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Setting the stage for critical negotiations – Firstpost

Setting the stage for critical negotiations – Firstpost



Interlocutors from Iran convened with representatives from Germany, France, and the United Kingdom in Geneva on January 13 for another round of discussions concerning Tehran’s contentious nuclear programme. These talks are taking place amidst heightened tensions in West Asia and the recent ouster of the Assad regime in Syria, which has severely disrupted Iran’s regional strategy. The timing of these negotiations is particularly significant, occurring just a week before Donald Trump is inaugurated as US President for a second term. With Iran steadfast in asserting its right to uranium enrichment and the United States absent from these discussions, the potential outcomes of these talks remain uncertain.

Background of the negotiations

The preceding round of talks on November 29, 2024, involving the same European parties, yielded little progress. This stalemate followed a resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on November 21, 2024, which censured Iran for its lack of cooperation. The motion, sponsored by the U.S., the UK, France, and Germany, was a continuation of a similar resolution adopted earlier in June 2024. Iran strongly criticized these actions, threatening to escalate its nuclear enrichment activities if the censure was not withdrawn. This tension arose despite a prior agreement during IAEA head Rafael Grossi’s visit to Tehran, where Iran consented to cap its stock of uranium enriched to near-weapons-grade levels up to 60 per cent purity. However, faced with additional sanctions, Iran threatened to scale up the program further.

Current State of Iran’s Nuclear Programme

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 14, 2015, was a pivotal agreement aimed at preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. It was an ‘instrument of faith’ between the two parties that incorporated strict checks and balances aimed at ensuring a strict vigil on Iran’s nuclear program, lest Iran progress to developing a nuclear weapon. However, the deal was derailed in 2018 when President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States, labeling the JCPOA a “horrible deal”. Negotiations to revive the agreement resumed under President Joe Biden in 2021 but stalled by early 2022 after eight rounds of talks due to geopolitical crises, including the Russia-Ukraine war and escalating conflicts in Gaza.

Iran, meanwhile, free from the shackles of the deal, has increased the Uranium enrichment drastically. While the IAEA has raised concerns over the enrichment and especially Iran’s decision to enrich Uranium up to 60 per cent, it was in January 2023 that an IAEA report raised the alarm when its inspectors discovered that two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordo nuclear plant in Iran had been configured differently. The samples collected showed particles up to 83.7 percent enriched uranium, close to 90 per cent required for weapon-grade uranium. Iran dismissed the concerns, stating that small particles get highly enriched during the process of enrichment. However, the concerns have mounted ever since.

Soon after the last meeting in November 2024, the IAEA report of December 2024 stated that Iran has significantly raised the levels of enrichment and has advanced its nuclear programme significantly. The two-page report caused immediate alarm as it indicated a dangerous spike in Iran’s enrichment activities at the Fordow enrichment plant. The findings stated that Iran is instituting a capacity to make weapon-grade uranium (WGU) under the guise of making 60 percent Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) at the Fordow underground enrichment plant and that it can possibly produce WGU without even using its existing stocks of 60 per cent HEU. As per the IAEA report, Iran is setting up a three-step, interconnected enrichment process at Fordow, going from natural uranium up to 5 percent enriched uranium in up to 8 IR-6 cascades, from 5 to 20 per cent in six current IR-1 cascades, and 20 to 60 per cent in two interconnected IR-6 cascades. This three-step process allows the near continuous, sequential enrichment of natural uranium to 60 per cent HEU. This process can be easily modified to produce WGU. If true, this could mark a dangerous escalation of the nuclear program with potential weaponisation possibilities.

As per the IAEA report of 19th November 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 6,604 kg, of which Iran had an estimated 182.3 kg of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent purity. By the IAEA’s theoretical definition, around 42 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent is required to make the required amount of highly enriched (beyond 90 per cent) enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb. By this calculation, Iran already has the required enriched uranium to make weapon-grade uranium for four bombs.

What Can Geneva Talks Achieve?

Geneva talks are happening more in hope than conviction. The talks aim to keep Iran engaged and responsive to the queries and discussions at the meeting. Unlike November last year, when the talks took place under threats and counter threats, it is hoped that there will be understanding this time. The recent developments in West Asia resulting from the successful Israeli operations in Gaza, West Bank and Southern Lebanon, wherein it has been able to eliminate any major threat from Hamas and Hezbollah have had a significant impact on Iran. The ouster of Assad from Syria has effectively broken any direct link that Iran had with the proxies in the region, dealing a deadly blow to its regional strategy in the region. The return of Donald Trump as the President is bound to have an impact, too, especially with his threats of ‘Maximum Pressure 2.0’, adding pressure on Iranian leadership.

Plus, the fact that only three European powers are engaging in talks with Iran gives it only a cosmetic look, especially with the big three, the US, Russia and China, not being part of the talks. The absence of these major stakeholders reduces the potential for binding agreements, relegating the talks to a largely symbolic exercise aimed at maintaining dialogue and preventing further escalation. As signatories to the JCPOA, these European powers, at best, could seek to prevent further nuclear proliferation and, once again allow the IAEA access to its nuclear sites. In return, Iran may be promised some relief from economic sanctions that have crippled its economy.

Conclusion

Iran’s nuclear issue has been an issue of conflict not only between Iran and other powers in the region, but also with the US and Israel. PM Netanyahu has often suggested taking out Iran nuclear sites through air strikes. In fact, Israel claimed to have successfully targeted some parts of Iran nuclear program during its airstrike on 26th October last year.

It is very unlikely that Iran will concede to roll back its nuclear program to July 2015 deal levels. Also, as per the ‘Sunset Clause’ of the previous deal, the restrictions on Iran to use only first-generation centrifuges (IR-1) for enriching uranium was only for ten years, i.e. 2025. There were other clauses that were applicable till 2030 like restriction on uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent purity and limit its enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kg. In any new deal that is to be negotiated, these clauses too will have to be re-drawn.

Also, with its regional strategy of fighting through proxies demolished, the nuclear programme is the only trump card that Iran holds and it would therefore not let it go, without concrete ‘iron clad’ assurances from the international community.

Statement from Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, after the meeting on 13th January, describing the talks as “serious, frank, and constructive”, is a clear positive and departure from the previous talks in November which were full of threats and mistrust. It is hoped that this meeting will help restore some trust and lay the foundation for future full-fledged talks later in the year.

Col Rajeev Agarwal is a military veteran and West Asia expert. During his service, he has been Director in Military Intelligence as well as Director in the Ministry of External Affairs. His X handle is @rajeev1421. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.



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