic Autonomy

India has pursued its policy of strategic autonomy, formally institutionalised through the Non-Aligned Movement in the 50s and 60s. Though strategic autonomy was not popular then, the term was popularised after the end of the Cold War, used mostly by the European Union vis-à-vis the US. Invoked by President K R Narayanan in 1999, it has been used by both the UPA and NDA leaders to chart an autonomous strategic course that India needs to undertake. Some scholars define it as “a dependence control strategy aimed at safeguarding its independence in both foreign policy decision-making and protecting strategic assets against American pressure”. This pursuit of strategic autonomy has led India to participate in issue-based alliances actively or groupings, eg, Quad, SCO, BRICS, G-20, etc.

India’s recent push for issue-based alliances rather than long-term strategic partnerships comes with its strategic consequences, particularly in today’s world of rising geopolitical contestation. Big powers often prefer dependable partners and camp followers — allies who align their interests, adopt similar strategic goals, and show a willingness to coordinate policy.

For example, the United States provides robust security guarantees and diplomatic backing to NATO allies Japan and South Korea precisely because these partners are committed to shared defence and strategic alignment. India’s non-aligned stance during the Cold War made Washington hesitant to extend full diplomatic or military support, viewing New Delhi as unpredictable or even sympathetic to the Soviet camp.

Even with the Soviet Union, India’s closest partner during the Cold War, the relationship stopped short of alliance. While Moscow supplied arms, diplomatic backing, and economic support, it understood that India would not become a satellite state or subordinate its interests to Soviet bloc priorities. This limited the extent to which Soviet support could translate into unreserved backing, especially when Moscow’s own global calculations conflicted with India’s.

In the contemporary context, the rise of China further complicates India’s position. While India has moved closer to the United States, particularly through frameworks like the Quad, it continues to avoid formal alliances or security pacts. As a result, both Washington and Moscow hesitate to “go all in” for India. Without clear strategic commitments, neither side will offer India the kind of automatic, noncommittal support it might extend to a formal ally — whether in military terms, intelligence sharing, or diplomatic cover in multilateral forums.

This reveals a broader pattern in international politics: big powers reward alignment, not independence. Countries that position themselves as independent-minded actors often preserve their sovereignty and flexibility but pay the price of standing largely alone when power politics heats up.

In India’s case, this means that despite its size, economic weight, and geopolitical importance, it remains diplomatically constrained — drawing on a razzmatazz of transactional relationships with multiple powers, termed as multi-alignment, but lacking the kind of deep, reliable backing that comes with formal alignments.

In conclusion, India’s Pahalgam diplomatic experience underscores a hard truth of international relations: strategic autonomy offers freedom but limits the scope of external support. This should drive home a lesson that India has to tread alone and can’t rely on Russia or, for that matter, any other power. Strategic autonomy comes with strings attached. As global rivalries sharpen and the international order becomes more contested, India will continue to face the challenge of balancing its cherished independence with the need for dependable partnerships in a world where major powers expect loyalty in exchange for support.

Amitabh Singh teaches at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Ankur is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.