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Why Taliban are turning against Pakistan – Firstpost

Why Taliban are turning against Pakistan – Firstpost



Over the past 18 months, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has significantly 
increased its terror attacks on Pakistan’s armed forces, reportedly killing three to four SSG commandos daily. In recent weeks, however, these attacks have intensified. This escalation began after Pakistani air raids targeted suspected TTP hideouts deep within Afghan territory in 
Paktika province, killing 46 civilians. These airstrikes were carried out in response to a series of Taliban attacks launched to avenge the killing of their minister, 
Khaleel Haqqani, on 11 December, allegedly by the ISKP (Islamic State Khorasan Province). The ongoing turbulence and conflict along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border is likely to dominate regional geopolitics for at least the next ten to twelve years.

Ties Gone Sour

Pakistan’s ISI has nurtured and strengthened the Taliban as a robust proxy over the past 30 years. During the previous 20 years, while fighting against US forces, the Taliban found sanctuaries, ideological and logistical support, and favourable jihadist networks in Pakistan. The Taliban also strengthened its presence in several prominent Pakistani cities, such as Karachi, Quetta, and Peshawar. Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba fought alongside the Taliban against US forces.

At its core, the ties between the Taliban and Pakistan’s jihadist ecosystem, with the ISI as a central entity, are organic. The Taliban subscribes to extremist Deobandi Islam, which holds significant influence in Pakistan’s state, society, and culture. The Taliban has strong ties with various Deobandi terrorist outfits, such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Harkat-ul-Ansar, Harakat-ul-Jihad Al Islami (HuGI), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Sipah-e-Sahaba. Many of these groups, particularly the Harkat network, were supported by the ISI and CIA to fight the Soviets.

Many senior Taliban leaders, such as Mullah Omar and the Haqqanis, have studied at historic Deobandi seminaries in Pakistan, including Madrasa-e-Binoria, Madarsa-e-Haqqania, and Akhora Khatak Madrasa, alongside prominent Pakistani jihadists like Masood Azhar, the founder of Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Maulana Fazlur Rahman Khalil, founder of HuGI.

In 2021, following the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan and the humiliating defeat of the US, Pakistan’s Interior Minister 
Sheikh Rashid stated that the Taliban’s rise to power would lead to the creation of a “new block” and elevate the geopolitical significance of the region. Prime Minister Imran Khan equated the Taliban’s victory to Afghans having broken the “shackles of slavery.” However, this historic bonhomie is rapidly declining and is expected to worsen in the future.

Sudden rise in Af-Pak hostilities

Before delving deeper into the dynamics of the Af-Pak conflict, it must be noted that a stable, robust, and independent Afghanistan, governed by a functional government, is antithetical to Pakistan’s strategic interests. Pakistan’s strategic community has always viewed Afghanistan as a backyard essential for providing ‘
strategic depth’ against India due to its narrow width. Kabul can best serve this purpose only by being a satellite state of Pakistan, governed by Islamabad’s jihadist proxies.

Before the civil war, the pro-Soviet Afghan government maintained strong ties with India, a close ally of the USSR. This equation fitted well with India’s strategic calculations premised on Chanakya’s 
Mandala theory. However, Pakistan always felt alarmed by the enemies on its eastern and western flanks. Soviet intervention and the resultant civil war offered Pakistan excellent opportunities to raise jihadist proxies in Afghanistan, thereby strengthening its strategic footprint. Islamabad successfully achieved this by nurturing a range of Mujahideen groups and, ultimately, the Taliban.

However, the fundamental friction points have continued to exist. After its ascension to power in 1996, the Taliban refused to accept the sanctity of the Durand Line, the colonial-era border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Durand Line remains an emotive issue in Afghanistan, as it divides Pashtuns on both sides of the border. Despite Pakistan’s strenuous attempts to dissolve Afghanistan’s tribal identity into a uniform Islamic identity that aligns with Pakistan on religious grounds, bypassing territorial disputes, Afghanistan’s strong tribal traits and nationalist impulses always resurge after the ousting of foreign powers.

Following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, it has attempted to placate the broader nationalist constituency by appealing to nationalist sentiments. Furthermore, the Taliban is transitioning to a stable and functional government, which requires reducing its over-reliance on Pakistan and hedging its bets by exploring alliances and friendships beyond Islamabad.

