How ‘all-weather’ China-Pakistan friendship faces most severe storm – Firstpost

China’s engagement with Pakistan has long been touted as an “all-weather” partnership, yet the trajectory of their relationship is nose-diving towards strategic uncertainty. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), once heralded as a flagship of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is now mired in economic, political, and security-related complications.

Pakistan’s fragile internal situation, marked by a deteriorating economy, political instability, and a resurgence of insurgency, has forced China to reconsider the viability of its investments in the region. While Beijing has sought to mitigate risks by strengthening its foothold over Gwadar, its broader strategic ambitions face serious setbacks.

When CPEC was initially launched, China viewed it as a game changer that would grant it direct access to the Arabian Sea, hence reducing its reliance on the vulnerable Malacca Strait, and also solidifying Pakistan’s economic and strategic dependence on Beijing. However, progress has been sluggish, largely due to Pakistan’s political dysfunction, deteriorating internal security, and financial mismanagement.

The fraught relations were evident back in 2022, when China had effectively frozen any new funding, citing Pakistan’s failure to honour its financial and security commitments. With outstanding debt exceeding $110 billion and mounting obligations to Chinese firms with $16 billion alone in the energy sector, Pakistan’s capacity to sustain CPEC had eroded.

Moreover, the deteriorating security landscape has further dampened Chinese enthusiasm. Balochistan, a crucial component of the CPEC route, has been the epicentre of anti-state insurgency. Frequent attacks on Chinese workers and interests, including high-profile suicide bombings, have signalled Pakistan’s inability to provide adequate protection to its Chinese counterparts. This failure is particularly striking given that Pakistan, at Beijing’s behest, raised a dedicated Special Security Division with fifteen thousand troops in 2016 to safeguard CPEC. This unit was later upgraded to a full infantry division in 2019, yet these measures have failed to stem the violence targeting Chinese nationals.

As the broader CPEC initiative flounders, China has doubled down on securing Gwadar. The strategic port offers a critical maritime gateway that enhances Beijing’s geopolitical leverage. The city’s proximity to the Persian Gulf, home to over 30 per cent of global oil and gas reserves, makes it indispensable for China’s energy security calculus. Additionally, control over Gwadar could allow China to project power in the Indian Ocean, challenging US and Indian dominance.

In a recent move, China has clearly signalled its intent to cement its hold over Gwadar. China has taken over operations at Gwadar International Airport, effectively transforming it into a key logistical hub. Adding to this, Beijing has declared the Chinese language as the first official language of the airport, an unmistakable indication not only to Pakistan but also to the rest of the world of asserting its growing control over the port city. This development underscores China’s broader ambitions of wresting Gwadar away from Pakistan’s sovereignty, further exacerbating tensions between the two nations.

To reinforce its grip, Beijing has explored expanding its naval footprint in the region. Beyond Gwadar, China has also expressed interest in Ormara, aiming to establish a ship repair dock and a submarine holding facility. The PRC has also been pushing for greater influence in Pakistan’s mining sector, particularly in the Siyadik Copper mine, while exerting pressure for the completion of the Gwadar-Nawabshah LNG terminal, which was abandoned under US and Saudi pressure.

However, Beijing faces a major roadblock that is Pakistan’s reluctance to cede too much control. Islamabad has resisted Chinese proposals to establish a joint security force, despite escalating attacks on Chinese personnel. This has further strained relations, with China dispatching a high-level security delegation after the 2024 Karachi suicide bombing but to no avail. The growing frustration in Beijing underscores its realisation that Pakistan’s security institutions are failing to protect its interests, raising serious questions about the sustainability of China’s involvement.

Amidst China’s waning enthusiasm to fund Islamabad, Pakistan has rekindled ties with the United States. Following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021, US-Pakistan relations soured, but by 2022, Islamabad began recalibrating its approach. Then Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa’s Washington visit marked a turning point, culminating in a $400 million military aid package.

Since then, Bajwa’s successor and current army chief, Gen Asim Munir, has managed to secure a further $7 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition to that, the World Bank has recently promised a funding of an additional $20 billion pending final formalities. This continued strategy of Pakistan to look once again towards the West has added much angst to Beijing.

China’s frustration was evident when it refused Pakistan’s plea for a crucial debt rollover, which was essential for securing the $7 billion IMF bailout in 2023. While a partial compromise was later reached, Beijing’s stance signalled its intent to exert financial pressure. The Chinese leadership understands that Pakistan’s desperation could be leveraged to extract strategic concessions and possibly greater operational control over Gwadar or deeper economic entrenchment in Pakistan’s infrastructure.

Adding to the strain, China has begun openly accusing Pakistan of backing out of its commitments under CPEC. Beijing suspects that Islamabad is deliberately stalling key projects at the behest of Washington, fearing that deeper Chinese involvement could jeopardise Pakistan’s strategic ties with the US. These allegations reflect a broader Chinese scepticism about Pakistan’s reliability as a partner, further complicating the bilateral relations between the two.

China’s approach to Pakistan is now guided by a two-pronged strategy of economic coercion and strategic entrenchment. Beijing is fully aware that Islamabad’s economic predicament leaves it with little room to negotiate entirely from a position of strength. Unlike Sri Lanka, which officially declared bankruptcy, Pakistan remains afloat due to emergency loans and international bailouts. Consequently, an overt Chinese takeover of Gwadar akin to Sri Lanka’s Hambantota model may be politically unviable, as it risks severe domestic backlash in Pakistan and international scrutiny.

Additionally, securing the entire CPEC route stretching from Xinjiang to Gwadar remains a herculean challenge. The persistent insurgencies in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan pose a severe security risk. The failure to effectively neutralise anti-state actors targeting Chinese personnel highlights the limitations of both Pakistani security forces and any future joint China-Pakistan security efforts. The prospect of Chinese casualties on Pakistani soil could be politically disastrous for Beijing, undermining the Communist Party’s carefully curated image of invincibility under President Xi Jinping.

Pakistan’s growing reliance on China for economic and infrastructural support has not yielded the anticipated benefits for either party. As CPEC stagnates and Pakistan pivots towards the US, Beijing is caught in a strategic conundrum of whether to continue sinking investments into an unstable partner or recalibrate its regional approach. While China may seek de facto control over Gwadar as compensation for its losses, any aggressive manoeuvring could backfire, triggering both domestic resistance in Pakistan and countermeasures from Washington.

For Pakistan, the challenge remains existential. As its debt obligations towards China keep mounting and insurgent threats persist, Islamabad’s ability to maintain its sovereignty over critical assets like Gwadar is increasingly in question. Whether China ultimately deepens its hold over Pakistan or scales back its involvement will depend on the evolving geopolitical landscape, but one thing is clear: the “all-weather” friendship between the two nations is facing its most severe storm.

Raja Muneeb is an independent journalist and a columnist. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.