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How US sanctions over Pakistan’s missile programme should concern Beijing as much as Islamabad – Firstpost

How US sanctions over Pakistan’s missile programme should concern Beijing as much as Islamabad – Firstpost



If China continues to engage with Pakistani entities, its own companies supplying parts and technology to any of these listed entities will find themselves in the spotlight. That’s something for Beijing to mull over

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In a rather strange twist, an outgoing US administration has decided to sanction Pakistan for a proliferation threat from its missile program. Entities designated include the well-known National Development Complex (NDC) and a clutch of other firms that supply to its massive complex for nuclear and missile capability. This last-minute action means that something has taken place, which is sufficiently important for the nonproliferation lobby to sit up and take notice. Or else it’s a message to Pakistan to back off on undesirable activity. Or it could be both.

NDC has been around for a while

The National Development Complex was created in 1990 and is located in the Kala Chitta Dhar mountain ranges west of Islamabad. It is a part of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), which is in charge of weaponisation. The NDC itself has been in charge of missilery, first pushing out the Shaheen series, based on the Chinese M-9, and then going on to create a short-range series like the Nasr, which is advertised as nuclear capable, at a mere 60 km range. That was part of the ‘mad hatter’ doctrine, essentially conveying that Pakistan would use its nukes at any time and under any circumstances, none of which could be easily predicted. That’s all in the public sphere. The point in terms of sanctions is that NDC is its primary missile aggregation facility, together with the production of TELs (transporter erector launchers), a facility located in Fatehjung, whose main supplier is also China. In recent months, Pakistan’s missile activity has been intense and on a distinctly upward curve after a long spell of relative inactivity.

2024 missile achievements

In 2024 there were some noticeable achievements. In August, Pakistan moved towards its stated goal of ‘full spectrum deterrence’, with a Shaheen ‘training launch’ of a stated 2,750 km range that could potentially target US bases in the Middle East. A training launch usually signifies full operationalisation and induction. Just months prior to this was the test of a MIRV (multiple independent re-entry vehicle), Ababeel, with a range that potentially skimmed Oman’s coast. It was claimed as Pakistan’s answer to Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programmes, either India’s or anyone else’s. All of this would have been viewed with alarm in Washington. Then came an even more disquieting development.

On November 5, a ballistic missile launch was announced by the Pakistani navy, with a range of 350 km. No details were given, but examination of the video showed that it was launched from a ‘Zulfikar’ class frigate. Multiple notices of launch (NOTAM) were issued, including one of 1,500 km. This could potentially threaten US assets in the Indian Ocean. China has demonstrated its own such capability, in a thrust towards area denial/access denial primarily to target aircraft carriers. It is well known that Chinese engineers are working alongside the Pakistan navy in Karachi.

Alongside these developments was the announcement of the launch in April 2024 of the ‘Hangor 2’ class of submarines in China, destined for Pakistan, delayed by a year as Germany refused to supply the diesel engines. It’s unclear what engine is now powering that potentially huge game changer. The four, which were to be produced in Pakistan, are due anytime, with the keel laid for one on December 21, 2024, and the second at the Karachi Shipyard a year later. In short, 2024 has seen a huge leap in capability. And it could affect the US’ Indo-Pacific plans. The whole thing also has a huge Chinese signature, especially since the technology being provided has been vastly upgraded.

Those shadowy entities

Then there are the two other entities involved. Rockside Enterprise in Karachi’s upscale Clifton area is one. The company seems to be invisible on the net but seems to be linked to Akhtar and Sons (also sanctioned). The latter is shown as a textile company with a large denim manufacturing capability. Ditto with regard to the other company listed, Affiliates International. This is remarkably like the Abdul Qadir Khan network, which sourced and sold nuclear and missile-related tech and parts across 20 countries. Uncovering that took years of patient intel gathering when it was brutally exposed in 2004 for an operation that probably started in the seventies. No one was actually prosecuted for this vast criminal enterprise, including AQ Khan himself. Detailed reports showed European companies, for instance, knew that the dual-use equipment was for Pakistan. What they did not know was that the network was supplying other countries like Iran, Libya, and North Korea. In this case, the listed entities are clearly shell companies, living in the shadowy world of international smuggling.

The objective of the sanctions exercise is to prevent the state-owned NDC and these private players from accessing the international market. But as is evident, the NDC is closely tied to China, and Beijing has been adept at accessing international technology, both legally and through a network of its own. ‘Sanctions’ on NDC have no real meaning, since it is hardly likely to engage with foreign buyers in its own name, nor is it likely to bank in western countries. But the upshot is that if China continues to engage with it, its own companies supplying parts and tech to any of these listed entities will find themselves in the spotlight. That’s something for Beijing to mull over. The sanctions are not a message to Islamabad only. It’s also for China.

Meanwhile, Pakistani reaction has inevitably mentioned ‘double standards’ in not sanctioning India. But some seventy-plus Indian companies have faced sanctions. The difference is that these are not cutouts but real industry-providing spare parts, in this case to Russia. That doesn’t violate Indian laws. There’s no shadowy network here. Even then, India’s defence ministry has acted swiftly to tighten export controls, particularly to prevent the movement of equipment to non-authorised hands. Delhi is not perfect, but it is not associated with any state-run effort to bypass nuclear and missile controls. There’s a reason. Delhi made its own nuclear weapons with its own domestic efforts. Pakistan’s weapons are an international cocktail.

The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.



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