The TTP, Pakistan’s most prominent security headache, has launched an armed struggle against the Pakistani state. In 2024, the TTP claimed 1,758 attacks, killing 1,441 Pakistani soldiers, including many of Pakistan’s elite SSG commandos. Allegedly, the TTP has ties with Baloch rebel groups, making life difficult for Pakistan in Balochistan. It is also reported to enjoy the Taliban’s patronage. Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, the TTP has found safe sanctuaries and logistical support in Afghanistan. Former ISI chief Asad Durrani has stated that the Haqqani Network harbours the TTP. Islamabad suspects Indian involvement in the TTP’s activities.

The TTP, primarily active in Pakistan’s KPK region, has many Pashtun cadres with kinship ties to Pashtuns across the border in Afghanistan. The Taliban has shown reluctance to take action against the TTP despite Pakistan’s repeated requests. The Taliban does not wish to disrupt its equilibrium with the TTP, fearing that doing so would empower the ISKP, the Taliban’s arch-rival.

The Haqqani network, once Pakistan’s pet protégé and a trusted proxy, is now at loggerheads with the ISI. The Taliban suspects the Pakistani army’s involvement in the killing of Khalil Haqqani by the ISKP. The Taliban alleges that Pakistan is harbouring the ISKP. Reportedly, under the ISI’s patronage, ISKP training centres are operating in Balochistan. In January 2024, the ISKP killed numerous Taliban officials, including a highly publicised mass execution of 20 Taliban members.

Additionally, Pakistan has started supporting the National Resistance Front (NRF), the Taliban’s primary adversary, which comprises former Afghan army veterans. The NRF’s headquarters are based in Tajikistan, a country that does not recognise the Taliban. The ISI chief, Asim Malik, recently visited Tajikistan, a move widely interpreted as part of Pakistan’s support for the NRF against the Taliban. Furthermore, in this context, the ISKP’s outreach in Central Asia and its recruitment of Tajiks align strategically. After the Crocus City Hall attack, Russian agencies suspected the involvement of Tajik migrant workers influenced by the ISKP’s propaganda and radicalisation.

If TTP attacks persist, Pakistan will likely have no choice but to resort to massive retaliation, as its army is under tremendous pressure to demonstrate its ability to safeguard national interests and protect infrastructure projects, particularly the CPEC initiatives in Balochistan, from terror attacks. Moreover, the army must project a confident stance to a populace already agitated and resentful of its overwhelming influence, which is perceived as undermining democracy in Pakistan.

Although Pakistan suspects an Indian hand in the TTP’s attacks, following the Balakot airstrikes, it cannot afford to provoke India through aggressive posturing or large-scale terror attacks. Such actions would likely invite harsh retaliation from Prime Minister Modi’s government, known for its uncompromising stance on security issues.

On the other Western front, the Taliban’s military weakness, struggling economy and lack of strategic allies leave it highly vulnerable. Furthermore, as the Taliban transitions into a stable government in the future, its stance on the Durand Line is expected to harden, which could have disastrous consequences for Pakistan’s internal security. The Pakistani establishment is already grappling with the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement and the secessionist insurgency in Balochistan. An intensification of Pashtun resentment would represent an ultimate nightmare scenario.

That said, with its aggressive posture and raids in Afghanistan, Pakistan aims to crush the Pashtun movement before it spirals out of control.

Conclusion

Finally, with regard to India, it is important to note that Pakistan’s vulnerabilities on its western front weaken its position and capabilities in Kashmir. The Taliban’s recent outreach to Russia, China, and India has further heightened Islamabad’s concerns. However, there is little room for complacency, as the TTP remains a hardcore Deobandi terrorist group with strong links to Kashmir-centric organisations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

Significantly, the TTP includes many former Jaish cadres who defected after General Musharraf’s perceived betrayal of the jihadists when he aligned with the Americans in the Global War on Terror. The TTP espouses an extremist ideology that poses a fundamental threat to a free, secular, and democratic country like India.

Moreover, if Pakistan strengthens ISKP to counter the TTP and the Taliban, it will further exacerbate India’s security concerns. ISKP is actively seeking to use India as a fertile recruitment ground and as a stage for its Islamist agenda. These developments suggest that Pakistan is edging closer to potential disintegration or failure as a state.

As Pakistan’s trajectory towards state failure accelerates, it creates a vacuum that Islamist actors are likely to fill, imposing their medieval mindsets and archaic values on the region.

The author is a Cornell University graduate in public affairs, bachelors from St Stephen’s College, Delhi and has done his PhD on Jaish-e-Mohammad. He is a policy analyst specialising in counterterrorism, Indian foreign policy and Afghanistan-Pakistan geopolitics. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.



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