Why China is so eager to spread its footprints in Africa’s west coast – Firstpost
Recently, China hosted a two-day forum focusing on maritime security and boosting its presence in the west coast of Africa. Hosted by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the second edition of the seminar on “Security Situation in the Gulf of Guinea” brought together maritime armed force leaders and defence attachés from 18 nations, including Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria.
The seminar, themed “Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security and Cooperation”, marks the first in-person international dialogue conducted by the PLA Navy on regional security in the Gulf. It follows an initial virtual meeting in 2022, during which participants explored maritime security challenges under the framework of “a maritime community with a shared future”,
according to the statement. Speaking at the
occasion, Admiral Dong Jun said that the Gulf of Guinea is the common home for regional countries and also an important bond for strengthening communication and cooperation between China and Africa and building a “maritime community with a shared future”.
Furthering ties with the continent, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) became the premier coordinating mechanism for Beijing’s engagement with Africa. The recent session Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit took place between September 4-6 2024 in Beijing. The joint statement
reads: “China and Africa will continue to work together to safeguard the security of shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea, Indian Ocean and Somali waters.”
Gulf of Guinea’s strategic location
Geographically, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) designates the vast Atlantic coast stretching from Angola to Senegal. Global interest on the GoG grew primarily due to the natural resources—particularly oil and gas—in the region. The
region hosts a number of leading oil-producing countries in sub-Sahara Africa, including Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Congo-Brazzaville. In terms of geostrategic value its oil and gas accounts for 40 per cent of Europe’s and 30 per cent of the US energy supplies.
The region’s maritime domain is valuable to both the global and regional economies, as it offers potential for sea transportation due to the absence of chokepoints, as well as opportunities for fishing and mining. This factor holds significant value in Chinese strategic thinking; hence, the economic ties between Beijing and the region reflect the importance attached to it, as it aligns with China’s strategy to diversify its energy imports.
In spite of its importance, the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) region faces numerous maritime threats, highlighting the limited capabilities of GoG states to secure their waters. Piracy is a key component of maritime insecurity, while other “blue crimes” that threaten local economies, international energy supplies, and global shipping include illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, illicit transnational trafficking of weapons and narcotics, and armed robbery at sea.
Such maritime insecurities—threaten both Chinese investments and, more broadly, its commercial interests reliant on maritime transport links. Africa, the
continent alone hosts over 10,000 Chinese firms, one million Chinese immigrants, and approximately 260,000 Chinese workers, mostly working on the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative related projects. To counter these threats, the PLA Navy (PLAN) has maintained an active presence through anti-piracy measures since 2008.
Beijing has been involved in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Guinea and has conducted security exchanges with countries in the region. Broadly, the
strategic location of the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) coupled with its proximity and potential for maritime trade with neighbouring countries, explains China’s push into this coastal area. This aligns with its broader ambitions to secure energy interests and expand its influence in Africa.
Beijing’s Maritime Aspirations
In 2022, Army Gen. Stephen J. Townsend, commander of US Africa Command,
testified at the House Armed Services Committee hearing on national security challenges and US military activities in the Middle East and Africa. He mentioned that China was actively seeking a military naval base in Africa on the Atlantic coast. For years, officials and media outlets have reported on China’s efforts to seek a military presence in West Africa, allowing it to access the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean.
Since
2021, US defence officials have warned that China is considering to build a naval base in the Central African nation of Equatorial Guinea’s mainland port of Bata. Bata’s is one of Equatorial Guinea’s largest ports and its location is strategically
positioned at the central point of the Gulf of Guinea coastline and benefiting from the proximity of Equatorial Guinea’s Bioko Island off the coast. This island could serve as a forward base for defensive assets in the event of an international crisis between the US and China. Regarding this Army Gen. Stephen J Townsend
stated, “They’re looking for a place where they can rearm and repair warships. If realised, that prospect would enable China to base warships from its expanding navy in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.” He added that a Chinese naval base in the Atlantic would be unsettling for US military interests, given the relatively short distance between Africa’s west coast and the US east coast. A base on Africa’s northern Atlantic coast could become China’s closest military facility to US national waters.
