Why Balochistan can’t go the Bangladesh way – Firstpost

Ever since the news of the hijacking of the Jaffar Express by Baloch insurgents in Pakistan came out, it has captured the imagination of security watchers and the Indian public at large. In common conversations, references are being made to how Balochistan could be the next East Pakistan (Bangladesh). The tumultuous history of the struggle for independence of the Bangladeshis and India’s role in helping the beleaguered populace overcome the tyranny of the Pakistani Army is still fresh in the subcontinental security and geopolitical circles.

It is, however, important to map the issue, literally and figuratively, before we indulge in geopolitical salami slicing. Balochistan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) do share some commonalities, such as being part of larger political entities (British India and later Pakistan), but there are more differences than similarities.

Political Geography

East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) was located in the eastern part of the Indian subcontinent, bordered by India on three sides and the Bay of Bengal to the south. It was geographically separated from West Pakistan by over 1,600 kilometres (about 1,000 miles) of Indian territory, which made communication, governance and military interference difficult for Pakistan.

However, being surrounded by India, with direct land access through porous borders, made it easier for the Indian security establishment to provide logistical and operational support to the Mukti Bahini and later conduct conventional military operations for the liberation of Bangladesh.

Balochistan, on the other hand, is located in the southwest of Pakistan, bordering Iran to the west, Afghanistan to the north, and the Arabian Sea to the south. It does not provide any direct access to India to provide any kind of hard power support to the insurgents without the involvement of proxies, Iran and/or Afghanistan.

To top it up, the international standing and political situations in Iran and Afghanistan do not allow these hostile neighbours of Pakistan to directly involve themselves in Baloch matters. While both the countries would find common interest with India in steaming up the Baloch situation to keep the Pakistan military off balance, they would prefer to not let the boiling water spill.

Another key geographical differentiator is also the terrain of the two regions. Balochistan is rich in natural resources, including gas, oil, and minerals but is generally arid and desert-like with limited cultivation and lower economic and human resource potential. East Bengal, however, is primarily a low-lying delta with extensive rivers and wetlands. The terrain is extremely fertile, has supported agriculture for centuries and is densely populated. The political, economic and demographic sustainability of Balochistan outside a larger nation-state would therefore always be difficult. This is also evident in the political history of these two regions.

Political History

Balochistan has been the frontier of two great civilisational empires. At times it was under the control of the Persian Empire to its west, while later it also came under the powers of the Mughal Empire to its east. Under the British, Balochistan consisted of various princely states and territories, some under British suzerainty, such as the princely states of Kalat, Makran, and others.

After 1947, the region became a part of Pakistan. Despite the Khan of Kalat, the ruler of one of the largest princely states, initially declaring independence, Balochistan was forcibly integrated with Pakistan after a military intervention in 1948 to become its largest yet least populated province. The Baloch identity and culture of the people, while being distinct from Punjabis and Pathans, are spread over many tribes and clans who draw their ancestry from the West and the East.

Bengal before and after the advent of the East India Company was a major cultural and political centre in India. In 1905, the British partitioned Bengal along religious lines, and East Bengal was formed, which roughly later became part of Pakistan. The Bengali identity of the population is distinct and had once apparently subsumed religion and, more importantly, political boundaries to this day. The relative homogeneity of the Bengalis in culture, language, cuisine and practice across borders is stronger than that of people from neighbouring regions. There are negligible divisions in the society on clans and tribes, and even the Indic caste system is relatively weak compared to the rest of India.

Amongst the Baloch people, tribal and clan loyalties of tribes such as Mengals and Bugtis lie stronger than the regional or provincial affiliations. While they all consider themselves to be Baloch, the underlying fissures are not too deep. It’s claimed that all the insurgent groups of Balochistan are for the first time working together rather than at cross purposes. While the catalyst for this is the atrocities of the Pakistan Army and the state, it remains to be seen how long the unity will last in the face of military and political adversity.

Cultural History

The Bengalis felt humiliated by the Urdu imposition as part of Pakistan, which was taken as an affront to their culture and became the fuel for the fire lit because of their political subjugation by the West Pakistanis. The cultural strength and bonds of the Bengali people were stronger than their political and politico-religious aspirations.

The culture of Balochistan is heavily influenced by its tribal and nomadic traditions. The Baloch people have a rich oral history, including poetry, music, and stories passed down through generations. It is influenced by Persian, Afghan, and Central Asian traditions, with the Baloch language (a member of the Indo-Iranian language group) as a common feature.

Possibly owing to the ruggedness of the terrain, nomadic and tribal social structures and the trepidations of being a frontier region between two empires, the overall cultural identity and discourse of Balochistan is significantly lesser in contrast to Bengal. In isolation, this may not be significant to its case to be independent, but is unlikely to be a singular rallying cry towards its peoples quest for freedom. In Balochistan, the primary reason for insurgency remains political indifference and exploitation by the Punjabis, not cultural imposition.

Prognosis

Pakistan’s response to the Baloch insurgency has been similar to its approach in East Bengal. The heavy hand of the army, already battling the terrorists in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, will be felt with momentum in Balochistan. This will give short-term results for tenure-based generals and politicians to escape with, but will negatively exaggerate the situation further in the mid to long term.

However, Pakistan won’t fold. Given the political geography, there is a negligible chance of direct external interference in Balochistan. Low-cost external support in material and training can continue indefinitely. Historically and culturally, Balochistan does not represent an independent nation-state and is likely to be another rentier nation just like Afghanistan and Pakistan, which the world can ill afford. No world power has significant interests in destabilising a nuclear Pakistan beyond where it is today, as repeated World Bank and IMF bailouts suggest. And hence, Pakistan can slowly choke the insurgency into submission over time with hard military power and hopefully nuanced political machinations.

However, with the history of political indifference and exploitation by the Pakistani state towards Balochistan, it will take some doing, politically and militarily, to subdue the Baloch insurgency. Given the interests of Iran and Afghanistan in keeping the Pakistan Army occupied internally, the material and moral support to the Baloch rebels will continue. They may also look at India to lend a hand in keeping the Pakistan Army’s head underwater.

The author served in the Indian Army for over 20 years. His service profile includes a tenure in the Military Operations Directorate, New Delhi, where he dealt with apex-level national strategy development and management of sensitive & volatile international relations. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.