What Trump 2.0 means for Taiwan and its future – Firstpost

Donald Trump’s second presidency has induced a much-expected sense of uncertainty in the US’ alliances. One such ally, known only as a “robust unofficial” partner to the US, is the island of Taiwan. And while the recent removal of the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” from the website of the US State Department has riled Beijing up, it may not mean anything more than continuity in US policy.

So does the US now support Taiwan’s Independence? The short answer is no. The political system of the US grants significant authority to its various executive departments and their heads to differ on policy issues and adopt their own narratives. This must be taken into account while assessing the decision of the State Department to remove the phrase shunning the idea of Taiwan’s “independence” from the US-Taiwan Bilateral Relations ‘Factsheet’. And so, the decision may just be a reflection of Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s hawkish China policy, but not necessarily a walk-back on the US’s commitments to both China and Taiwan, as specified under the American Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979.

The TRA specifies that the US only promotes the use of peaceful means for the resolution of the cross-Strait unification issue. Further, even the modified ‘Factsheet’ does not stand for any unilateral manoeuvres to change the status quo. ‘Unilateral changes’ pertain not only to the use of force by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to annex Taiwan and its outlying islands but also to any Taiwanese endeavours to declare independence.

What Should Taiwan Expect from Trump?

As ambiguous as Trump’s Taiwan policy may seem, it is unlikely he will want to concede the US’ position on aiding the island’s defence. While Trump has often remarked that he “likes Xi Jinping very much”, he has also emphasised the need to create a level playing field in the US-China relationship. He has demonstrated flexibility in his approach to Beijing, which makes it difficult to, in a pinpointed manner, make the case that he is pro or anti-China.

Similarly, Trump has criticised Taiwan for stealing the American semiconductor business and has demanded money in exchange for promises of security from the US. And yet, Taiwan’s policymakers seem to be at ease. Taiwanese National Security Council Secretary General Joseph Wu told audiences in Taipei recently that he finds Trump’s support for Taiwan “very strong”.

Uncertainty aside, it is notable that Trump appointed hawks on China across key positions in his government. Unofficial conversations have also revealed that many of these appointees are part of a US Congress grouping known as the ‘Taiwan caucus’, which acts as a voice for Taipei’s interests in the Senate and House of Representatives. For example, Pete Hegseth has been appointed Secretary of Defence. In his opening remarks to the Ukraine Defence Contact Group on February 12, Hegseth clearly highlighted that the US’ priority is to deter China with all its resources and not get involved in Europe’s security. Then there is Mike Waltz, the National Security Advisor, who seems to enthusiastically support speedy deliveries of weapons systems to Taiwan. And of course, there is Rubio, who, even in a short call with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi right after stepping into office, critiqued China’s coercive actions vis-à-vis Taiwan.

In this light, even though Trump is expected to be transactional in his approach and has taken a tough stance on the American alliance ecosystem, his administration as a whole is unlikely to walk back US support to Taiwan. In fact, if precedent is any proof, by value, Trump notified Congress of the highest Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan during his first term ($18.76 billion). This is as opposed to Barack Obama, who, in his two tenures (2009-17), notified of FMS worth $14 billion. It is likely that arms sales trends will continue to flourish under Trump 2.0. There are two main reasons for this. First, Taiwan’s defence is closely tied to China’s preponderance, and second, defence exports are an important component of the US’ economic growth.

Moving Forward

However, Taiwan must be cautious in its approach to Trump or be accused of over-reliance on American defence, like Europe has been in the past few days. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te has demonstrated some such caution in his remarks around Trump, promising to act “prudently” to address Trump’s concerns surrounding the semiconductor industry. More than narratives of friendship and cooperation, however, what is likely to work for Taiwan is ensuring reciprocal benefits for the US in economic and technological domains as Trump endeavours to nip China in the bud. And a virtue to hold close would be patience, given that Trump is unlikely to give in to Taipei’s demands based on abstract timelines predicting invasion or annexation.

Anushka Saxena is a Staff Research Analyst (China) with the Indo-Pacific Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru. The views expressed are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of Firstpost.