A
WSJ article in February 2024 published China’s plans for a military base in the Central African state of Gabon. Similarly, U.S. officials also claimed that China was attempting to seek out a military base in neighbouring Equatorial Guinea, at Bata port. China is already invested in multiple commercial ports along the coast of West Africa — such as Kribi port in Cameroon, Lekki Port in Nigeria, and Lome Port in Togo.
China’s anchoring influence
One, it must be noted that Chinese financing and construction of ports and related infrastructure, whether through aid or investment, indicate potential use by the PLA Navy. This is
supported by domestic Chinese law, which requires civilian ports to support the PLA Navy when needed. Financial ties from port construction and expansion fosters Beijing’s enduring relationships that align with its overseas basing ambitions. Hence, the larger the financial outlays for such projects, greater the leverage to request favours.
Two, for Beijing, a military presence in the Gulf of Guinea would allow the PLAN to expand beyond its current waters in the Indo-Pacific and Gulf of Aden into the Atlantic Ocean, opening the door for the Chinese military to the rest of the world. A
potential base in West Africa would allow the PLA to go on longer and more distant missions than is possible right now, as Chinese ships will be able to replenish, rest, and refuel at such secure locations.
Three, an Atlantic base would place the PLA Navy in
relative proximity to Europe, the Strait of Gibraltar, and key trans-Atlantic shipping lanes. A shift to the Atlantic would disadvantage the West, particularly the US, as it seeks to reconfigure its focus to the Indo-Pacific. The United States has been preoccupied with fighting wars that are largely counterterrorism in nature; thus, Beijing’s plans in the Atlantic would undermine Washington’s naval strategy.
Four, a
report by the Heritage Foundation authored by Brent Sadler highlights the importance of Ascension Island. Both the US and the UK maintain bases on Ascension Island in the Atlantic Ocean for sensitive missile testing, in addition to rocket test launches from Cape Canaveral, Florida. China’s sustained presence in the Gulf of Guinea would allow it to monitor these activities persistently. This is particularly significant for India, which has previously encountered Chinese surveillance vessels in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
A recent incident in
April 2024 involved the high-endurance Chinese surveillance vessel Xiang Yang Hong 01, anchored 600 miles west of the Andaman Islands in the middle of the Bay of Bengal. The vessel’s purpose was to validate ocean models for the future deployment of naval assets in the IOR, such as aircraft carriers. The Chinese PLA gathers data on ocean temperature, salinity, sound velocity, sediment characteristics, and the sea bottom profile in the IOR. It can be certain that India will face increasing maritime coercion from China in the coming years.
Five, it is important to note China’s use of naval statecraft as a framework. China has established an overseas naval base in Djibouti in 2017, and the CCP’s desire to acquire naval-basing rights is not new. In many cases, it has adopted a subtle approach: for example, China is known to send its warships to commercial ports it has invested in, developed, and operates, such as Piraeus (Greece), and Ream Naval Base (Cambodia). However, China’s efforts to facilitate trade and commercial operations often legitimise the need to secure its economic investments and resource access. This is likely to result in a consistent PLA naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea under the guise of protecting its legitimate interests.
Over the years, China’s maritime forces have become highly active, with increasing maritime deployments by the PLA Navy. It underscores China’s continued push for greater power projection and expanding global posture, with Africa playing a central role in this strategy. The evolving dynamics demand careful monitoring, as they will continue to shape the geopolitics of the Gulf of Guinea and the broader region.
Maritime security will remain a key driver of China’s actions as its interests, economic assets, and activities increasingly extend beyond its borders. This shift significantly influences Beijing’s foreign policy, transitioning from an economics-driven approach to one that is security-led. Countries in the Indo-Pacific, including India, should closely observe the playbook China has adopted.
The writer is the Head of Strategic Studies Programme at the Centre for National Security Studies (CNSS), Bengaluru. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.
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