Iran’s regional strategy in disarray after Assad’s fall – Firstpost
The fall of Assad’s regime has sent shock waves across the globe, including the West Asian capitals. However, the strongest tremors are being felt in Tehran as it lost its closest ally in the region
read more
After a protracted civil year which led to widespread destruction, social instability and produced one of the most unprecedented refugee crises of the 2Ist century, Syria’s Assad regime fell in a matter of days at a time when Bashar al-Assad’s grip on power seemed firm. The Syrian conflict over the last 13 years had become what many analysts called “frozen conflict”. However, the rebel offensive which began late last month in the northwest of the country and took down the Assads from the map of West Asia has taken everyone by awe. Hardly anyone had predicted that Assad’s regime was so fragile that it would fall in just 11 days. In fact, everyone including regional Arabs states, which had lately rehabilitated Assad in the Arab League and normalised diplomatic relations, got it wrong about Syria. This is true of Iran as well, which was the most significant regional ally of the Assad regime and actually helped Assad to stay in power at least since 2015 when Iran through its Revolutionary Corps and its so-called ‘axis of resistance’ propelled support to the regime in Syria.
There is something unique about the Middle East that no one seems to comprehend fully. That’s why it always disappoints political pundits, regional regimes and even the strategies of external powers. When the Middle East seemed quite calm and the State of Israel was fast being integrated by even more Arab states and the Palestinian question seemed to have been thrown into oblivion, the Gaza war happened and the region was again back in crisis with the Palestinian cause making a global comeback. Again when Assad’s regime in Syria seemed to have faced it all and possibly secured itself from any serious internal or external threats and everyone had accepted the status quo in the Syrian conflict, the sudden rebel offensive took it down and Syria is again back in discussion. It is the unpredictability of these sorts which makes it interesting to watch the Middle East.
But how did Iran fail to grasp the ground situation in Syria? Was Iran running out of options or resources to put up for Assad’s defence this time around? Did Assad ask for support from its only state-level ally in the region? While there is no clear answer to these questions, Assad did put up a confident image in the midst of the lightning operation launched by the Hayat Tahrir al Sham and other opposition groups. When Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi visited Assad in Damascus early this month, it seemed he had been assured by the regime that the HTS and a plethora of other groups including Turkiye-backed Syrian National Army didn’t pose a serious threat to the regime in Damascus. However, after Damascus fell to the rebels, Abbas Araghchi expressed shock over the fall of the regime there and the inability of Assad’s troops to respond to the rebel offensive.
With the fall of Assad’s Syria, Iran has lost its most important regional ally, one which was often touted as the heart and soul of the ‘axis of resistance’. Syria under Assad’s watch functioned as an overland bridge for weapons and other critical supplies to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Both Iran and Hezbollah have now lost a great ally which will definitely force a fundamental rethink in their approach or strategies. This is a shock of unprecedented magnitude as the very ‘axis of resistance’ on the back of which Iran projected its regional power and influence over the years is in tatters.
The change of guard in Damascus is likely to negatively affect Iran more than any other regional or extraterritorial power in the Middle East.
Iran will increasingly find it difficult to establish cordial relationships with the new rulers in Syria. The overall dynamics have changed so will the terms of the engagement. At some point the new administration in Syria might fully normalise ties with Tehran but Iran is never going to achieve the depths of strategic cooperation and goodwill that it had been enjoying for years in Syria.
Iran’s approach or foreign policy toward the Gulf states is likely to see a change but not a very fundamental one at least now. The Gulf states, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have recently normalised relations with Tehran and started to initiate cooperation across a wide range of areas including defence after years of their ties being in cold-storage. Iran and Gulf States except Qatar also found themselves on the opposite side of the conflict in the Syrian civil war. However, before Assad’s dramatic fall, everyone in the region except Erdogan had more or less accepted the status quo in Syria and started normalising ties with the regime. Interestingly, many European powers lately had started to do the same.
Since the fall of Assad surprised Washington too, the incoming Trump administration might consider a policy rethink in the Middle East especially toward Iran. Again a more proactive American engagement in the Middle East during Trump 2.0 would see Iran’s power and influence diminished in the region since it’s the US’ primary adversary in the region. This also doesn’t sound good for the prospects of a possible deal on the Iranian nuclear issue or sanctions relief.
Israel, which is the most significant regional threat to the regime in Tehran, is in a very comfortable position as of now. Israel has wreaked havoc in the Gaza strip and Southern Lebanon and dismembered the ‘axis of resistance’. And immediately after Assad’s fall, Israel conducted hundreds of air strikes, the largest in its history since 1948, against Syria and almost completely destroyed the Syrian military assets. It also invaded the county near Golan and occupied some more chunk of Syrian territory in a clear violation of the international law and 1974 agreement with the Syrian government. As a result, the regime in Tehran must be on high alert right now. There is a possibility that Israel will try to exploit the situation to settle the scores with Iran and attack its nuclear programme.
Similarly, Iran and Turkiye aren’t going to see eye to eye for a while given Erdogan’s support to the rebel offensive against the Assad regime. Turkiye’s reach and depth of influence in the post-Assad Syria could well be said to have matched Iran’s during Assad’s time. Turkiye will also play a very crucial role in shaping a post-Assad future of Syria.
Yet the hardest hit of all is Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’. The land route with Hezbollah is lost for now. Since the resistance axis is shattered as of now, Iran is unlikely to restore its regional dominance in the foreseeable future.
This is more likely to force a fundamental shift in Iran’s foreign policy, especially its regional strategy in West Asia. The more conservative lobby in Tehran might lose some ground to the reformists. As a result, the regime will pursue a more accommodating and less militant regional strategy. However, if the regime in Tehran is pushed beyond a certain threshold by the Israelis or Americans, the Khomenis will not hesitate to lift the religiously motivated self-imposed embargo to develop a nuclear bomb.
Liyaqat Nazir is a doctoral fellow at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
Post Comment